A Reading of the New Turkish Security Doctrine (2026)

 

The outcomes of the first meeting of the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) in 2026, and its subsequent final communique, represent a watershed moment in the trajectory of Ankara’s foreign and security policy. These results indicate that Turkey has updated its threat perceptions, leading to a comprehensive “re-engineering” of the Turkish national security concept.

These strategic shifts can be deconstructed into the following key pillars:

I. Transition from “Procedural Security” to “Comprehensive Existential Security”

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Council’s document is the elevation of the “Turkey Without Terrorism” (Türkiye illâ Terörsüz) concept from a mere operational-field slogan to an integrated “state project,” to which the document accorded ultimate priority.

In security theory, this shift reflects an integration of three security levels: Hard Security (military), Societal Security (internal stability), and Developmental Security (economic prosperity). The new Turkish approach adopts the principle of “Transborder Security,” also known as “Forward Defense,” whereby Ankara seeks to protect its national security far beyond its geographical borders. This explains the organic link established in the document between national security and active engagement in three spheres of influence: Asia, Europe, and Africa.

II. The Duality of Deterrence and Diplomacy

The outcomes demonstrate a clear adoption of a strategy that combines two apparent opposites: “military decisiveness” and “political initiative.” Academically, this falls under the concept of “Coercive Diplomacy” or effective deterrence. While Turkey emphasizes the continuity of preemptive operations against organizations it classifies as terrorist, it links this hard power to a singular political objective: “stability.” This doctrine establishes the legitimacy of Turkish foreign intervention by justifying it not as an expansionist ambition but as a preventive necessity to preserve national security.

III. Regional Files Analysis

• The Syrian File: The emphasis on “Syrian territorial integrity” and the rejection of “partitioning maps” reflects an existential concern for Turkey. Ankara recognizes that any separatist entity on its southern border is not merely a security threat but a “time bomb” threatening Turkey’s own demography and geography.

• Gaza: In the Gaza file, Turkey seeks to solidify its image as a “normative power.” By emphasizing “reconstruction” and partnership in international mechanisms, Ankara aims to secure a seat at the table for “Day After” arrangements. This grants Turkey influence in the Eastern Mediterranean through humanitarian and political gateways, rather than just military ones.

• Iran (Regional Security Interdependence): The Turkish vision underscores Iranian domestic stability as a pillar of regional security, reflecting a deep awareness of the need to maintain the “balance of power” in the Middle East. Despite historical competition with Iran, Turkey recognizes that chaos in Tehran would create a geopolitical vacuum that international powers or separatist movements might fill, inevitably leading to a “domino effect” impacting Turkey—particularly if Iranian Kurds were to obtain a region for statehood.

• The Horn of Africa: The document’s commitment to Somalia signifies that Turkey no longer limits its scope to its immediate neighborhood. Instead, it is building alliances across international trade routes and the Red Sea, bolstering its leverage within both regional and international systems.

Conclusion: Shifts in Turkey’s Functional Role in 2026

From a reading of the 2026 security document, we can conclude the following shifts:

1. Stability-Broker Image: Turkey is transitioning from being a “party to a conflict” to a “guarantor of stability,” presenting itself as an indispensable power for crisis resolution in Ukraine, Gaza, and Somalia.

2. Redrawing the Map of Interests: There is a relative decline in the intensity of rhetoric regarding traditional files (such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus) in favor of humanitarian-strategic files (Gaza and Africa). This suggests that Ankara feels a relative stabilization in the former and has begun directing its surplus power toward new arenas to maximize influence.

3. Security Pragmatism: The common thread among these orientations is “pragmatism.” Turkey in 2026 is not driven by the purely ideological or Islamist motives seen during the Arab Spring; rather, it is guided by strict national security parameters aimed at preventing the spillover of crises and leveraging international contradictions to serve national sovereignty.

Offensive Selective Intervention: The New U.S. Defense Doctrine (2026)

 

A careful examination of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) reveals that the administration has consolidated and evolved several traditional strategic principles. However, it has fundamentally reassessed and redefined threats to national security through a multi-layered and prioritized framework, as follows:

I. The Primacy of "Expanded" National Security

For the first time, domestic security is organically integrated into the U.S. Defense Strategy, designated as the "First Line of Effort." The strategy outlines the foundations for this through the deployment of the "Golden Dome" missile and air defense system, as well as efforts to combat illegal migration and narcotics.

More significantly, the strategy merges national security with the defense of American interests across the Western Hemisphere by adopting the "Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine." This corollary revitalizes the classical Monroe Doctrine (preventing foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere) but in a more offensive iteration:

1. Classifying border security and the fight against drug cartels as direct military missions (designating cartels as terrorist organizations).

2. Ensuring absolute control over strategic waterways such as the Panama Canal, Greenland, and the Gulf of Mexico (which the document renames the "Gulf of America," following the executive order issued by President Trump in his second term).

3. Preempting any Chinese or Russian influence within the United States' "backyard."

II. Reassessing Geopolitical Priorities

Since World War II, a primary American objective has been maintaining unrestricted access to vital regions and ensuring a balanced political system that guarantees influence in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East (specifically the Gulf). Consequently, the U.S. has not hesitated to launch military campaigns to protect these core interests.

While Europe and East Asia are vital due to the presence of other Great Powers, the Middle East has remained significant because of Israel's security and the presence of oil, a critical natural resource for global powers. Historically, Europe was the most important of these three; the U.S. maintained an "Europe First" policy even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and throughout the Cold War.

In the current Defense Strategy, the Trump administration reshuffles these priorities, adopting a strictly selective approach to global threats, manifested in the following hierarchy:

• China as the Primary Front: The adopted strategy is "Deterrence by Denial," focusing on fortifying the "First Island Chain" to prevent Chinese maritime expansion. The goal is not "containment" in the classical sense or direct military confrontation, but creating a "balance of power" that allows for "negotiating from a position of strength," reinforcing the Trumpian principle of "Peace through Strength."

• Russia and Europe (Burden Shifting): * Russia is viewed as a "containable" threat rather than an existential one like China.

  • The burden is shifted to European allies, who must assume responsibility for their own security, the war in Ukraine, and its subsequent reconstruction.

  • A new spending benchmark has been imposed on NATO allies (5% of GDP), thereby transferring the conventional defense burden. The U.S. provides the nuclear umbrella and limited support, but Europe is responsible for its own theater.

• The Middle East and Iran:

  • The strategy references "decisive military operations" that resulted in the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program and emphasizes the necessity of containing Iran.

  • It aims to empower regional allies to deter Iran and its proxies, support Israel, and enhance cooperation with Gulf states by integrating them further into the Abraham Accords.

  • Israel is often referred to as the "Model Ally" because it defends itself independently.

III. Strengthening the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

The strategy calls for a comprehensive national mobilization and an industrial "call to arms" equivalent to the mobilization of the last century that led the U.S. to victory in the World Wars and the Cold War. The objective is to renew and secure the defense industrial base by enhancing domestic capabilities, supporting non-traditional suppliers, and reviving the American spirit of innovation.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the strategic documents—namely the 2026 National Defense Strategy and the 2025 National Security Strategy—do not indicate a desire for American withdrawal from the world. Instead, they aim to establish the principle of "Offensive Selective Intervention" to protect only direct interests, while abandoning the role of a "Global Policeman" responsible for "free" collective security.

The "Sevres Syndrome": Why Turkey Fears Chaos in Iran

The recent clashes in Aleppo have coincided with security tensions in Iran, sparked by confrontations between Iranian security forces and protesters, particularly in the Kurdish-majority western regions of the country.

In Syria, the Turkish political and military leadership (the Office of the Speaker of Parliament and the Ministry of Defense) has expressed an explicit readiness to provide operational support to the Syrian government in its engagements against the "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF) in Aleppo. The Turkish position is anchored in the principle of "Syrian territorial integrity" and the rejection of military dualism (the presence of two armed forces), while emphasizing the necessity of implementing the March 10, 2025, Agreement as the reference framework for future engagement.

Regarding the situation in Iran, Omer Celik, the spokesperson for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), stated: "Turkey does not wish to see the spread of chaos in Iran, despite some issues between society and the government." Celik emphasized that "foreign intervention will lead to worse consequences, and the intervention incited by Israel, in particular, will lead to greater crises."

Undoubtedly, the Turkish perspective on regional shifts is driven primarily by Turkish national security interests and, secondarily, by the impact of these shifts on Turkish influence in the region. Alongside material determinants, Turkish threat perceptions stem from a collective memory saturated with suspicion and wariness toward the outside world, shaped by painful historical experiences, resulting in what is known as the "Sèvres Syndrome."

The memories of the Treaty of Sèvres resonate deeply within the Turkish collective consciousness. History and experience have forged a deep-seated conviction among the Turkish elite—both secular and Islamist—that Western powers have never abandoned their schemes to partition Anatolia. They believe these powers consistently seek to support minorities—specifically the Kurds—to undermine the state from within, continuing the objectives set by the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres that dismantled the Ottoman Empire.

This syndrome has shaped a "Security Culture" based on several key pillars:

• A. Fear of Partition: The "secessionist threat" sits at the apex of Turkish threat perceptions. Consequently, the Kurdish issue and its extensions in Syria are not viewed as a traditional terrorism file, but as an "ontological" (existential) threat to the identity and survival of the state. This perception has evolved to include what Ankara calls the "Terror Corridor" in northern Syria and Iraq. Turkish military doctrine holds that allowing a quasi-independent Kurdish entity on its southern border is not merely a tactical security threat, but a "geopolitical encirclement" aimed at isolating Turkey from the Middle East and tearing its internal demographic fabric.

• B. Suspicion of Alliances: Even as a NATO member, Turkey deals with its Western allies (especially following the 2016 coup attempt) with extreme caution. It interprets any Western support for Kurdish units in Syria as part of a "grand conspiracy" targeting Turkish territorial integrity. The failed coup of July 15, 2016, constituted a "second foundational moment" for the Turkish Republic. The leadership in Turkey read the Western hesitation to condemn the coup in its early hours as tangible evidence confirming the "Sèvres Syndrome," leading to the merging of "internal threats" and "external threats" into a single category labeled the "Battle for Survival."

• C. Priority of Internal Security: The entirety of Turkish foreign policy is engineered based on the requirements of maintaining the "unity of the central state." This is the primary driver justifying preemptive military intervention in northern Syria and Iraq to prevent the emergence of any geographically contiguous Kurdish entity, which is viewed as a "dagger" in Anatolia's southern flank.

Consequently, recent developments in which Kurds have played a central role have fueled Turkish fears regarding the collapse of the regime and the disintegration of Iranian geopolitics. Such a vacuum could allow armed Kurdish factions (such as PJAK and the KDP)—which reports suggest receive external intelligence support—to establish an autonomous entity in western Iran.

Based on the above, chaos in Iran constitutes a complex security dilemma for Turkey. The potential collapse of central authority in Tehran is not viewed as an inevitable geopolitical opportunity, but rather as a direct threat to Turkish national security. From the Turkish strategic perspective, this scenario would establish geographical contiguity between Kurdish influence zones in northeastern Syria, northern Iraq, and the Iranian heartland. Turkey considers this extension a strategic encirclement of its southern and eastern borders by hostile, Israeli-backed entities, posing a threat to Turkish territorial integrity that far exceeds the danger of traditional competition with the Iranian state.