Leila Nicolas PhD
Introduction
Till now, there
is no internationally agreed definition as to which groups constitute
minorities. The "United Nations Minorities Declaration" refers to
minorities as groups based on national or ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic identity, and confirms that States should protect their existence[2].
Minorities in Arab Levant, like in all regions of the world
"continue to face serious threats, discrimination and racism, and are
frequently excluded from taking part fully in the economic, political, social
and cultural life available to the majorities in the countries or societies
where they live.” [3]
Minorities in
Arab world are not only religious; there are ethnic, linguistic, tribal
minorities forming a mosaic of ethnic, national and religious communities in each
state. The fate of minorities in the Arab region is one of the important
problems that face Arab states since the Arab Uprisings which led to civil wars
and rise of extremism and terrorism. However, this problem is not new; minorities
have been subjected to injustice, discrimination and forced displacements for
more than four or five centuries ago.
Nearly a century
after they rose on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, Arab Levant states have
failed to unite their communities and form nations with common goals and
aspirations. Through all their history, those societies have been torn by
ceaseless internal and external troubles, political and economic
discrimination, revolts, civil wars and military coups.
Research and
Methodology
This research seeks to fill the research gap that exists
regarding the perceptions of the minorities towards what has been recalled as
solutions for their crisis after the rise of extremism. Most of the
publications about minorities in the Middle East or the Arab world in general try
to tell about the hard conditions they are living, their status; as well as
their exodus after the massacres done by Jihadists like Al Qaeda, ISIS, Al-
Nusra front and others. Little - if any-
tried to seek how people belonging to minority groups see their future, what
are their aspirations, and which type of political systems they prefer. No one
has ever asked them about their perceptions towards what has been published or
leaked as solutions for the states' crisis in the region.
Who are the
minorities in the Arab Levant? How can we define their collective history?
How did their conditions
change with the continuous developments in the region?
What are their
rights and status in power, constitutions and education in each of the
countries that constitute the Arab Levant?
How do they see their future in the region? And what are
their perceptions towards diverse scenarios and projects, being suggested by global
and regional powers in the region?
Trying to bridge the gap and answer these questions, this
study utilizes secondary sources about minorities in the Middle East, and
relies on surveys and interviews with persons belonging to minority groups
living in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine.
In this research, I argue that:
1. The future of
minorities in the Arab Levant is affected by the balance
of powers between global and regional players in the Middle East. Global (USA, Russia) and regional powers' (Turkey,
Iran and Saudi Arabia) policies or what can be called the "Clash of
Titans" in the Middle East will shape the future of the whole region and
the fate of minorities.
2. Syria’s
geostrategic importance makes it the dominating changer of the Middle East. It
means that the future of Syria shall determine the future of the region. The
Syrian crisis could spill over to Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. On the contrary,
the geographic position of Iraq (surrounded by powerful states, and by desert
on the Syrian - Iraqi border) lessens the ability of the Iraqi dynamics from
spreading to the neighborhood.
3. In each Scenario drawing the future systems,
minorities' rights and future will depend on the ability of the regional and
global powers to prevent worst scenarios and promote good ones. It is power
politics that will shape the minorities' future and rights in the region.
4. Minorities in Syria and Lebanon have
learned from the experiences of minorities in Iraq, so they have taken a
decision to defend
themselves and their existence. Therefore, the attempts to persecute and displace them will fail, and they
will not leave their homelands even persecuted. Uprooting will fail exactly as
the previous attempts by Turkish Ottomans to sweep out minorities at the
beginning of the twentieth century, through Genocides.
Minority rights'
in the Arab Levant will be discussed in this paper. In the first part, we will
give a brief historical background of the minority presence and status in the
political and social systems since the ottoman rule till the Arab uprisings. In
the second part, we will draw a sketch of the minorities' status at the legal,
power and demographic levels in each of the countries that constitute the Arab
Levant; Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine; emphasizing on the first
three states due to their security issues and turbulence. The third part will
reveal the findings of our survey that was conducted with 550 people belonging
to minority groups in these countries. Finally, we conclude trying to predict
the future of minorities in this region, based on each of the scenarios that have
been evoked lately.
Part I- Historical background
Arab Levant
states share many characteristics; they were subjected to ottoman rule, and all
- except Lebanon- have a wide Muslim majority, with diverse communities and
minorities.
Politically, Palestine
suffers of occupation, Jordan is a kingdom that has extensive Palestinian
refugee population, and Lebanon has its unique - style power sharing system
based on religious and sectarian balance. Before 2011, Syria was ruled by Alawites'
minority much resented by the Sunni majority. Syria is now witnessing a bloody
civil war, which caused 250,000 deaths and leading over 3
million to flee to Syria's immediate
neighbors Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, plus 6.5 million are internally displaced within Syria[4].
In Iraq, the
Sunni minority which ruled until the fall of Saddam Hussein was not ready to
concede power to the Shia majority which emerged after US occupation on 2003,
leading to a civil sectarian strife between 2006- 2008, then to resurgence of
Islamic extremist groups like Al-Qaeda and Islamic state of Iraq. Persecutions
of Iraqi Christians started on 2003; lead to their exodus and seeking refuge in
Syria and Lebanon.
A-Minorities during the Ottoman rule
The
minorities’ issue in the Arab world started eventually during the rule of
Ottoman Empire that created the "Millet system" starting in 1454,
right after the conquest of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmet II. The first Millet to
be constituted was the Orthodox Millet, followed by the Armenian Millet in 1461
and by the Jewish Millet at the end of the 15th century[5].
However, Millet System was not a “uniformly adopted system” but, on the
contrary, was a “series of ad hoc arrangements made over the years, which gave
each of the major religious communities a degree of legal autonomy and
authority with the acquiescence of the Ottoman state.”[6]
It was based on "separation
of the main religious communities from each other and on the recognition of
each denomination as legal entity with specific communal ‘segmental’- rights
and privileges"[7]. That
system classified minority groups into two categories:
a- The followers
of monotheistic religions or "people of the Book"- (Ahl Zimma) which
were Christians, Jews and Sabeans- had the right to profess their religion,
provided that they recognized the primacy of Islam and their inferior role
vis-à-vis the Muslim population.[8]
This status granted Zimmis the right of residence in return for taxes, and
regarded the non- Muslims' residents in the territory of Islam as second-class
citizens[9]. Those
were prohibited from holding public religious ceremonies, raising their voices
loudly when praying and even from ringing their church bells loud. It was not
allowed to build new churches, synagogues, convent, hermitage or cell in towns
or cities of Dar al- Islam (Muslim lands). When these injunctions were
disobeyed, Muslim leaders were authorized to treat the offenders as dwellers in
Dar al-Harb (non-Muslim lands/lands of war) and not as Ahl Zimma in Dar al-Salam
(Muslim lands/ lands of peace).
b-
Polytheists and idolaters were on the contrary recognized as inferior and as
such condemned to annexation to Islam or to slavery. Shia Muslims were
considered apostates, so they were persecuted most of the times, and had to
choose between three choices: convert to Sunni Islam, convert to Christianity
to be treated as Zimmis, or being killed as apostates. In 1513 on the orders of
Sultan Selim I, 40,000 Shiaa were massacred throughout Eastern Anatolia on
suspicion of being Safavid spies or potential traitors[10].
The Protection
system
From
the late eighteenth century onward, discrimination and persecution of
minorities lead to chaos and calls for more justice. Western powers used this
to declare their protection of minorities.
At
its origin, this protection was limited to Ottoman Christians and Jews, locally
recruited for service of the foreigner states. The individual so employed was
given a warrant, issued by the Ottoman government at the request of and through
a foreign consulate called 'berat', whose terms resembled diplomatic immunity,
including some privileges like exemption from Ottoman criminal jurisdiction, as
well as reduced customs levies and other commercial privileges[11].
Later
on, this protection developed and Russians declared protection on the Orthodox (Rum),
France protected the Maronites (in Mount Lebanon) and Catholics, Britain
protected Druze in Lebanon and Prussia competed with Britain for the protection
of the small Protestant communities and occasionally extended it to the
numerically more important Jews.
In
order to forestall more drastic intervention, the Ottoman government issued the
Reform Decree of 1856, which proclaimed the equality of all—Muslim and
non-Muslim alike, but it was just a utopia. At that time, the Millet system
changed. The 'Gȕlhane' or 'Tanzimat' Charter proclaimed on November 3, 1839
announced the equality between all citizens. It was regarded the opening period
of reforms, which stretched until 1860s.[12]
Young Turk era:
When the Ottoman state failed to defend its territory and
sovereignty, the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress, the revolutionary
rulers who gained power in a coup, adapted a program of national homogenization
i.e. Turkification. As a result of this policy, the Young Turk government
launched a series of initiatives which marginalized, isolated, incarcerated,
altered borders, deported, forcefully assimilated, exchanged populations,
massacred and conducted genocide against its non-Turkish minority populations[13].
A- Turkification:
The
new ottoman rule, used Islam
and Ottoman Turkish language as cornerstones in - what they called - 'defending
and homogenization of the empire territories'.
Arab
Levant minorities resisted Turkification. Arabs in the Arab land continued to
speak Arabic. Lebanese Christians defied Turkification by initiating and hiding
prints in their monasteries. Coptic and Syriac were retained in liturgy alone.
To a much greater degree than any other region, these lands were linguistically
unified. Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and many Syrian Christians, along with the
Jews, wrote in a large variety of different languages in their respective
liturgical scripts.
b-
Genocides
From
1900 to 1923, various Turkish regimes killed from 3,500,000 to over 4,300,000
Armenians, Greeks, Nestorians, and other Christians.[14] Suffering deportations, famine, exposure, war,
genocide, and massacres, millions of minorities in the Levant; Armenians,
Assyrians, and other Christians died.
- Armenians:
- Armenians:
In their highest councils,
Turkish leaders decided to exterminate every Armenian in the country, whether a
front-line soldier or pregnant woman, famous professor or high bishop,
important businessman or ardent patriot; All 2,000,000 of them[15].
This lead to the Armenian Genocide.
- Assyrians:
Between 1914 and
1920, the Assyrian civilian population was forcibly relocated and massacred by
the Ottoman army, together with other armed and allied Muslim peoples,
including Kurds, Chechens and Circassia's forces. Estimates on the overall
death toll have varied. Providing detailed statistics of the various estimates
of the Churches' population after the genocide, David Gaunt accepts the figure
of 275,000 deaths as reported by the Assyrian delegation at the Treaty of
Lausanne and ventures that the death toll would be around 300,000 because of
uncounted Assyrian-inhabited areas[16].
B- Creation of the Arab states
After World War
I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Arabs failed to build modern states, with
a separate national civil identity, and to develop political-social-economic policies
that would ensure reasonable equality for all citizens, economic growth, and
prosperity.
The 1920 Treaty
of Sevres, which ended up the war between the Ottomans and the Allies, granted
immediate independence to the Hejaz (the Saudi peninsula), Armenia, as well as
eventual statehood to Kurdistan. These arrangements collapsed three years
later, however, when Turkish forces defeated the Allies. A renegotiated
settlement, the Treaty of Lausanne, ended the dreams of a Greater Kurdistan and
Greater Armenia, setting the borders of modern Turkey.[17]
Immediately
after the creation of the Arab states, even before they attained full
independence, two visions competed concerning state-building and the identity
of their citizens: the Islamic vision and the secular-national vision:
§ The
Islamic vision posits a state based on religion, its governance and social
structure determined by Sharia.
§ Secular-Arab-national visualized a state based
on Arab nationality.
Christian
thinkers and elites strongly supported the second one. They pioneered Arab
nationalism, as they regarded it the best choice for Arab non- Muslim
minorities to be citizens with full rights regardless of their ethnic or
religious origins, and in its main goal and objective to put the Christians, who
were scattered throughout the Arab states and for the most part saw themselves
as Arabs, within the majority community.
Except for
Lebanon, that emphasized a consensus formula of the power-sharing between
religions, the new Arab states - upon their establishment - didn't make an
effort to tackle the problem of different cultural identities.
The first constitutions
formulated in Syria and Iraq in the 1920s and 1930s, for example, and under the
influence of Britain and France, were relatively liberal and granted equality
to citizens without connection to their religion, ostensibly. Besides, all the
aforementioned constitutions affirmed that each state was part of the Arab
world and worked for its unity, and that Islam was the religion of the state.
C- Military coups
Reaching the
fifties and sixties of the twentieth century, and with the growing anger over
the inability of the active and powerful Arab countries to prevent the
formation of the State of Israel, added to bad socio-economic conditions and
increase in corruption etc., military coups purported in Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
Libya, and Sudan trying to remedy the problems of Arab societies.
The new military
regimes, in Syria and Iraq, promised to restore dignity of their peoples in the
Arab Israeli conflict, to step into modernization, economic and social reforms,
and public education. Yet, within a short time, it turned out they could not
fulfill their promises; instead their states further deteriorated into cruel
dictatorships marked by corruption, which is still endemic in the Arab states
and by domestic oppression and conflicts with neighbors.
Despite
their secular discourse, and the emphasis on Arab nationality, they were unable
to come up with a narrative that could unify the whole mosaic of ethnic, national,
and religious groups.
It is worth to
note that, while professing secularism; military regimes did not deny Islam. On
the contrary, they boosted Islamic education as a way of distracting the masses
from their military and economic failures. With most of the public clinging to
religion in the face of failed economic development and ongoing poverty,
Islam's influence grew in the seventies and the eighties of the twentieth
century.
D- The Lebanese civil war ( 1975-
1990) and aftermath
The
Lebanese War started as a fighting between Christian groups and Palestinian
forces, and quickly changed to a multifaceted civil war with sectarian and
religious aspects resulting in an estimated 250,000 causalities[18]. There was an exodus of almost one
million people from Lebanon as a result of the war[19], however there are no official
estimates of the religious affiliations of the Lebanese immigrants during war
and later on after the Ta'ef agreement.
E-Occupation of Iraq 2003
After the US
invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi civilian population has been subjected to horrific
levels of violence and terror. Iraq’s minority communities were caught between
the warring factions and their crisis was particularly acute. The very
existence of some of these groups in their ancient homeland was under threat.
Some
of these groups have lived in Iraq for two millennia or more. A huge exodus
took place. Minorities were specifically eradicated because of their faith and
ethnicity. Christians were at risk because of their faith. Islamist groups have
dubbed the Yezidi religion ‘impure’ and called for their destruction. For
Sabeans- Mandaeans, carrying weapons is a direct violation of their religious
laws, thus making it difficult for them to defend themselves.
All of Iraq’s
minority communities have suffered mass murder, abduction, ransoming, murder of
religious and civic leaders and individuals including children, in addition to
forced conversion to Islam using tactics such as: death threats, rape and
forced marriage[20].
Even before Arab
uprisings and the rise of ISIS, minorities in Iraq were facing difficulties in
all spheres of religious and public life, and many members of minorities in
Iraq find themselves effectively in ghettos as they are excluded from whole
areas of public life, and more than 4,000 Iraqi Christian families were forced
to leave their home town immediately, seeking refuge in other parts of Iraq or
in foreign countries, a report (2011) by Minority
Rights Group International revealed.[21]
F- Arab uprisings: Minorities'
Catastrophe
As
the revolution started in Syria, Christians and Alawites feared a similar
situation of Christians in Iraq where hundreds of thousands have either left or
fled to the northern part of the country due to violence linked to Islamic
extremism.
Very early in
Syria, demonstrators against Assad regime chanted “Christians to Beirut,
Alawites to 'tabout' (coffin)”[22].
This chant in addition to many other incidents against civilians belonging to
minority groups alluded to what many Syrian minorities fear might happen if the
Baath regime comes to an end.
As
the war continued its 5th year in Syria and still on, and the capture of three
Iraqi provinces by Islamic extremists (summer 2014); minorities continue to pay a heavy price in respect to
their rights; especially their right to life, their existence and exercise of
their beliefs. Entire minority communities, including Armenian Christians,
Chaldo-Assyrians, Sabean Mandaeans, Shabak, Turkmen and Yezidi, have been
uprooted from areas where they have been living for thousands of years. Women
have been the targets of particularly horrific forms of sexual and gender based
violence, including kidnapping, rape, forced marriage, sexual slavery and
trafficking.
Hundreds of Christian families, Yezidi
and other minorities joined the exodus of civilians leaving Mosul, with the UN
estimating that 500,000 people fled in the first week following the entry of
ISIS into the city. The remaining Christian families received an ultimatum to
either convert to Islam, pay jizya (a tribute levied on non- Muslims) or be
killed.
Extremists; like ISIS, al - Nusra
front and other Al Qaeda affiliated militias in Syria, imposed new rules on the
inhabitants of their captured territories, marked by the imposition of strict
interpretations of Sharia law, the silencing of all forms of opposition and the
destruction of any traces of minority culture and heritage.
In Mosul, Deir zour and al Raqqa,
ISIS issued orders mandating women to wear the veil and instructing them not to
leave the house unless accompanied by a man. Residents of all occupied areas
have been tried in self-styled Sharia courts for violating or opposing the
group’s ideology, with many sentenced to public executions and other
punishments.
In either Syria and Iraq,
Alawites, Kurds, Shia and Sunnis have developed their own armed groups and
recalled support from foreign troops, however marginalized minorities have
found themselves with little effective protection in that deteriorating
security environment.
Arab
uprisings and rise of extremism and terrorism reopened the file of the
minorities in Arab world again. In
this context, members of smaller minorities have been particularly targeted
for a variety of
reasons:
1- For ideological reasons; fundamentalist
groups aiming to bring an end to Iraq’s and Syria's religious diversity and to
establish a Sunni caliphate in the region.
2- Political reasons; minorities
in Syria have been seen as supporters of Assad regime, and both Christians and Yezidi
in Iraq were associated with the West and attacked as a result.
3- Militarily; minorities often
constitute ‘easy targets’, as they do not have their own militias.
4- Minority groups are
concentrated in strategic areas or oil-rich regions; like Baghdad, Kirkuk and Ninewa
etc. in Iraq, and Lattikia, Homs and Deir zour in Syria.
5-Rebel groups attack civilian
targets to increase sectarian hatred, mobilize jihadists, and undermine the
governments' abilities to maintain basic security in both Syria and Iraq.
Fortunately, Lebanon, as it was
during the Ottoman rule, still seen as haven for minorities in the Middle East.
The refuge of minorities from Ottoman persecution, constructed the Lebanese
diverse religious population, and today; it is still seen as the safest place
for religious freedom and protection of minorities.
Part
II- Status of minorities in each of the Five states[23]
A- Iraq
The ancient nation of Iraq was a
home to dozens of ethnic and religious minorities, who were severely affected after
the US- led invasion in 2003, the civil war (2006-2008), then after the advance
of ISIS fighters into large parts of Ninewa, Mosul and other provinces.
a-
Minorities' rights: legal framework
Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution drafted and approved on
15 October 2005, recognizes Islam as the official religion, mandates it to be a
source of legislation, and states that no law may be enacted contradicting the
established provisions of Islam.
As
for the religious minorities' rights; the constitution guarantees the full
rights and freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals such as
Christians, Yezidi, and Mandean Sabeans (Art.2).
b-
Minorities' Status in Power
Minorities have a
quota of the 328 seats in the Council of Representatives; the electoral law reserves
just 8 seats for members of minority groups: five for Christian candidates; one
for Yezidi; one for Sabean -Mandaean; and one for Shabak. The Iraqi Kurdistan
Parliament reserves 11 seats for minorities: five for Christians, five for
Turkmen, and one for Armenian.
In
the 2014 national parliamentary elections, six minority candidates won
parliamentary seats outside of the quota allocation, bringing total minority
representation to 14 seats.
c-
In Education
The government requires Islamic religious instruction in
public schools, but non-Muslim students are not required to participate. Ministry
of Education approved the inclusion of Syriac and Christian religious education
in the curricula of 152 public schools in Baghdad, Ninewa, and Kirkuk. Private
religious schools operate in the country, but must obtain a license from the
director general of private and public schools and pay annual fees.
The
constitution establishes Arabic and Kurdish as official state languages but
guarantees the right to educate minority children in their own languages, and
makes Turkmen and Syriac official languages in “the administrative units in
which they constitute density populations.”[24]
d-
Demography
There
is no accurate data about religious demography in Iraq due to violence,
terrorism, collective migrations, and governmental tracking capability. Following
ISIS incursions in 2014, 1.8 million people were displaced; the exact number of
religious minorities among those displaced remains unknown. ISIS abuses
disproportionately affected religious minorities, with between 100,000 and
200,000 Christians, an estimated 300,000 Yezidi, and several thousand Kakai's
displaced throughout the country. In the wake of this displacement, high
concentrations of those minorities now reside in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
According
to 2010 government statistics, the most recent official statistics available,
97% of the 32 million population are Muslims; the majority are Shia Muslims
constituting 60 to 65 % of the population predominantly Arabs but including
Turkmen, Shabak, Faili (Shia) Kurds, and others. Sunni Muslims make up 31 to 37
% of the population, with 18 to 20 % representing Sunni Kurds, 12 to 16 % Sunni
Arabs, and the remaining 1 to 2 % Sunni Turkmen. Minorities constitute approximately
3 % of the population, composed of Christians, Yezidi, Sabean-Mandaeans,
Bahais, Kakai's, and a very small number of Jews[25].
Christians
Christian
identity is not as homogeneous as some of the other Iraqi minority identities.
Many Christians not only consider themselves a religion, but also as part of
one of four distinct ethnicities as well; Chaldean, Assyrian, Armenian, or
Syriac[26].
Twenty years ago, there were
approximately 1.4 million Christians in Iraq.
After 2003, more than 50% of them
left the country. Before June 2014 and
the ISIS take of Ninewa and Mosul, only around 350,000 Christians were still based
in Iraq[27],
mostly in Baghdad, Mosul and the Ninewa plain, Kirkuk, Basra as well as the
three governorates in the Iraqi Kurdish Region.
Turkmen
Turkmen are a distinct ethnic group; range of between 500,000 and 600,000. Approximately 60%
of them are Sunni, just around 39 % are Shia and the remainder are Christians (
around 30,000) .Turkmen, as well as Kurds and Assyrians, were forcibly
displaced from their homes during Saddam Hussein rule, where the government
launched “Arabization” and “correction” campaigns and brought in Arab settlers
to replace them.
Approximately
85 % of Turkmen Iraqi population lived in the regions around Mosul, Kirkuk,
Erbil and Tel Afar; the rest are in Baghdad and smaller villages, such as Tuz
Khurmato[28],
with the largest concentration based in Kirkuk, and south as far as Wassit
governorate, south-east of Baghdad.[29]
Before
ISIS incursions in 2014, Turkmen were intimidated by
Kurdish and central government authorities, as well as by extra-judicial
militias, on religious and ethnic grounds as well as for their presence in the
disputed territories[30].
Shia Turkmen have been executed by ISIS fighters.[31]
Yezidi
Those are an ethno-religious
group indigenous to northern Mesopotamia. Yezidis is an ancient religion
present in the Middle East since approximately 4000 BC, based mainly in
northern Iraq, though some are also based in neighboring Syria and Turkey.
Even though they are ethnically
Kurdish, Yezidi are a distinct and independent religious community with their
own unique culture.[32]
This reportedly created conflict within the community and pressure from Kurdish
officials and Kurdish-identifying community members, as well as death threats.[33]
Because
of the violence from extremist groups, there have been no Yezidi left in Mosul
since 2007.[34]
Due to a misinterpretation of their religion, Islamic militants regard Yezidi
as heretical, and "devil worshippers" so they have been regularly
targeted with violence as a result.[35]
Unlike Christians, or the "People of the Book" who can pay a
tax to stay in their homes, the Yezidi can only choose between conversion,
expulsion, or execution.[36]
Prior to June 2014, the 2005
population of 700,000 had reportedly fallen to approximately 500,000, with
thousands of families having fled to Syria, Jordan and other states.[37]
Other
Minorities
Like
other groups; Mandean -Sabeans, Shabak, Baha'is,
Faili Kurds, and Kakai's (Yaresan) have been targeted because of their ethnic
or religious identity and forced to leave their homes as majority communities
try to create religious and ethnically homogeneous enclaves.
Mandean- Sabeans estimated 70,
000 worldwide and most lived in Iraq before the 2003 war; less than 5, 000 were
still there before ISIS incursions[38]. Like
all other minorities, Sabeans do not
intermarry and their beliefs are considered heretical by the extremist groups
who target them. However, it was not only extremists who targeted them; they
have a reputation as being wealthier than ordinary Iraqis because many formerly
traded in alcohol, jewelry and other profitable businesses. This has made them
the target of criminal gangs conducting kidnappings for ransom.[39]
Kaka’i, also known as Ahl-e Haqq
or Yarsan, estimated between 110,000 and 200,000 in Iraq, mainly south-east of
Kirkuk and in the Ninewa plain near Daquq and Hamdaniya, with others also based
in Diyala, Erbil and Suleimaniya.[40]
The
Shabak, with a population of 200,000–500,000 (2010 estimates) residing -mainly-
in Mosul, have been targeted by Radical Islamists, Al-Qaeda (2006- 2008) and
ISIS (2014- ). The Baha'i religion is still not
recognized by the majority of Middle East governments and they have no right to
express their identity.
B-Syria
The brutal and destructive nature
of the conflict has caused severe catastrophe for all civilians, majority and
minority communities alike. Alawites are among the groups most in danger of
violent persecution by armed opposition groups due to their perceived
association with the Assad regime, although -in general- minority political
allegiances are divided between support and opposition. [41]
a-
Minorities' rights: Legal Framework
Syria is considered a secular state although the
constitution requires the president be Muslim and stipulates that Islamic
jurisprudence is a major source of legislation. The 2012 constitution confirms
that "the State respects all religions" and provides "freedom to
exercise of all religions". The constitution grants freedom of faith and
religious practice (Article 35) provided that religious rites “do not disturb
the public order” (article 3). There is no official legal punishment under
Syrian law for apostasy of Islam, or any other religion.
The constitution also ensures “the civil status of the
religious communities is protected and respected,” and “the citizens are equal
in rights and duties, without discrimination as to religion or confession”
(article 33).
The
Syrian penal code prohibits “causing tension between religious communities.” Religion
is not mentioned on identity cards or passports. For issues of personal status,
the government requires citizens to be affiliated nominally with Christianity,
Judaism, or Islam. Shari 'a is applied in matters related to personal
status(including inheritance, marriage, divorce, and child custody) for Muslims
only, while religious minorities apply their own laws[42].
b-
Minorities status in Power
Recognized religious minority groups are represented in the
parliament, the government, and administration and among the senior officer
bodies of the Syrian military.
c-
In Education
Public schools are officially government-run and
nonsectarian, although in practice the Christian and Druze communities operate
some public schools. There is mandatory religious instruction in public schools
for all students, with regime-approved teachers and curricula. Religious
instruction is provided for Islam and Christianity only, and courses are
divided into separate classes for Muslim and Christian students. Members of
religious minority groups can choose to attend public schools with Muslim or
Christian instruction, or attend private schools that follow either secular or
religious curricula. Groups participating in Islamic courses include only
Sunnis, Shia, Alawites, Ismailis, Yezidi, and Druze[43].
On 21 July 2010, the government ordered the banning of
face-covering niqab in public and private universities amid fears of increasing
Islamic extremism among young Muslim students; with hundreds of teachers
wearing niqab were transferred out of Syrian schools and universities and
reassigned to administrative jobs, where they would not come into contact with
students.[44]
Although Arabic is the official language in public schools,
the government permits the teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac (Aramaic), and
Chaldean in some schools on the premise that they are “liturgical languages.”
The government permitted the use of religious language in public, including
banners bearing religious slogans at prominent public landmarks during
religious holidays. The display of nativity scenes and other symbols associated
with Christmas is common.[45]
d- Demography
By
July 2014, Syrian population was estimated at 17,951,639 with approximately
18,900 Israeli settlers live in the Golan Heights (2012). Syrian religious
demography can be classified as: Muslims 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% (Arabs
and Kurds) - Alawite, Ismailis, and Shia 13%), Christian 10% (includes
Orthodox, Catholics, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining in
Damascus and Aleppo)[46]
- Christians
The Syrian Christian community
makes up approximately 10 % of the population, but its size has been declining
since the March 2011 uprising due to displacement and emigration. Like other
minorities, many Christians feel they have to support Assad because they fear
what may happen if the rebels win; they may face the same tragedy as Christians
in Iraq.
- Alawites
Alawites comprise about 10 % of
the population. The
Alawites, a Muslim minority in Syria were also a subjugated people until the
arrival of the Alawite Assad family to the presidency in 1971. Many Sunni
Muslims (who make up the majority of the Syrian population) see the Alawites,
who do study the Quran and recognize the five pillars of Islam but who differ
in some fundamental religious beliefs from mainstream Islam, as heretics.
- Druze
They constitute 3% of Syria's population. Druze, who
refer to themselves as al-Muwahhideen, or "believers in one God," are
concentrated in the rural, mountainous areas known officially as Jabal al-Arab
or Jabal al-Druze.
They have generally avoided taking sides in the conflict.
The majority of Druze tried to stay neutral between the regime and the
militants. This couldn't save them, for the Druze faith is
considered heretical by jihadists, so Dozens of Druze
living Sowaida were murdered, and Druze living in Idlib have been subjected to
religious persecution by "al-Nusra Front" with several hundred forced
to convert to Sunni Islam. The militants also were accused of desecrating
graves and damaging Druze shrines.
- Kurds
They represent about 10 % of the
Syrian population. According to Law 93 of 1962, Kurds who could not prove their
residence in Syria from 1945 onwards were denied Syrian nationality. It was
till 2011 that President Bashar Assad issued a decree to grant citizenship to
the 300,000 Kurds living in Hasaka.
During Syrian war, Kurds fought
the Islamic radical groups Like Al Nusra Front and ISIS. They could win most of
the battles and expel ISIS jihadists from the regions in northern Syria, which
allowed them to declare autonomy for the Kurdish-controlled areas.
Shia Muslims also faced difficulties and massacres since the uprising.
Shia villages have been besieged by the opposition fighters, and many others
were displaced because they were seen as supporters of the regime.
Yezidi population was approximately 80,000 before the war, media
reports indicate that it has grown due to Iraqi Yezidi fleeing across the
border into Syria. Yezidi live in fear and
desperation following the ISIS’s brutal campaign against their community
members in Iraq. ISIS has smuggled unknown numbers of abducted Yezidi women and
girls from Sinjar into Syria, where they have been sold as commodities,
enslaved, raped and forcibly married to ISIS fighters.
Turkmen comprise 1.2% of the
Syrian population, making them "one of the smallest minority groups in the
country", according to historian C. H. Bleaney[47].
During the War, they have been
involved in military actions against Syrian government forces and they were
backed, funded and militarized by Turkish army and intelligence.
The
Ismailis of Syria are about 1% percent of the population, they are
mostly found in Al Silmiya near Hama. At the onset of the “Syrian revolution,”
al-Silmiya witnessed some unique demonstrations with protesters proudly
drinking alcohol and raising a glass to the civil revolution, but when the
conflict turned into a battle between the Syrian Army and the jihadists, the
Ismailis looked for the government for protection like other minorities.[48]
Jews numerically are less 100 in Syria (2014). Before the war,
Jews had separate primary schools for religious instruction on Judaism and were
allowed to teach Hebrew in some schools. Jews and Kurds were the only
minorities not allowed to participate in the political system and Jews did not
have military service obligations.[49]
C-Lebanon
a- Minorities' rights: legal
framework
Religious freedom is protected
by both constitution and laws. The constitution stipulates that " There
shall be absolute freedom of conscience" (Article 9), the State respects all religions and creeds and
guarantees, under its protection the free exercise of all religious rites
provided that public order is not disturbed. It also guarantees that the
personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever
religious sect they belong, shall be respected.
Religion is not encoded on
national identity cards or on passports, but just noted on “ikhraaj qaid”
(official registry) documents. Citizens have the right to remove their religion
or change the religion on their identity cards and official registry
documents. Government documents refer to
Jewish Lebanese citizens as Israelis, although they are not Israeli citizens.
The law gives religious
groups the right to administer their personal status' laws freely. There are no
procedures for civil marriage; however, the government recognizes civil
marriage ceremonies performed outside the country, irrespective of the
religious affiliation of each individual.
Unrecognized groups are
permitted to perform their religious rites and assemble for worship without
government interference. An individual may change religions if the change is
approved by the head of the religious group the person wishes to join. The Lebanese
penal code prohibits “causing tension between religious communities.”
b- Minorities in Power
The constitution assures the
balance of power among the major religious groups. Christians and Muslims are represented
equally (and proportionally among the 18 officially-recognized religious groups)
in parliament, the cabinet, administration, and high-level civil service
positions.
The President of the
Republic is Christian, and the total number of Christians' seats in Parliament
is 64. Total number of Muslim seats in the Parliament is also 64; Sunnis
have 27 seats and 27 seats are for Shia, the speaker of the parliament is Shiite,
and the prime minister is Sunni. Druze has 8 seats in the parliament.
Alawites have 2 seats in the parliament.
The government does not
officially recognize some religious groups such as Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus,
and unregistered Protestant groups. Although members of these groups do not qualify
for certain government positions, but there are many of them who have been in
government and administrative positions. Government records list some members
of unregistered religious groups as belonging to recognized religious groups[50].
c- In Education
The government permits the publication of religious
materials of every religious group in different languages.
The
constitution confirms that education shall be free insofar as it is not
contrary to public order and morals and does not affect the dignity of any of
the religions or sects. The State gives religious communities a right to have
their own schools.
d- Demography
Lebanon can be considered
as a pot of minorities, where all the religions and sects are regarded as
minorities. The population is approximately 4.3 million, with 18 officially - recognized
religious groups include 4 Muslim groups, 12 Christian groups, Druze, and
Judaism.
Many persons fleeing
religious mistreatment and discrimination in neighboring states are immigrants
in the country, including Kurds, Shia, and Chaldeans from Iraq, as well as Coptic
Christians from Egypt and Sudan[51].
There are no official
records or estimations, however a study conducted by Statistics Lebanon, a
Beirut-based private research firm, cited by the United States Department of
State, found that Lebanon's population constitute of approximately 4.3 million;
Muslims around 54% (27 % Sunni Muslim, 27 % Shia Muslim).Christians declined to
41% (21 % are Maronites, 8 % Greek Orthodox, 5 % Greek Catholic, 6.5 % belonging
to smaller Christian groups). Druze estimate around 5.6 %. Alawites count 40,000
to 120,000 in Lebanon.
Jews:
Unlike
other Arab countries, where Jews were declared "personae non gratae"
following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Lebanon did not expel
its' Jewish citizens. There are no official estimates as to the size of
Lebanon’s remaining Jewish community today. According to the President of the
Lebanese Jewish Community Council, Mr. Isaac Arazi; there are more than 2,000
Lebanese Jews still living in Lebanon.
D-Jordan
a- Minorities rights: Legal
framework
The Jordanian constitution stipulates the
freedom to practice the rites of one’s religion in accordance with the customs
that are observed in the country, unless the government deems they violate
morality or public order. It assures that there shall be no discrimination in
the rights and duties of citizens on grounds of religion, but also notes that
the state religion is Islam and the king must be a Muslim.
Religious affiliation is required on
national identification cards and legal documentation, including on marriage
and birth certificates, but not on travel documents. National identification
cards and legal documentation identify individuals as either Christian or
Muslim but do not specify their sects. Atheists and agnostics must associate
themselves with a recognized religion for purposes of official identification.
Employment application forms for government positions occasionally contain
questions about an applicant’s religion.
The constitution mandates that matters
concerning personal status are under the exclusive jurisdiction of religious
courts. The constitution and law do not explicitly ban Muslims from converting
to another faith, and there are no penalties under civil law for doing so.
Nonetheless, by according primacy to sharia, Muslims who convert can be
prosecuted by the State Security Court under the penal code’s provisions
against “inciting sectarian conflict” or “harming the national unity.”
Non-Muslims may convert to Islam or from one recognized non-Islamic faith to
another.
b- Minorities in Power
Christians regularly serve as cabinet
ministers. According to the law, Christians are allotted nine seats out of 150
seats in parliament. They are also eligible to compete for the 27 seats
reserved for national list candidates. Christians may not run for the remaining
114 seats. No seats are reserved for adherents of other minority religious
groups. The government classification of Druze as Muslims permits them to hold
office. The government traditionally reserves some positions in the upper
levels of the military for Christians, anecdotally estimated to be
approximately 4 %.
c- In Education
Public schools provide Islamic religious
instruction as part of the basic national curriculum, although non-Muslim
students are allowed to opt out. In several cities, Christian denominations
operate private schools, and are able to conduct classes on Christianity. The
schools are open to adherents of all religions.[52]
d- Demography
The official Jordanian government estimates
- cited by the US department of State - the population is 7.9 million (July
2014), 97.2 % of which is Sunni Muslim. Christians are 2.2 % of the population,
and groups that together constitute less than 1 % of the population include
Shia Muslims, Bahais, and Druze. Shia
and Baha'i count not more 1000. There are also about 20,000 to 32,000 Druze
living mostly in the north of Jordan.
E- Palestine
West Bank: Muslim population is around 85.0%
(predominantly Sunni), the Jewish settlers estimates 12%, and Christians
consist 1.0 - 2.5% (mainly Greek Orthodox), while in Gaza Strip: Muslims 98.0 - 99.0% (predominantly Sunni), Christian 1.0%.
An
estimated 50,000 Christians live among 3.9 million Muslims in the Palestinian
territories, most in the West Bank, notably in Bethlehem, and East Jerusalem.
Some 3,000 are in the Gaza Strip.[53]
The
Palestinian Authority says the Christian population in the West Bank has shrunk
over the last three decades due to emigration, mainly to Australia, Canada and
the United States, but lacks accurate figures. The rise of Islamic radicalism,
protracted Palestinian - Israeli conflict, blockade and better living standards
are the main reasons for Christian emigration.
Part
III - Findings and Future Solutions
A- Survey Results
and Analysis
Our survey was conducted on March - April, 2016 by a group
of researchers residing in Lebanon, through direct interaction with the
respondents, and via email and/or phone with the minorities living in other
Arab Levant countries.
The respondents were mainly; Christians, Kurds, Druze,
Turkmen, Alawites, and Yezidi. We couldn't reach Ismailis due to security
concerns in Syria. Jews couldn't be reached due to their no- show in Arab
societies.
According to the definition given by United Nations Human
Rights- Office of the High commissioner, the existence of a minority is a
question of fact and any definition must include both objective factors (such
as the existence of a shared ethnicity, language or religion) and subjective
factors (including that individuals must identify themselves as members of a minority)[54].Therefore,
Shia and Sunnis were excluded from our survey- despite the fact that first are
considered a minority in Syria, and the latter constitute a minority in Iraq -
because they don't define themselves as minorities in the region. Kurds in Iraq
are also excluded from our survey because they don't consider themselves as a minority,
they are in a dominant position in Iraqi Kurdistan, and they don't have the
same concerns, fears and aspirations like other minorities in the Levant.
According
to the given estimations of minorities in the Arab Levant, the survey sample is
classified as follows:
·
Christians 47%
·
Alawites 19%
·
Kurds 13 %
·
Druze 8 %
·
Yezidi 6 %
·
Turkmen 4 %
·
other 2 %
The
no. of respondents is 550, categorized as follows:
Nationalities:
47% Lebanese Syrians 42 % Iraqis 7 % Jordanians 3 % Palestinians 1%.
Age:
·
20 % of them are above 50.
·
18 % are between 38 and 50 years,
·
24 % are between 28 and 37.
·
38% are between 18 and 27.
Gender:
53% of the respondents are males, and 47% are females.
The Questions and answers were as follows:
1. With which of the following do you associate your belonging:
Country 37 % Family 35% Religion 28 %
The results show
that minorities still have ambiguity in their sense of belonging. Their crisis
of identity can be seen as those associate themselves with both family and
religion constitute around 63%, while those affiliate themselves with national
identity are just 37%. This shows that Arab Levant states - after decades of
independence- couldn't develop a national identity for all citizens.
2. Do you practice your own cultural, political and social
rights in your country?
53% Yes
32% No 15% No
Answer
The
percentage of "no answer" in critical questions shows that minorities
still have fear to express their opinions which can be seen as criticizing the
authorities.
* If Not, why?
Those who
said that they don't practice their rights in the previous question (32%),
refer to the following reasons:
Absence of freedoms and democracy: 47 %
The corrupt political system: 31%
Religious intolerance and sectarian
divide: 13%
Displacement:
9 %
Note that some Lebanese answered that they don't practice
their political rights, referring to their right to vote for a new parliament
as the deputies are continuously extending their own mandate in a severe breach
to the constitution.[55]
However, this Lebanese issue can be seen as a national problem not a minority
rights' one.
3. Do you have any preferences for your neighbors?
58% no preference
20% same nationality
20% same sect 2% no answer
Despite
all the fears and rise of criminality due to war and displacement; the majority
still feel that they can co- exist with other religions and nationalities at
the same neighborhood.
Note that Iraqi
respondents had the major concerns; they said that "most Iraqi Christians
and Yezidi captives were handed to ISIS by their Sunni neighbors".
4 - Do you feel intimidated because you are a minority?
42% never
27% sometimes 16%
always 15% rarely
43% of the
respondents have some sort of fear due to the fact that they are minorities,
while 42% have never had this feeling. Lebanese respondents were the most
satisfied and non afraid ones.
5. before the rise of extremism, have you ever been exposed
to persecution or injustice because of your religion?
65% No 30% Yes 5% no answer.
It means that a good majority of them were satisfied with
their status and weren't subject to persecution of injustice due to their
religious affiliations. It is important to note that injustice and persecution
in Arab states -before the uprisings - affected all citizens regardless of
their religious affiliation. Persecution and injustice - in most cases- were
the result of dictatorship and has nothing to do with rights of minorities
specifically.
6. Which of the following statements define you?
48% I want to stay in my homeland.
24% I am thinking of immigration.
14% I am a refugee.
13% I am displaced.
Almost half of the
respondents want to stay at their homelands, despite all challenges and fears.
7. Do you think that strict adherence to the religion is
desirable today?
72% No
28% Yes
Why?
Those who said NO (72%) justified as follows:
48% it increases instability and
hatred between communities.
38 % intolerance leads to the
absence of national unity.
4% intolerance is a mental illness.
10 % no answer.
The first two justifications
mentioned in this question, and their high percentages reveal high level of
awareness; and show that minorities still strive to societal coexistence and
national unity (86%).
Those
who answered YES (28%) referred it to the following reasons:
64% intolerance is the right
reaction towards intolerance.
18% for protection of the community.
14% to maintain our rights.
11% to counter foreign policies.
8.
How do private religious institutions (economic, political, educational...)
affect the development of the State?
31%
they eliminate State loyalty and patriotism.
26%
they help raise the capabilities of the state.
19%
they contribute to sectarian loyalties.
16%
they develop groups outside the framework of the State.
8%
no answer.
The above
percentages show that that negative attitudes (66%) are far higher than
positive one (26%). It means the majority prefer to get their rights from their
states not through private religious institutions. High negative attitudes
reveal that religious institutions are not accepted as a substitute of the
State, or as intermediaries between the citizen and the State.
9. Do you
support the emergence of secular parties in your country?
63% Yes 18% No 19% no answer
63% of respondents
are convinced that there is a need to establish secular parties. This is
logical compared to answers in no.7, where 72% are against fanaticism. It means
that there is a strong conviction among minorities that secular parties can be
a way to get rid of intolerance and radicalism, and grant them equality.
10. Do you
Support civil marriages?
58% yes No 34% 8% no answer.
11. Would you
(yourself) adapt a civil marriage or encourage your children to do so?
49% Yes 32% No 19% No Answer
12. Do you think
that religious affiliation should be deleted from identity cards?
78% yes it
should be deleted 21% I am with keeping it 1% no answer.
Those who refuse
to delete religious affiliation from national identity cards, considered its
presence as a sign of pride of their religions.
13. Which
political system you think is best for the states that have minorities? (Open
answers)
39% democratic
System 36 % secular system 19% federal - decentralized System
3% power- sharing system 1% Islamic Caliphate
1 % partition of
the state 1% no answer.
14. Extremism is
a result of:
28%
foreign interventions.
9%
foreign intelligence.
8%
internal sectarian policies.
3%
Media.
46% All of the above.
6%
None of the above.
15. Do you think
minorities will return to their homeland when the war ends?
43% Yes 55% No 2% No Answer
16. is there any
future for minorities in the Arab Levant?
33% Yes 30%
No 37% I do not know
The results of
this question show the uncertainty the minorities have for their future
in the Arab Levant.
17. What were
your fears before the emergence of extremism? (Open Question)
32% tyranny of
the majority, 46%
dispossession of rights
20% absence of
power- sharing 2% No answer
18. What are your major fears today? (Open Question)
34%
uprooting 32% genocide 33% deprivation of civil and religious
rights 1% no answer.
19. in your
opinion, what is the best solution for minorities in the region? (Open
Question)
42%
Secularism.
30
% defending their homeland to reach Stability, peace, and security.
18%
amending constitutions to protect "rights of minorities".
7%
Immigration.
1%
No solution
2%
No answer.
B-Future of minorities in the Arab Levant
Minorities in
Arab Levant, is a term that refer to groups that were found in the region
before the independence and creation of the states. Through history, these
groups fought each other (Druze vs. Maronites, Kurds participated in the
Armenian genocide etc). Today, most of them live in fear, insecurity, and
desperation and have no clear vision for tomorrow.
Minorities are
not unified in their perceptions for their future in the region. So, if we want
to figure out, how the new regional system would look like, we have to
determine how minorities themselves see their future with respect to the
scenarios and plans suggested by major powers.
Scenarios
Syria’s geostrategic importance makes it
the strategic center of the Middle East. It is important to note that the
future of Syria shall determine the future of the region; the Syrian conflict could
spill over to Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. On the contrary, the geographic position
of Iraq (surrounded by powerful states, and by desert on the Syrian - Iraqi
border) prevents the Iraqi dynamics from spreading to the neighborhood.
Therefore, what are the future Scenarios of
Syria? and what is the fate of the minorities in each of these scenarios?
1- Partition_ Balkanization
This solution could get just 1 % in our survey. Lebanon
defied previous attempts to partition during civil war (1975- 1990). The Syrian
regime and opposition both reject this solution. Iraq is still striving to
unity, however hard to obtain.
In this Scenario, Middle
Eastern countries will be Balkanized; i.e. separated and fragmented along
sectarian lines. This would result in the creation of several weak landlocked
religious micro-states.
Many maps were drawn for partition in the
Middle East; we can mention the old Oded Yinon[56] map, Bernard Lewis one[57], the US retired Colonel -
Lieutenant Ralph Peters map[58] which was published
during the Bush administration call for a " New middle East", and the
most recent map for the partition of the region was published by "New York
Times" on September 28, 2013[59].
Partition calls to
divide Syria into three, four or more states:
1.
the
Alawites' State that take the west of Syria along a corridor from the
south through Damascus, Homs and Hama to the northern Mediterranean coast till
it reach Alawites' province in Turkey.
2.
The
Sunni-dominated heartland can become a Sunni State that has links with
the heartland of Iraq which will be a new Sunni state (Ironically, the borders
of this Sunni state are exactly the same area dominated by ISIS).
Some
of the maps drew two Sunni states; one in Damascus and the second in Aleppo. Those
two Sunni states will be hostile to each other; the Damascus state will have
the moderate Sunni Islam, while the Aleppo state will contain the radicals.
3.
Kurdish
State: Kurds may have their own state
that may extend to Kurdish parts of Turkey, and to Iraqi - Kurdistan.
4.
Druze State can merge Druze of Syria with Druze of Lebanon, and -
maybe- those living in Golan Heights.
Iraq will be
partitioned to 3 states; the Shiite state in the south, the Sunni
State in the heart, and a Kurdish State in the north.
Either it was in the form of partition or federalism, this can be
regarded a very critical solution for minorities and for the whole region, for
the following reasons:
1. the most
dangerous aspect is the religious and sectarian factor in determining the
borders of the states which may turn into sectarian battle lines. These new states will start protracted endless religious
wars, especially between Sunni and Shia in the region.
2. The resources factor; some of the mini - states
will get all the resources, and the rest will be left to starve. The Alawite
state will have a substantial amount of Syria’s water, agriculture, oil and
will be open to the Mediterranean. The Sunni majority will be deserted in a
landlocked state, which leaves them without enough resources though having some
oil.
3. Minorities will be forced to leave the ethnically and
religiously heterogeneous regions, to live in their designated mini-states. For
partition to be a reality; the new states should constitute sectarian
homogeneous population and this will obviously lead to ethnic and religious
cleansing in the region.
Either in the name of partition or federalism, this
scenario will not be a road to peace in the Middle East. Iraq which adopted
federalism in 2005 is still very far from peace. Except for Kurds, this scenario
is catastrophic for most of the minorities in the region.
The partition Scenario is very hard to be obtained for
it will present a threat to most of the major regional powers, so they will
work against it.
Global Powers stances:
- Despite the Americans called for partition of Iraq[60], the Obama administration has called - together with
the other powers- for a 'united Syria'[61]. Russians are against partition[62]; however, they have said that they may accept a
"federal" solution, if it is the "Syrian people choice"[63]. Russians called for a federal - decentralized system
in a united Syrian state[64](19% of the respondents agreed for such a solution).
Moreover, Russians fear that a huge radical Sunni state that includes the heart
of Iraq and heart of Syria, may encourage North Caucasus' states for secession.
- Regional powers positions:
Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia will fight against
partition:
Turkey: The
partition of Syria and the establishment of a Kurdish state would threaten
Turkey's national security, and will give an additional impetus to Turkey's
Kurds aspirations to secession, noting that all the maps have called for
merging Kurds of Syria, with Iraq and Turkey.
Saudi Arabia:
will not accept the division of Syria, because it is threatened by partition
also. The "New York Times" map divided Saudi Arabia to five separate
mini-states along sectarian and tribal lines.
Iran: This
option is even more dangerous for the Iranians than the fall of al-Assad in
Syria, for many reasons:
a- The separatist Kurds inside Iran may tempt to
revolt and call for secession. It was the first found ‘State of Republic of
Kurdistan’ in history in Mahabad in Iran in January 1946 and, although it
survived for ten months, it greatly inspired Kurdish nationalists everywhere.
b- Partition will interrupt the geographical
contiguity between Iran, Syria and Lebanon, which affects their ability to
support both Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Alawite state in Syria.
c- More importantly, it prevents the initiation of the
proposed natural gas pipeline running from the Iranian South Pars field towards
Europe via Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
2- Islamic Caliphate
This Scenario could get 1% of the approval of the
respondents. It may happens in one case, i.e. a great victory for Islamists and
Jihadists in the war, which is unlikely to happen.
This is the worst Scenario for the whole region and for the
minorities in the region.
Genocides shall be the absolute outcome. Islamic Caliphate laws authorize the
use of terror and public brutality as a means of deterring sins, promoting
righteousness, and for intimidating enemies. Under the caliphate, heretics,
atheists and apostates, or those who have renounced Islam, are put to torture
then death if they are men, however their women should be enslaved- mainly
sexually.
Christians and Jews or the "People of the Book",
by law, may be permitted to live as long as they are submissive to their Muslim
masters, abide by Islamic Sharia, cover their heads, refrain from drinking and
pay additional taxes for safety. Anyone found living outside the borders of
Sharia law, should be lashed, tortured, jailed or killed. Shia and all other
non - Sunni factions of Islam will be seen as apostates by the Jihadists, thus
their absolute penalty is beheading.
Global Powers' stances:
Both USA and Russia will try to prevent the Islamic
Caliphate state from emerging. They will not allow the establishment of the
caliphate, i.e. it is a red line for both states.
Regional powers' positions:
Iran will
fight against the establishment of a Sunni Caliphate for its consequences on
the Shia in the whole region.
Saudi Arabia
fears the jihadists' demands of the overthrow of Saud regime, both ISIS and
al-Qaeda loathe the Saudi royal family and have carried out major attacks
inside the kingdom — including a sustained, bloody campaign by al-Qaeda in the
mid-2000s to bring down the Saudi regime, which took years to defeat[65].
Turkey will try
to take advantage of the Caliphate and try to inaugurate a Muslim Brotherhood Caliph.
Then, Turkey may propagate itself as a bridge between the Islamic Caliphate
State and the West (Europe).
3-
Chaos / Anarchy
This happens if
the Syrian war turned to an endless protracted one, or if the religious mini-
states (after partition) started to clash.
Two versions for anarchy in the region have
been recalled since 2005; both are catastrophic for the region and for the
minorities living here for more than a two millennia.
1- First call for a "Creative
Chaos" was by the former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
The
phrase “constructive anarchy” with its variant “the creative chaos” means that
bringing a society to a state of anarchy can have some of the most varied
forms; different dynamics from one situation to another, temporary or long
perspective interests and/ or different results
in terms of scope, impact and consequences. From this point of view, the
essence of the “constructive chaos” was synthesized by Condoleezza Rice who, in
an article hosted by “Washington Post” in April, 2005 stated that “the anarchy
that involves reforms and democratic transformations in the Middle East is a
constructive one to the extent that it can create a much better and more
acceptable situation than the one existing today in this part of the world”. [66]
Michael
Ledeen, a prominent member of the American Enterprise, conceptualized the
theory of “constructive anarchy” or “constructive destruction”, in its
political acceptance. He explained it in the “Global Change in the Middle East”
project in 2003. “Destruction or positive deconstruction”, the author writes,
“is our highest virtue (American policy) ... It's time for us to once again
export the democratic revolution” and among the first “beneficiaries” of this
export are Iran, Iraq and Syria. The idea was resumed in a political forum of
the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) held in Washington,
where Michael Ledeen argued: “The time of diplomacy has ended. Now it's time to
create a free Iran, a free Syria and free Lebanon”[67].
2- Al Qaeda: "Overwhelming violent
Anarchy" strategy
In a publication by ‘Abdullah bin Mohammed’[68], entitled "Valuable
Collection for the Strategic Memorandum Series", bin Muhammad sought to
give instructions how could Al Qaeda benefit from the Arab Spring to conquer
and rule the whole region.
The author called for causing an"
overwhelming violent anarchy"; which "will cause us to see
emigrations such as what happened in Palestine, famines such as what happened
in Somalia and massacres such as what happened in the Balkans", predicting
that "the international community will be unable to deal with this
historic magnitude of anarchy. Moreover, it is going to fail to contain the
effect of it on itself"[69].
He adds, "Continuous anarchy and
sectarian and civil wars will begin to take effect. The effects of the wars
will begin to appear such as migrations, massacres and destruction. Here the
Psyche of these segments of society, who are the greater majority, will be
ready to welcome any power capable of providing security and stability".[70]
The fate of minorities in this scenario is
catastrophic:
Very clearly, Bin Muhammad urges to expel
minorities from the region, claiming that "...The criminal
record of these minorities
in conspiring against Muslims, especially during the colonial era, where they were the best facilitators for the
colonization against us, is the greatest evidence of that".
He emphasizes
that "...This requires of us, based on the principle of securing the
heart of the state that we work at deporting the religious minorities of that
region and make Sham (Levant) the second area that is forbidden to non-Muslims
after the Arab Peninsula. If the question of removing the idolaters from the
Arab Peninsula was a necessity imposed by the provisions of Sharia, then the
deportation of idolaters from Sham is a necessity imposed by the political,
military and cultural reality. The great powers drew up and legislated this
reality, whereby they made these minorities the key to entering the area and
interfering with internal affairs on the pretext of protecting minorities,
human rights and public freedoms"[71].
This confirms that the Islamists will
exploit chaos to expel minorities, force them to emigrate, which will - for
sure- happen in a violent way; i.e. genocides.
Global and regional powers may not be able to control chaos. Everyone
knows it's very harmful; however the ability to contain it or prevent the spill
from one state to another is hard to obtain. And most of all, it may spread to
Europe through the huge influx of refugees and the transnational waves of
terrorism.
4- Power - Sharing System
Consociationalism as a power - sharing
solution is one of the discussed solutions for the future of Syria, and it has
been central in the leaked Syrian constitution draft on May 24, 2016.
It has been accepted just by 3% of the
respondents. This type of solution can be one of the acceptable choices for
protecting minorities in the Levant, despite its shortcomings and un - favorability
among people, based on the Lebanese example and experiences.
Consociationalism is the state where the
major divisions in a country ethnic, religious, or linguistic, are represented
in the political system. It was academically discussed by the political
scientist Arend Lijphart; who identified four key characteristics of
consociational democracies[72]:
1- Grand coalition
between the elites, as they recognize the dangers of non-cooperation.
2- Mutual veto
which gives a balance of power between diverse communities.
3- Proportionality
in representation in government, administration, police and in other national
and civic segments of society.
4- Segmental autonomy which allows the application of
different culturally-based community laws.
A confessional type
of Consociationalism was applied in Lebanon, where the constitution requires
distributing political, institutional and administrative powers equally between
Christians and Muslims, and proportionally among religious sects.
This system protects minorities' rights and
existence; however, critics of this type point out that such a system may
actually deepen conflicts and sectarianism, decrease the sense of loyalty to
the State, and prevent the development of national identity and citizenship. As
it has been experienced in Lebanon, this system is unjust, where some of the
posts are reserved for certain sects, thus persons are mainly chosen to public
offices based on their religious identity not on their merit and
qualifications.
This solution was introduced in the leaked
Russian Draft for a new Syrian constitution, which was denied by both Russians
and Assad[73].
Both Assad regime and opposition declared that any constitution shall be
written by Syrians themselves.
5- Democratic - Civil States
This Scenario got the majority approval of
the respondents, and Actually it can be the best solution for all citizens in
the region and for Syria for sure. Despite the fact the civil citizenship has
been fractured by sectarian wars, this solution can be the best way to preserve
the states, national identities and the rights of both majority and minorities
in the Arab Levant.
Either it was called a secular system, or a
civil state which is a more accepted term by Muslims, a democratic - civil
State that abide by Rule of Law and apply good governance can lead to the
development of the Arab Levant states, increase justice, reduce repression, and
maintain fairness for all sects and confessions in the societies.
During their negotiations in Geneva (April
2016); Syrian regime and its allies called for a secular state, while the Saudi
- Turkish backed opposition called for a democratic non- sectarian state.
This solution has been supported - publicly,
at least- by USA, Russia and Iran in Vienna declaration, and UNSC resolution 2254.
Turkish government fears that the re-
creation of a "secular" state in Syria means that the AKP will be
last Islamist party that governs Turkey.
Conclusion
A secular (or civil) political system in Syria and stability in Lebanon,
will maintain the minorities presence in the Middle East. Without these
conditions, minorities will face dull future in the region.
Christian Minorities diminished in Palestine and their presence in Jordan
is relatively stable. The instability, terrorism and sectarianism in Iraq may
not encourage minorities to return even after the liberation of Ninewa and the
other Northern provinces. Balance of power in Lebanon prevents the exodus of
minorities. Security and stability are all what is needed to protect Lebanese
minorities and other minorities fleeing from the other neighboring countries
and residing in Lebanon.
A negotiated settlement in Syria that lead to a secular or a civil State
will help the minorities to rebuild their lives again in that country. Any
other solution may have bad consequences on their existence, rights and dignity.
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Berkes
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[1] This paper
was presented at ISA conference "Human Rights in an Age of Ambiguity"
in the "Minority and Indigenous Rights" panel, Fordham University, New
York, 13- 15 June, 2016.
[2] A/RES/47/135. Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
92nd plenary meeting, 18 December 1992.
[3] Navanethem
Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement on Human Rights Day,
10 December 2009. Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/events/humanrightsday/2009/hc_statement.shtml
[accessed May 18,2016].
[4] According to
the reports of United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). available at:
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
[accessed, May 15, 2016]
[5] Recep Boztemur, Historical Foundations of
Multiculturalism in the Ottoman Empire, in "Challenges
of Multiculturalism in Eastern and Central Europe", 2004,pp. 6-7.
[6] Benjamin Braude
and Bernard Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning
of a Plural Society, Holmes and Meier Publisher, London, 1982.
2 Ibid, pp. 12-13.
[8] Barbara Jarevich, History of the
Balkans,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 40.
[9] These included
the Christian, Jewish, Samaritan and Sabeans communities. for further
illustration of this status, refer to:
H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the
World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 218–219.
[10] Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran
After the Gulf Wars, Routledge, USA,
2001, p. 2
[11]Benjamin
Braude, the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged
Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 2014.
[12] Niyazi Berkes,
The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Hurst & Company, London, 1998, pp.
144-147.
[13] Ugur Umit Ungor,
"Geographies of Nationalism and Violence: Rethinking Young Turk ‘Social
Engineering’", in European Journal of Turkish Studies (7), 2008.
[14] Rudolph. J.
Rummel, Statistics Of Democide, Center for National Security Law, School of
Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1997.
[15] Ibid.
[16] David Gaunt,
"The Assyrian Genocide of 1915", Assyrian Genocide Research Center,
2009.
[17] Gabriel
Scheinmann, The Map that Ruined the Middle East, July 2013, available at:
http://www.thetower.org/article/the-map-that-ruined-the-middle-east/
[ accessed May16, 2016].
[18] UN Human Rights
Council, "Implementation Of General Assembly Resolution 60/251", 15
March 2006.
[19] Daniel Byman,
Kenneth Michael Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an
Iraqi Civil War, Brookings Institution, 2007, p. 139.
[20]Preti Taneja,
Assimilation, Exodus, and Eradication: Iraq’s minority communities since 2003,
report by Minority Rights Group International, 2007. On this link: http://www.aina.org/reports/mrgi0702.pdf [accessed May
16, 2016].
[21] Minority Rights Group International, Iraq’s
Minorities: Participation in Public Life”, released at 28 November 2011.
available at: http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html [accessed May
16, 2016].
[22] Check it on many
websites, for example: http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/syria-bashar-al-assad-alawite-opposition-religion; and
http://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2011/05/30/should-syrian-christians-be-afraid/ [accessed May
16, 2016].
[23] It is
important to note that reliable and accurate sources for status of minorities
are rare. The problem that faced this study is the contradicting information
and statistics about the number of followers of minority groups, emigrations,
death tolls, freedoms and minority rights. Each party, state, or NGO used
numbers to propagate political agendas and / or cause. Most of the data in this
part (II) has been taken from US department of state reports which were the
most detailed and comprehensive reports found, and because they were -
mostly- based on official statistics and
estimations.
[24] Iraq - Report on
International Religious Freedom, US department of state, 2015.
[25] US department of
State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2014, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, State of Iraq, available at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2014&dlid=238456 [accessed May
16, 2016].
[26] United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Annual Report 2013,
April 2013, Washington, DC, USCIRF, p. 88.
[27] Miriam Puttick,
From Crisis to Catastrophe: The Situation of Minorities in Iraq, MRG and
Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, London, October 2014, p. 5.
[28] Munier Gilles,
Les Turcomans Irakiens: un people oublié ou marginalisé, Le blog de France-Irak
Actualité, May 31, 2007. Available at: <www.gmunier.
blogspot.com/2007/05/turcomans-irakiens.html>
[29]Mumtaz Lalani, Still Targeted: Continued Persecution
of Iraq’s Minorities, MRG, London, June 2010, p. 7.
[30] IILHR, Iraq’s
Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation, and
Human Rights, IILHR, Washington, DC 2013, p. 141.
[31] HRW, ‘Iraq: ISIS
kidnaps Shia Turkmen, destroys shrines’, 28 June 2014.
[32] Palmer, Michael
D.; Burgess, Stanley M., The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Religion and Social
Justice, John Wiley & Sons, 2012, p. 405
[33] IILHR, 2013, op.
cit., p.148.
[34] Mukhtar Lamani,
Minorities in Iraq: The Other Victims, CIGI Special Report, 2009,p.7.
[35] Puttick, op.
cit., p. 5.
[36] Lamani, op.cit,
p.7.
[37] United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Annual Report 2013,
April 2013, Washington, DC, USCIRF, p. 89.
[38] Angus Crawford,
Iraq’s Mandaeans face extinction, BBC News, March 4, 2007. Available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6412453.stm>
[39] Preti Taneja,
Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication : Iraq’s minority communities since 2003,
Minority Rights Group International, February 11, 2007, Available at:
<http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=2805> [ accessed May 16,2016].
[40] IILHR, Iraq’s
Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation, and
Human Rights,
Washington,
DC, IILHR, 2013, p. 99.
[41] Middle East and
North Africa State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2015, p.241
[42] Freedom House,
Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa 2010.
[43] US department of
state, religious freedom report, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper
[44] Syria bans niqab
from universities, The guardian, 20 July 2010. available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/20/syria-bans-niqab-from-universities
[ accessed May 16, 2016]
[45] US department of
state, op. cit.
[46] CIA World
factbook, available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html
[47] C. H. Bleaney,
"The Turkic Peoples of Syria" in
Margaret Bainbridge (ed.) "Turkic Peoples Of The World",
Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 206–209.
[48] ISIS threatens
the Ismaili capital of Syria, al- akhbar English, Mar 06 2015.
[49] Jews in Islamic
Countries: Syria. (Updated February 2016)
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/syrianjews.html#9
[50] US department of
state, Lebanon, op.cit.
[51]
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper
[52] - See more at:
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper
[53] FACTBOX -
Christians in Israel, West Bank and Gaza, Reuters, May 10, 2009.
[54] Minority Rights:
International Standards and Guidance for Implementation United Nations Human
Rights, Office of the High commissioner, UN, 2010, p. 1.
[55]
On 31 May 2013, the Lebanese
Parliament extended its mandate for 17 months, due to the deadlock over the
electoral law. And, on 5 November 2014, the Parliament enacted another
extension until 20 June 2017, referring it to security concerns.
[56]
Odid Yinon plan was drawn up by
Israel in 1982, he said: “Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic
and religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so
that there will be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the
Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor,
and the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan… ” (Oded Yinon,
“A strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”, Kivunum, translated by Israel
Shahak, February 1982.)
[57] the most
prominent thinker who called for partition was Bernard Lewis in his infamous
article in Foreign Affairs “Rethinking the Middle East.” He advocates a policy for “Lebanonization”of
the Middle East. The plan envisaged breaking Syria up into small fragments with
the territories populated by the Druze and Alawites separated to become independent
mini-states. Lewis wanted to establish new entities: a tiny state on the
territory of Lebanon populated by Maronites, an independent Kurdistan
comprising the Kurds-populated areas of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran, an
independent Shia state in Iraq...",
Bernard
Lewis, Rethinking the Middle East, Fall 1992,
available at:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/1992-09-01/rethinking-middle-east
[58] Army Lt. Col.
(ret.) Ralph Peters published it in the June 2006 Armed Forces Journal. In
“Blood Borders”, Peters suggested that a reimagining of Middle Eastern and
Asian borders along ethnic, sectarian and tribal lines might ease regional
tensions. For more info, check online:
http://armedforcesjournal.com/peters-blood-borders-map/
[59]Robin Wrigh,
Imagining a Remapped Middle East, New York Times, September 28, 2013.
[60] Brooks: Joe
Biden’s Idea To Divide Iraq Looks ‘Smarter and Smarter’, 30 May 2015,available
at:
http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015/05/30/brooks-joe-bidens-idea-to-divide-iraq-looks-smarter-and-smarter/[accessed,
May 21, 2016].
[61] in John Kerry's
Speech, Austria, May 17, 2016, he said:
we "have agreed on a basic framework, which is a united Syria,
nonsectarian, that is able to choose its future through a transitional
governing body which is, in effect, the implementation of the Geneva
process". Available at:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/05/257311.htm [accessed, May 21,
2016].
[62] Unacceptable’:
Lavrov blasts Biden idea on splitting Iraq into parts, 24 Aug, 2015. available
at:
https://www.rt.com/news/313274-lavrov-splitting-iraq-biden/
[accessed, May 21, 2016]
[63] Russia says
federal model is possible for Syria in future, Feb 29, 2016. Available at:
http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-russia-syria-idINKCN0W21TP [
accessed May 21, 2016].
[64] Draft Syrian
constitution promotes decentralization and minority rights, Rudaw 26/5/2016,
available at:
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/260520162
[ accessed May 28, 2016].
[65] Jennifer
Williams, The Saudi Arabia problem: why a country at war with jihadists also
fuels them, Vox, December 1, 2015. Available at:
http://www.vox.com/2015/12/1/9821466/saudi-problem-isis
[accessed May 18, 2016].
[66] Dumitru CHICAN,
"Constructive Anarchy” In The Context Of The New Middle East, Supplement
Geostrategic Pulse, Issue No.147, Thursday 20 June 2013.
[67] in Jewish World Review, 24 June 2003.
[68] He is one of the
most important Al-Qaeda thinkers and strategists.
[69]Abdullah bin
Mohamed, Strategic Memorandum, al-Ma’sada Media, 2011, p. 7
[70] Ibid, p.8
[71] ibid, pp.43-44.
[72] Arend Lijphart,
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1977.
[73] Syria denies
Russian constitution rumours, 28 May 2016, available at: at:
http://www.skynews.com.au/news/world/mideast/2016/05/28/syria-denies-russian-constitution-rumours.html#sthash.0XWwBVHb.dpuf
[ accessed May 29, 2016].
