presented in "The Evolution of UN
Peace Operations: Contemporary Challenges and Requirements", 2015 ACUNS-ASIL
Workshop at NUPI, Oslo, 26 October – 1 November 2015.
List of Acronyms. 3
Research and Methodology. 4
Part I- Defining the concepts. 6
1.1- The introduction of Peacekeeping and Peace enforcement
1.2- Definitions. 8
A- Peacekeeping. 8
B- Changes in Peacekeeping mandates. 10
C- Peace Enforcement 11
Part II- Defining the political Environment 13
Part III- Findings and Evaluation. 22
Concluding Remarks. 29
A- UNIFIL II: a Chapter VI or VII mission?. 29
B- UNIFIL II: Peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission?. 31
C- UNFIL: an evaluation. 33
D- UNIFIL: Impartiality vs. credibility. 34
and Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
Armed forces (LAF)
Task Force (MTF)
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
of Engagement (RoE)
Lebanon Army (SLA)
United Nations Organization in the Congo (UNOC)
Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF)
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
Multi-National Force (USMNF)
Seven years since first deployed in Lebanon, the 'United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon' (UNIFIL) became a part of the recent Lebanese history, and to a
large extent, a major part of the daily lives of the Southern Lebanese.
1978, in the aftermath of Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 425 which created a peacekeeping mission to confirm the withdrawal
of the Israeli forces, maintain peace and security, and assist the Lebanese
government in regaining its authority in this area. Twenty two years later, the
UN confirmed the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon (with some
violations) and helped in drawing the Blue Line between the two states. Till
now, the second objective has not been achieved totally, despite the fact that
the 'Lebanese Armed forces' (LAF) were deployed in the South in 2006, for the
first time since three decades.
its deployment, UNIFIL has been accused of ineffectiveness, weakness and
incapability, especially due to its inability to fulfill its mandate. When the
new 'robust' force was discussed in the aftermath of the 2006 war between
Israel and Hezbollah, many at the UN offices and in the world thought it would
be a new phase of effective UN peacekeeping in Lebanon.
the UN officials and organizations don't use different names for the old UNIFIL
which has been deployed in 1978 under the authorization of the SC resolutions
425 and 426, or the 'robust' UNIFIL, which has been deployed in 2006, within
the authorization of Resolution 1701. However, this paper shall recall the
terms: UNIFIL I and UNIFIL II, for the sake of differentiation and clarity.
research seeks to fill the research gap that exists regarding the perceptions
of the Lebanese local communities towards UNIFIL. Most of the publications
about UNIFIL seek to define the force, its Rules of Engagement (RoE), as well
as positive and negative outcomes of the peacekeeping experiences in Lebanon. Little
tried to seek how the UNIFIL fits in the locals' narratives, and the researches
about the Lebanese attitudes towards what became a 'perennial' force in their
land are rare.
UNIFILII a peacekeeping mission or a Peace Enforcement mission trying to disarm
Hezbollah and defend Israel as some EU officials has said in 2006?
- How do the highly politicized Lebanese people
judge UNIFIL's presence and role before and after 2006?
the religion is the dominant variable in the Lebanese politics and history, what
is the role of religion in shaping their attitudes towards UNIFIL?
out of all major accusations of UNIFIL I of ineffectiveness, why do the
Southern Lebanese have this affection with that force?
to bridge the gap and answer these questions, this study utilizes secondary sources
about UNIFIL experience in Lebanon, and relies on surveys and interviews with
the locals - the author has conducted in Eastern Sector of the UNIFIL
deployment in August 2015- plus an interview with UNIFIL spokesperson, Mr.
Andrea Tenenti, on 2 September 2015.
this research, I argue that:
There is ambiguity in the language of the UNSC Resolution 1701; it doesn't
refer directly to chapter VII, however uses the strong language of chapter VII.
Some NATO contingents tried to benefit from this ambiguity to apply their own
national agendas, and practice wide interpretation for 1701. However, the
realities in the South made them more humble and forced them to abide by the
narrow interpretation of 1701.
II was sought to be a different force from UNIFIL I with more aggressive
mandate, different (RoE), and with an ability to enforce peace not just keeping
it. Real politics moved UNIFIL II away from overt peace enforcement type of activities
towards a more UNIFIL I style.
does shape the perceptions of the Lebanese towards UNIFIL, but it may not be
the dominant variable. The outcome of the surveys reveals that the political
stances as well as the behavior of the troops have the major role in the
Lebanese attitudes towards UNIFILII.
While UNIFIL I was accused of inefficiency and weakness, UNIFIL II is accused
of aggressiveness, spying and lack of understanding of cultural sentiments.
UNIFIL I despite its shortcomings, could win the hearts and minds of the
population and became a part of the land.
is caught in the dilemma of credibility and impartiality. Credibility sometimes
is the price of keeping the impartiality image.
the peacekeeping experiences in many countries has been marked by some scandals
like killing civilians, humiliating people, rape and sexual abuse, the UNIFIL
history - through 37 years in Lebanon-
is described as excellent and so clean despite some tensions between the locals
and UNIFIL II soldiers.
First part of this paper gives brief definitions and an overview of the peacekeeping
and peace enforcement concepts. The second part details the political context
within which UNIFIL I and II were created and the challenges they faced. The
third part displays the results of the surveys conducted in addition to some
analysis and comments from UNIFIL spokesperson, and the final part shows the
outcomes and evaluations.
it was not mentioned in the charter, Peacekeeping has been a major part of the
functions of the UN through its history. The Second secretary general
Hammarskjöld elaborated that concept during the Suez conflict 1956. On July 26,
1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of
the Suez Canal Company, which lead to a conflict between Egypt, Israel and the
two dominant powers Britain, and France. On October 29, 1956, the Israeli
forces attacked across Egypt's Sinai Peninsula advancing to within 10 miles of
the Suez Canal. Under the pretext of protecting the Canal from the two
belligerents, Britain and France landed troops of their own a few days later. As
the Security Council was blocked with the British and French vetoes, it was the
General Assembly that adopted a resolution on 7 November, 1956 calling for the
creation of the first peacekeeping operation in UN history, the 'UN Emergency
Force in the Middle East' (UNEF).
When UNEF was
established Hammarskjöld considered it a new departure. "It is", he
said, "certainly not contrary to the Charter, but is in a certain sense
outside the explicit terms of the Charter".
peacekeeping operations, were not foreseen under either Chapter VI or VII of
the Charter, they fell somewhere in between. Hammarskjöld's famous 'Chapter VI½'
placed peacekeeping at the crossroads of peaceful and coercive measures.
laid down three principles that govern these operations:
(1) Consent from
the territorial state and other parties involved;
from the UN side to secure credibility in the operation; and
of force from the UN side, unless in individual self‐defense
or collective mission defense.
Later on, facing
the challenges of the Congo crisis in 1960, Hammarskjöld developed the concept
peacekeeping operations through creating a peace enforcement mission. He Urged
the Security Council to establish 'The United
Nations Organization in the Congo' (UNOC) which was the UN's first peacekeeping
mission with a significant military force, and deployed without the consent of
the parties. Trying to overlap on his previous basic principles on peacekeeping,
Hammarskjöld made it clear: "You
try to save a drowning man without prior authorization".
That statement shows
that Hammarskjöld believed in what was - then- set as "Responsibility to Protect"
norm in 2005, and his approach of protecting civilians through peacekeeping
operations which was brought by the Brahimi report (2000)
is now codified in the peacekeeping doctrine of the United Nations.
the 1990s, UN peace operations had come to be seen as falling into two separate
camps: peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. The former were the 'Blue
Helmet' operations commanded formally by the UN Secretary-General; while the
latter were war-fighting operations conducted by multinational forces ( usually
NATO forces) or 'coalitions of the willing' which were sponsored by SC, but
commanded by designated national commanders.
peacekeeping principles and guidelines (Capstone Doctrine) set the legality of
these peace operations within the Security Council mandate and
responsibilities; "the Security Council may adopt a range of measures,
including the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The
legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the
Charter... [P]rovided such activities are consistent with the purposes and
principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter".
The UN has
defined peacekeeping as missions "involving military personnel, but
without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain
or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict".
The Capstone Doctrine
defines peacekeeping as "a technique designed to preserve the peace,
however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing
agreements achieved by the peacemakers".
The three basic
principles of peacekeeping are:
a- The consent
of the parties or the territorial authority, derives
from the cornerstones of the charter and the international law; i.e.
sovereignty and non intervention.
This consent is
the main difference between a peacekeeping and a peace enforcement mission
which doesn't seek to have the consent of the parties. UN ensures the
importance of having the consent of the state or the parties of the conflict; "In
the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to
the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its
fundamental role of keeping the peace".
One of the UN
officials in the 'Department of Peace-keeping Operations' referred to
impartiality as the 'oxygen' of peacekeeping.
As Moskos defines it; "Impartiality means that the peacekeeping soldiers
have no apparent interest in seeing the moral vindication or material triumph
of either of the disputants".
that "Peacekeepers are intended to be enablers rather than enforcers. They
have no enemies and are not there to win. Their effectiveness depends on
voluntary cooperation. This in turn enables them to act impartially, since they
threaten no one. The abandonment of impartiality, whether deliberate or
inadvertent, runs the risk of turning the peace force into an enemy of one or
more of the parties".
Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and
cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or
inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings
with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their
c- Non-use of
force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate
saw in peacekeeping a role for the UN which was quasi-military but avoided the
use of force.
It was, later, approved that UN
peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool, however, they may use
force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if
acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate.
Urquhart was right when he insisted that: "The real strength of a
peacekeeping force lies not in its capacity to use force, but precisely in its not
using force and thereby remaining above the conflict and preserving its
unique position and prestige".
He went further to ensure that "The moment a peacekeeping force starts
killing people it becomes a part of the conflict it is supposed to be
controlling and thus a part of the problem".
The non-use of
force except in cases of self-defense or the defense of the mission ensures the
UN commitment to conflict resolution rather than being a party to the conflict.
Using force in
cases of self-defense is a natural and inherent right. It is derived from
Grotius philosophy who regarded "self-defense" or "the
preservation of the self" as a natural right of individuals that could not
be abrogated or limited by law. Grotius refers such right to the natural law; "the
right of self-defense has its origin directly, and chiefly, in the fact that
nature commits to each his own protection, not in the injustice or crime of the
exercise of the right to self-defense by UN peacekeepers, must be used proportionally,
as a last resort, and when absolutely necessary facing an imminent threat.
Quite apart from
legal considerations, it has been clear since the initiation of peacekeeping operations
that states are unwilling to provide forces to the UN if they are not accorded
the right of self-defense.
was Kurt Waldheim, the 4th UN Secretary General, who broadened the 'Self-defense'
He issued the concept of 'the defense of the mission' which was copied later on
by all subsequent UN peacekeeping operations. Waldheim in his report that
initiated UNEF II (1973) assured that "Self-defense would include resistance
to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under
the mandate of the Security Council".
Over the years,
peacekeeping operations advanced from traditional military models to combine a
complex form of many elements working together to help lay the foundations for
the collapse of USSR, and the end of cold war; Peacekeeping has developed into
two main types: traditional and robust (expanded).
The term 'traditional'
peacekeeping is used to refer to UN peace operations involving the deployment
of military contingents to monitor, supervise and verify compliance with
ceasefires, ceasefire lines, withdrawals, buffer zones and related military
often have a limited life and are set as 'interim' forces. However, some of
them end up as 'freezing' missions, or stuck on lines of fire between the
After the cold
war, a new form of 'robust' peacekeeping emerged. The Security Council initiated
UN peacekeeping operations giving
them more expanded mandates and authorizing them to 'use all necessary means'
to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians
under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national
authorities in maintaining law and order.
enforcement is defined as an operation that aims to "ensure the
implementation of a peace agreement or arrangement (such as a ceasefire),
including compliance by all parties with their undertakings, through the
judicious application of incentives and disincentives, among them the robust
use of force".
doctrine insists that "It involves the application, with the authorization
of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of
military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and
security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression".
Origins of the Term
The meaning of
the term peace enforcement is often disputed. When soldiers are performing
enforcement actions under a UN Security Council mandate, they are still called
peacekeepers. The term's origins are found in the UN Charter under Chapter VII
in the designated procedures for reacting against 'breaches of peace and acts
The first real
use of the term peace enforcement came with the 6th Secretary General of the
UN, Boutros Ghali. In his report to the Security Council, Agenda for Peace
(1992), he outlined the procedures for the use of 'peace enforcement
forces', arguing that:
States should place at the UN's disposal volunteers to manage broken or
ineffective cease fires,
2) The forces must be more heavily armed than peacekeepers
and undergo extensive preparatory training, and
3) Such forces would be under the command of
the UN Secretary General".
Ghali's report didn't
give a definition to peace enforcement, however a clear definition of the term
has to wait until the British and the American military doctrines on
peacekeeping were published on 1994.
field manual, Wider Peacekeeping, published in September 1994
defined peace enforcement as: "Operations carried out to restore peace
between belligerent parties who do not all consent to interventions and who may
be engaged in combat activities".The
US Army's Field Manual of December 1994 defined peace enforcement as, "The
application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to
international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted
resolutions or sanctions."
Even the Brahimi
report (2000), did not define peace enforcement, but recommended that the
mandate must authorize the use of force and those bigger, better-equipped
forces, and more costly forces should be used to present a more credible
UN made a clear distinction between the 'robust' peacekeeping and 'peace
enforcement' missions: "Although on the ground they may sometimes appear
similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as
envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:
peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the
authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the
main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require
the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at
the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member
States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security
1- Most of the Lebanese internal problems in recent
history started after signing the Arab League-sponsored 'Cairo Agreement'.
Under that agreement, the 'Palestinian armed resistance' gained official
legitimacy, freedom of movement, and the right to establish autonomous
institutions in the refugee camps inside Lebanon. The influx of
Palestinian militants who fled Jordan following the 'Black September' in 1970
turned southern Lebanon to a battlefield between Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Israel from one side and PLO and other Lebanese militias
on the other side. This turned southern Lebanon, thereafter, to what the
Lebanese call 'Fatah Land' where the PLO fighters risked the lives of the
Lebanese, raped women, killed their opponents, and tried to dominate Lebanon
militarily driving Lebanon to civil war on 1975.
On 14 March 1978, Israel invaded south Lebanon in response to an operation executed
inside Israel by a Palestinian gunman who originated in the Lebanese territory,
leaving over 30 civilians killed. The Israeli major invasion of Lebanon
resulted in the deaths of as many as 2,000 people, mostly civilians. Lebanon
strongly protested to the UN Security Council, which adopted two resolutions;
425 and 426, on 17 March 1978.
Compared to other Security Council resolutions during the cold war, adopting
the resolution 425 was surprisingly fast. Urquhart, the former Undersecretary-General
of the United Nations, explains that; "the Camp David negotiations, which
the United States was sponsoring between Egypt and Israel, had reached a
critical stage. If the Council took no action on Lebanon, President Anwar Sadat
of Egypt could not be expected to continue negotiations with Israel when Israel
had just invaded yet another Arab country. The United States was, therefore,
pressing hard for urgent action in the Security Council and specifically for a
UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon".
425 called "upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against
Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all
Lebanese territory;" It also decided "in
the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately
under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the
the withdrawal of Israeli forces,
international peace and security; and
the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in
Resolution 426 approved the UN Secretary General's report on the implementation
of UNSC resolution 425 and authorized the deployment of UNIFIL force.
UNIFIL's (RoE) included provisions to "use its best efforts to prevent the
recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation is not utilized
for hostile activities of any kind". Moreover, the peacekeeping units could
"not use force except in self-defense" and were required to maintain "complete
The Secretary General report also made it clear that there were three
pre-conditions for UNIFIL to be effective: "First, it must have at all
times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Second, it must
operate with the full cooperation of all the parties concerned. Third, it must
be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit."
UNIFIL couldn't get the consent of the parties of the conflict: The official
Lebanese government welcomed, however Israel, its proxies, and the most radical
factions in PLO rejected the presence of UN peacekeepers. As Israel withdrew
some of its troops from Lebanon on 13 June 1978, it handed the authority to the
South Lebanon Army (SLA), under Saad Haddad command, to take control of what
they called the 'Free Lebanon' zone. While the relationship between UNIFIL and
the PLO remained tense over the years, it is the SLA that accounted for the
bulk of attacks against UNIFIL in southern Lebanon.
from their unwillingness to share Lebanon's southern border strip with UNIFIL,
the SLA saw the peacekeeping force as powerless and consistently confronted it.
The SLA was delegated to protect Israel's northern border against the PLO. The
two non-state actors fought severely, and UNIFIL was caught in the middle of their
On 6 June 1982, in response to a failed attempt to assassinate the Israeli ambassador
in London, Israel launched a massive invasion of Lebanon, reaching Beirut
within days. For the first time in Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel occupies an
Arab capital. Lebanese authorities reported that an estimated 19,000 people had
been killed and 30,000 wounded during the invasion.
In August 1982,
the United States brokered an agreement to end the fighting and evacuate PLO
and Syrian forces from Beirut. A
Multinational Force (MNF1), composed of US, French, British and Italian troops,
arrived on 21 August 1982, as a peace mission to administer the agreement. The
pro-Israeli candidate Bashir Gemayal was elected president of Lebanon eleven days
later. The MNF1 withdrew on August 30, following the evacuation of the PLO.
8- On 16
September 1982, in revenge for the assassination of president-elect Bashir
Gemayel, the Israeli-backed Christian militias (Kataeb) entered two Palestinian
refugee camps in Beirut (Sabra and Shatilla), and massacred many hundreds of
Palestinians over a period of three days.
Ronald Reagan decided to deploy a new US- Multi-National Force (USMNF) to help
the Lebanese government restore and maintain stability. That Multinational
Force, which was deployed without UN endorsement, was soon driven to be a part
of the civil war. By August 1983, less than a year after their arrival, USMNF
troops were exchanging fire with various factions in Lebanon's civil war.
The Western foundation of the USMNF led most people in the Middle East to
perceive it as a NATO operation. On April 18, 1983, the U.S. embassy in West
Beirut was bombed. On October 23, 1983, a terrorist attack in a huge truck
demolished the U.S. Marine's base and French quarters in Beirut, killing 241
American and 58 French soldiers. Under escalating
congressional and local pressure, the US president ordered the withdrawal of
USMNF, which was completed on 26 February 1984.
By 1990, the civil war in Lebanon ended with the implementation of Taif
agreement, which called - among many other things- for: "privileged relations with Syria, the
immediate implementation of UNSC Resolution 425, the withdrawal of Israeli
occupation troops, the dissolution of local militias and their integration into
the Lebanese Army".
By the end of the
civil war, Hezbollah gained more legitimacy as a resistance against Israeli
occupation and soon it monopolized the armed resistance in the South.
Aiming to drive Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon, Israel launched two major
incursions (1993 and 1996). UNIFIL had now been reduced to 4,500 troops and
could only deliver humanitarian assistance, watch and record, including the
attack on the Fijian Battalion Headquarters of UNIFIL in the village of Qana on
18 April 1996.
The shelling of Qana took place when Israeli artillery attacked a UN compound
in the village where 800 Lebanese civilians had taken refuge to escape the
fighting. The result was: 107 civilians dead and around 116 others injured,
including four Fijian UNIFIL peacekeepers. While Israel claimed it was a
mistake, the UN investigative report stated that "the pattern of impacts
in the Qana area makes it unlikely that the shelling of the United Nations
compound was the result of technical and/or procedural errors".
- Rather than deterring Hezbollah's capacity to strike against Israeli soldiers
in the occupied Southern Lebanon, the 1993 and 1996 incursions actually
strengthened inter-sectarian solidarity against Israel and compelled the
international community to react once again by helping to negotiate a 'Document
of Understanding' between Israel and Hezbollah on 27 April 1996.
'April Understanding' established what were to become the new 'rules of the
game', prohibits the belligerent parties from targeting civilians and firing
from civilian areas.
13- On 17 April 2000, the Secretary-General received
formal notification from the Government of Israel that it would withdraw its
forces from Lebanon by July 2000 "in full accordance with Security Council
resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)". Starting on 16 May, much sooner than expected, the IDF and
its proxies began to evacuate in great and surprising rush. On 25 May, the
Government of Israel notified the Secretary-General that Israel had redeployed
its forces in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426
United Nations cartographer and his team, assisted by UNIFIL, worked on the
ground to identify the Line between the two states- the Blue Line-
which was adopted for the practical purposes of confirming the Israeli
withdrawal, and till now- it is not considered the official international
border between the two states.
The period between May 2000 and July 2006 was calm along the Blue Line, but
many of the root causes of the conflict remained. Actually, Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon was not complete; there are still some occupied land i.e. Shebaa
Farms, Kafarshuba hills, and the northern part of Ghajar village. These
occupied territories maintained Hezbollah's armed resistance legitimacy.
Lebanese prisoners detained by Israel and provided an excuse for Hezbollah's operation
on 12 July 2006 with the aim of capturing Israeli soldiers in order to engage
in prisoners' exchange with Israel.
By the time of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, UNIFIL troops had been reduced to
their lowest number since 1978, down to only around 2,000.
Following Hezbollah's operation, Israel reacted fiercely. Israel's armed forces targeted not just
Hezbollah positions, but also the Lebanese Army bases, civilian areas and
infrastructure throughout Lebanon.
On 13 July, Israel bombed Beirut's
International Airport and imposed a total land, sea and air blockade on
Lebanon. By 14 July, Israel's declared aims had gone beyond the mere return of
its captured soldiers and now sought the total elimination of Hezbollah and
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559. The war lasted 33 days,
and resulted in the deaths of 1,200 Lebanese and 43 Israeli civilians, as well
as the internal displacement of a million Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis. Hezbollah kept shelling rockets on
Israel till the last day of war.
16- The US-French drafted
text of UNSC resolution that had been circulated on 5 August,
aimed to give UNIFIL only a supervising and humanitarian role, while a
NATO-supported "international force" would deal with the task of
disarming Hezbollah, implementing UNSC Resolution 1559,
and guaranteeing security for Israel along the Blue Line.
The war ended on 14 August 2006, when the UNSC Resolution 1701 went into effect.
The Resolution which was unanimously passed on 12 August 2006; declared the "cessation
of hostilities", and established a new mandate for UNIFIL. It was
ultimately accepted by all parties to the conflict as "a compromise deal
that was urgently needed in light of the humanitarian disaster and Israel's
military failure on the battlefield".
The language of the new resolution was absent from the previous controversial
references in the US-French draft to peace enforcement measures under Chapter
VII, didn't mention clearly disarming Hezbollah, and retreated from the
idea of an "international force".
As for UNIFIL, Resolution 1701 authorized an expanded force increasing its
troop strength to a maximum of 15,000. And for the first time in UN history, a
Maritime Task Force (MTF) was deployed. The first troops of the expanded force
were deployed with record-breaking speed for any peacekeeping operation of such
Many States declared their willingness to contribute, and by July 2015, the
number of contributing countries was 39.
addition to carrying out its original mandate under Council resolutions 425 and
426 (1978), UNIFIL would:
the cessation of hostilities.
and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South,
including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from
its activities referred to in the preceding paragraph (above) with the
Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel.
its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations
and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.
the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment
between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any
armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of
Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area.
the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and
other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of
arms or related materiel.
resolution, the SC also authorized UNIFIL to' take all necessary action' in
areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to
ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of
any kind; to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging
its duties under the mandate of the Security Council; and to protect United
Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security
and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and,
without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
- UNIFIL II in the field:
arrival of 'robust' UNIFIL units coincided with growing suspicions among most Southern
Lebanese. It was seen as a NATO tool to disarm the 'Resistance' under the
umbrella of UN peace mission. Suspicions increased when the new robust UNIFIL
troops – particularly those from the Spanish and French contingents – appeared
overly militant, aggressive and disrespectful to the locals.
2006 and 2007, most of the locals refused to engage with UNIFILII largely due
to the outstanding mistrust and the statements made by Western leaders, such as
German Chancellor Angela Merkel's proclamation that "UNIFIL was there to
The EU political statements joined with the UNIFIL Force commander General
Alain Pellegrini statements
made it impossible for the Lebanese to trust the new forces.
20- Contrary to the aforementioned statements,
the Secretary General Kofi Annan has been quoted to say; "If, for example,
combatants, or those illicitly moving weapons, forcibly resist a demand from
them, or from the Lebanese Army, to disarm, then armed force could be used".
He added, however, that disarming Hezbollah "is not going to be done by
force....The expanded peacekeeping force's mandate is to support the Lebanese
Army in enforcing the resolutions. But disarmament of Hezbollah "has to be
achieved through negotiation, and an internal Lebanese consensus, a political process,
for which the new UNIFIL is not, and cannot be, a substitute".
to UNIFIL II
In the months
after the 2006 war, Ayman al-Zawahri (One of Al Qaeda's leaders) called for
Sunni extremists in Lebanon to take up arms against UN peacekeepers.
The first attack came in June 2007 and six members of the Spanish battalion
were killed when their armored personnel carrier was struck by a powerful and
sophisticated car bomb.
- Another small
attack few weeks later involving a stick of dynamite detonated beside Tanzanian
military police at the Qasmiyah Bridge north of Tyre.
- Two other
attacks planned for the Abbassiyeh area near Tyre never materialized and
another targeting UNIFIL soldiers on Tyre beach failed.
- Jan. 8, 2008,
a road side bomb exploded on the coastal highway near Rmeileh beside a jeep
carrying Irish soldiers, lightly wounding two of them. The bombing came less
than two weeks after Al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden threatened both UNIFIL
troops and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in a recording released 29
2009, the Lebanese Permanent Military Court indicted five Palestinians related
the Fatah el Islam (a Radical group affiliated with al- Qaeda) for their role
in the Irish bomb attack and other terrorist-related activities.
- May 2011:
unclaimed bomb blast on the southern coastal highway near Rmeileh wounded six
Italian peacekeepers and two civilians. A week before the attack, the Lebanese
Army caught a radical militant planning to fire rockets from a place near
Hasbaya, just outside UNIFIL's area of operations.
Even though UNIFIL II has been praised for
more powerful (RoE), its performance has not been without criticism, and it has
received the same accusations of incompetency as the preceding UNIFIL I troops,
in addition to accusations of unilateral widening of ( RoE) and acting
independently of LAF which led to
tensions with the local population.
Most of the criticisms
of inefficiency are due to the violations of 1701, especially UNIFIL II
inability to stop the continuous daily Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace,
plus Israeli occupation of Lebanese territories.
-Tensions with the locals
generally enjoyed full freedom of movement throughout its area of operations. However,
on many occasions, it encountered tensions with the civilians and have been
prevented from freedom of movement in its area of deployment (Sector West and
tensions and skirmishes between UNIFIL troops and some local villagers, former
Force Commander Major-General Alberto Asarta Cuevas addressed the people of
south Lebanon in an open letter on 08 July 2010, promising them to be more
careful and assuring that there are no hidden national agendas for the
the whole nine years (2006-2015), series of
standoffs and clashes erupted between UNIFILII troops and Lebanese villagers in
the border region:
- Villagers accused
French peacekeepers of offensive and disturbing patrols, driving heavy vehicles
causing damages to the roads, and of taking pictures of people inside their
- People of Marjayoun, accused the French regiments of
driving their heavy vehicles through their two-month-old tobacco fields, destroying
their only means of economic support.
- July 2010: Failing
to coordinate with the Lebanese Army, the French contingent decided to carry
out exercises unilaterally. Residents in 22 villages in the South took
to the streets, blocked roads and attacked French troops with stones. French soldiers fired against the angry civilians,
who smashed the vehicles' windows by stones and wounded the French commander.
French troops were forcibly disarmed by the villagers, and weapons were then
handed over to the Lebanese Army.
Tensions due to aggressive driving and high speed car accidents
locals accuse UNIFIL drivers of high speed driving inside the villages. The
high rate of UNIFIL II car accidents proves the accuracy of these accusations.
the internal audit of UNIFIL ground transport on June 2009, proved that; "The
Mission had a high rate of accidents as compared to the previous year, with
nearly 70 per cent accidents caused by UN drivers' fault".
author conducted surveys in Sector East of UNIFILII deployment from 15- 25 August
2015. The Eastern Sector was chosen because it has heterogeneous population,
i.e. Shiaa Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Sunni Muslims. However, the Western
Sector is mainly inhabited by Shiaa; where the total majority is supporters of
Hezbollah, and their perspectives maybe different from those of other religions
and sects in Lebanon.
in consideration the percentages of Muslims and Christians in the Sector, the
survey is categorized as follows:
Muslims (Druze, Sunni and Shiaa);
no. of respondents is 150, categorized by age as follows:
37 % of them are
between 40 and 60 years of age,
25 % are between
26 and 40 years,
20 % are above
18% are between
15 and 25.
Are you satisfied with the UNIFIL's role in providing security?
% of the respondents said NO, they are not satisfied, while 23 % said YES, they
are satisfied, 5 % with no answer.
shows that Lebanese locals feel that UNIFIL II has not been successful in its
mission in providing security.
In an open question: Name is the provider of security, in your opinion?
(57%) of the respondents said Hezbollah is the
provider of security, UNIFIL alone (3%) and UNIFIL + LAF (40%).
answers are in accordance with common trends in Lebanon that 'Hezbollah is the
provider of Security against ISIS threats' even among non- Shiaa. A survey
conducted among Christians in Lebanon on Oct. 2014, revealed that "Two-thirds
of Lebanon's Christians believe Hezbollah is protecting Lebanon from the threat
of terrorists (extremist groups), and when asked about replacing Hezbollah
fighters with UN peacekeepers on Lebanon's eastern borders with Syria, to
counter attacks by extremist groups, 58 % of those surveyed said they are
Are you satisfied with the UNIFIL's role in keeping peace?
% said they are satisfied, while 40% are not satisfied, 5% with no answer.
the Christian, Sunni and Druze perceptions have high positive results.
the results of questions (1, 2, and 3), we find:
perceptions about security are different from those of Peace. That means UNIFILII
has succeeded in conflict management and mediation, but is still seen as ineffective,
powerless force despite all the heavy arms and powerful NATO troops.
perceptions of weakness and inability are commonly shared by all religious
groups in Lebanon. Those are due to UNIFIL's inability to deter Israeli confrontations.
references to UNIFIL's powerless position refer - as example- to the passive
reaction of UNIFIL when a Spanish observer was killed on January 28, 2015 by
mortar rounds fired by Israeli forces.
People say that the force didn't react
or release any statement even the UNIFIL officers were convinced that Israel
deliberately targeted one of their positions.
UNIFIL didn't even release the outcome of the investigative report, which was
leaked later on, and it revealed that "UN position was clearly targeted".
behind the negative results concerning security issue can be effectively
described by a statement quoted from one of the respondents "if they can't
protect or defend themselves against the Israelis, how can they provide
security for us?"
Have you ever benefited from UNIFIL Services?
Yes (23%) - 77% No.
It means only 23% of the total respondents
said that they have benefited, while 77% didn't.
means that the affirmative votes and the positive perceptions about peace
(question 2) have nothing to do with the humanitarian aid, or personal benefits
of the respondents.
Andrea Tenenti, UNIFIL spokesperson, refers this low percentage "to the
fact the projects are mainly public projects. UNIFIL is doing projects
everywhere in the villages, like building schools, providing generators or
rebuilding roads etc... So the question may have emphasized on personal
benefits and this is not the case of UNIFIL projects in the South".
Do you think that UNIFIL is impartial between Lebanon and Israel, when there are
% said NO, 30 % said yes, and 5 % with no answer.
means the Lebanese perceptions towards UNIFIL's impartiality are negative. They
see UNIFILII is biased and partial in favor of Israel.
Tenenti, says that this maybe also the case on the other side of the border "when
we go to Israel, they accuse us that UN is always blaming Israel". He
finds "these accusations on both sides of the borders are the outcome
of the Mediation role of UNIFIL. Mediation obliges you to be very neutral, and
this is sometimes perceived as a bias".
Do you think that UNIFIL can stop Israeli violations?
said NO, while 7 % said yes, and 2% have no answer.
general, these negative Lebanese perceptions are not surprising. There is a common
general conviction in Lebanon that UN in general is incapable of preventing
Israeli violations to international law, and particularly to 1701. This
conviction has been derived from the UNIFIL long history in Lebanon, the
continuous daily Israeli violations of 1701, and the Israeli shelling of
Spanish Supervision base.
Do you think that UNIFIL treat the locals equally?
of the respondents said YES, while 45% said NO they don't treat the southern
equally, and 15% had no answer.
who said that there is discrimination refer it to:
saying that UNIFILII discriminate between Christian and Muslim villages.
affiliations: they believe that NATO contingents apply independent national
agendas, and discriminate against people in accordance to political
affiliations i.e. they prefer Christians, Sunnis and Druze because Shiaa are
supporters of Hezbollah.
spokesperson, Mr. Tenenti, claims that the positive perceptions should be
higher than that. He says; "In the past, the negative perceptions were
high but this has changed after the UNIFIL new strategies. Things were done in
the past differently, especially in terms of transparency. Now, we are hiring
personnel from all villages, we give opportunities to all of them, and projects
are distributed equally between villages. There is a committee in the
organization decides the priorities, and the local municipalities request their
needs. Thousands of projects have been distributed equally between villages in
both sectors; east and west".
the claims of independent national agendas of NATO troops, He said "we
work for UN not for our national countries; therefore there are no independent
national agendas. It was important to be
clear from the beginning that we are here to implement the UN agenda not the
national ones. Even it is your money, but you should spend it on UN projects
and under UN umbrella".
Which contingent do you trust? (In the East Sector):
Trust according to religious affiliation of the respondents:
those who had answers:
85% of Christian respondents said they trust the Spanish contingent the most,
15% of them trust the Indonesian force, 0% for the French, and 0% for the
50% trust the Indonesian force, 31% trust the Spanish, and 11% trust the
French, 8% trust the Indians.
Overall, How do you evaluate the UNIFIL role in the South?
those who had answers:
87% had positive perceptions, while 13% had negative perceptions.
64% had positive perceptions, while 36% had negative perceptions.
answers in (7, 8, and 9), we can realize the following:
Southern Lebanese of different backgrounds, sects and religions have positive
perceptions towards UNIFIL major role in the South.
positive perceptions vary according to the religious affiliation of the
Trust given to
the contingents, differs according to the nationality of the troops.
is almost the dominant variable in Lebanon doesn't seem the dominant one in the
Lebanese perceptions towards UNIFIL. If the religion was the dominant variable,
Christians should have trusted both the French and the Spanish and not the
Noting that 77%
of the respondents didn't benefit from UNIFIL services, it means that either
the political opinions (suspicious of EU/ NATO agendas) or the behavior of the
troops are the dominant variables in the trust given to the contingents.
I: the Nostalgia
open discussions with the locals, people talked about their shared memories
with UNIFIL I, and drew some comparisons between UNIFIL I and UNIFIL II, here
- Old UNIFIL
patrols were friendly, but newer patrols have a colder and aggressive
- UNIFIL I
soldiers were part of our families, while the new ones are almost terrified and
drive quickly through villages.
- UNIFILI became one with the land; they were
our only means to survive through decades of occupation.
- They (UNIFIL
I) provided compassion and assistance to people who had long been ignored by
the Lebanese State.
Love has no borders: we had many love stories with the soldiers. We counted around
60 marriages with Norwegian soldiers.
They helped me building the orphanage, without them the orphans couldn't
They defended us; they sacrificed their lives for us.
of the UNIFIL II as a peacekeeping force under Chapter VI or as a Chapter VI
activity has been disputed:
a- The 'Security
Council Special Research Report' about Resolution 1701 stated clearly "although
the Resolution does not explicitly mention Chapter VII, 1701 was clearly
adopted by the Council using Chapter VII powers... [UNIFIL] was given an
enforcement mandate with strong (RoE). The concept of operations is also very
innovative as are the arguments for command and control".
final text of the resolution 1701 remained vague in many key passages and left some
remnants of 5th August draft text which implied the embedding of Chapter VII
the final preamble paragraph of the resolution, the following statement was added:
"determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international
peace and security." This statement refers directly to the Chapter VII
logic, and not that of Chapter VI, which is concerned with the "Pacific
settlement of disputes."
"Security Council resolutions which authorize the use of force never
specifically mention it, they usually mandate a mission simply asked to use 'all
necessary means' to accomplish its mandate, and refrain from specifying in
advance the appropriate level of force to be used".
By the same way, The SC resolution 1701 "authorizes UNIFIL to take
all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems
within its capabilities..."
On the contrary, those who refer to the UNIFILII as a peacekeeping force under
the authorization of Chapter VI, base their argument that UNIFILII has been
granted the consent of the parties, i.e. Lebanon, Israel and even Hezbollah
which was - and still- a part of the government which gave its consent to the
Besides, The use
of force and its new (RoE) are robust in the sense that the authority to use
force remains based on the principle of self-defence. For all other situations,
UNIFIL cannot use force, or behave without coordination with LAF who take the
UNIFIL official spokesperson ensures "our mission is a chapter VI
mission, even though we have wide RoE. There is no need for peace enforcement
at this time. Definitely, we are a peacekeeping mission; there is nothing like
VI and half. Either it is VI or VII; we are - definitely- not a peace
enforcement mission. We have heavy equipment. It is not used, but it is a kind
of deterrent." He adds "UNSC resolution 1701 is completely
under chapter VI of the Security Council. The Mission is here at the invitation
of the Lebanese Government and all our activities are carried out in close
partnership and coordination with the LAF".
aforementioned divergent views for the interpretation of UNSC 1701 and the
UNIFIL II mandate were dominant between different contingents before and during
their deployment in Lebanon in the post-war era.
of the EU contingents in UNIFILII came with aggressive attitudes and broad
interpretation for the resolution 1701 and its RoE. Many had been a part of the
NATO coalition of the War in Iraq and Afghanistan, and tried to exercise the
same measures. Different attitudes and measures have been applied by smaller contingents
and the culturally more aware EU contingents like the Italians. Those
interpreted their mission as a peacekeeping mission and established close ties
with villagers; offering humanitarian services.
within few months, UNIFILII had been threatened by Al Qaeda. Their commanders
took the threats very seriously, and soon they discovered that they do not have
the necessary intelligence resources to protect the troops.
It was evident that the UN forces cannot face these challenges without good
relationships with the local communities. It was obvious also that Hezbollah's cooperation
and its extensive intelligence repertoire in the South are necessary to
ensuring UNIFIL's security and preventing future terrorist
attacks against it.
UNIFILI spokesperson, Timur Göksel, describes the new situation; "The
new UNIFIL caught on quickly to the realities of peacekeeping in South Lebanon
and realized that more than a combat force, they were supposed to be a conflict
management tool with heavy emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of the
population; and that good relations with the people would also be key to force
protection because true, useful intelligence information would come from them".
UNIFIL II established open channels of communication with the local population,
forged better relations with the local political leadership and municipalities,
which of course included Hezbollah members or supporters.
In time, French
and Spanish contingents eased their aggressive postures, and substituted heavy
vehicles with smaller unaggressive ones. Göksel says with some bitterness "The
UN, which had given the original UNIFIL humanitarian missions with a zero
dollar budget, also contributed money and personnel for quick impact projects".
He adds "Soon, the mood in South Lebanon began to change and the people
began to rely more and more on UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army for their needs.
Even Israel noticed that change in South Lebanon would lower the levels of
hostilities and eased back its perennial efforts to intimidate UNIFIL into
serving its own interests".
It was clear for
UNIFIL II that if they want to be secure and if they want to maintain their
security and succeed in their mission, they should stick to the narrow interpretation
of Resolution 1701 and do not adopt any proactive positions of an enforcement
This drives us
to a conclusion that" the robust UNIFIL II had been given - literally in
UNSC resolution 1701- an enforcement mandate, but it is actually applying just
peacekeeping roles. UNIFIL II moved away from explicit peace enforcement type
activities towards, a more humble UNIFIL I style.
UNIFIL spokesperson, Mr. Tenenti, confirms this conclusion; "the
reality was clear from the beginning the role if the mission is not to disarm
Hezbollah. Our mandate is to ensure that there is no entry for weapons in our
area. We are not in charge of the south, it is LAF. We are here to support
them, help them but at the end it is their duty".
notes that there is disagreement among the various experts in defining the
factors by which to evaluate a peacekeeping mission. He cites four criteria for
assessing the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission, proposed by Duane
Bratt in his book assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations:
a- Completion of
of conflict resolution,
of the conflict and
d- Limitation of
In accordance to
the aforementioned criteria, UNIFIL 1 has failed. However, it was obvious from
the beginning that UNIFIL's mission was impossible to achieve:
It couldn't get the consent of the parties. Israel, PLO, and De- facto forces
didn't welcome the deployment of UNIFIL and criticized Resolution 425.
It was a lightly armed force stuck in the middle of the conflict, where heavily
armed forces and undisciplined militias fight each other.
A force with minimum budget and little political international support.
Goksel was absolutely right when he said" That UNIFIL, despite its
unworkable mandate and with no political support except for a small group of
dedicated UN bureaucrats, turned out to be a resilient force that held its
ground despite suffering more than 100 fatalities killed in action (out of 250
total fatalities) was an achievement in its own right. The real and rarely
noticed success story however is how this force became a part of the land, how
it established close links with the ignored people who had no state services
whatsoever, gained their gratitude, enabled them to rebuild their lives and
helped to transform an abandoned landscape into a thriving, secure region
during the 1990s".
The success of a
peacekeeping mission is directly proportional to the level its effectiveness in
the force's commitment to the mandate, gaining mutual trust with the locals,
and cooperation of the parties to the conflict: the stronger those elements,
the greater the success. In these dimensions, UNIFIL II is proving to be
successful in facilitation of conflict resolution, containment of the conflict,
cooperation and trust- building with the parties, and providing humanitarian services
to the locals.
We can categorize three successful areas:
a- UNIFILII as a
Buffer zone between the parties
speaking, UNIFILII is in no position to stop the IDF in case of a new invasion,
or prevent Israeli incursions into Lebanese airspace which occur on a daily
basis. However, in the main time, UNIFILII shields both conflict parties from
presence serves both sides: From a Lebanese perspective, it constitutes extra power
to aid LAF in monitoring the border and enhancing the official authority in the
South. From an Israeli perspective, it is useful as a means to limit the
freedom of movement of Hezbollah.
b- UNIFILII as a
conflict management tool
dimension of UNIFIL's success is its role as a mediator between the LAF and the
IDF. Periodically, UNIFIL II hosts - in no men's land- tripartite meetings
between LAF and IDF to address military-strategic issues. Furthermore, a set of
UNIFIL liaison officers mediate the small day-to-day confrontations between
and liaison work serve both as a confidence-building tool and as a way to
prevent small incidents from developing into potential conflict.
c- UNIFILII as
an economic mobilizer
CIMIC activities, humanitarian projects, and hiring local personnel, UNIFILII
has developed to be into an important mobilizer to the local economy. The
economic dynamics and supporting the local population in their basic needs
proved to have political, military, and security outcomes.
In his report,
Brahimi urged the peacekeeping missions to develop the impartiality norm. He
was clear in his invitation to change the previous practices, "No failure
did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping
in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor".
forgot that distinguishing the victim from the aggressor is sometimes biased.
States tend to define the causal story of the conflict based on their
interests. They usually view conflicts from their own point of view rather than the perceptions of
those involved. Hezbollah for example, is seen as a resistance by the majority
of the Lebanese, However, regarded as a terrorist group by US and EU.
Big powers usually have tendency to side with one of the
parties, and this was obvious in the 5th of August draft of 1701. All these
undermine the cornerstone of peacekeeping, i.e. impartiality.
In Lebanon, the Multinational Peace mission in the Eighties
has been seen as partial, and this lead to a disaster for the peace mission
troops. Thus, it is very important for a UNIFIL to keep its image of impartiality;
otherwise it would undermine its legitimacy, and lose the consent of one or
The problem is how to combine seeking for impartiality
image, and gaining the credibility of the local population at the same time. As
we noticed in the results of the surveys, that the locals are not satisfied
with the UNIFIL II role in providing security, besides they didn't recognize
UNIFIL II as impartial.
UNIFIL had been caught in
the middle of this dilemma for many years, Mr. Teneneti describes it as follows
"legitimacy can be gained on behalf of credibility. You gain legitimacy
from impartiality but you tend to lose your credibility. Sometimes it is
frustrating if you cannot say who is the oppressor and who is the victim, but
how can you go to a tripartite meeting if one of the parties doesn't accept you
as impartial. So, credibility sometimes is the price".
As the Capstone
Doctrine assures, "The deployment of a peacekeeping mission
generates high expectations among the local population regarding its ability to
meet their most pressing needs. The ability to manage these expectations
throughout the life of a peacekeeping operation affects the overall credibility
of the mission. Credibility, once lost, is hard to regain. A mission with low
credibility becomes marginalized and ineffective. Its activities may begin to
be perceived as having weak or frayed legitimacy and consent may be eroded".
In accordance with these important and useful instructions, UNIFIL II should do
more to break the ice with the locals, to build trust, and gain more legitimacy
Troops should work on their fear, and most of all, they shouldn't appear
terrified. A terrified soldier cannot provide the local civilians a sense of
security and stability.
should improve its outreach strategy, and develop better communications with
the locals, and try to win the hearts and minds of diverse communities in the
impartiality has been questioned by the Lebanese, and their credibility is at
stake also. UNIFIL II is in need to develop its impartiality, and try to gain
doesn't mean better": UNIFILII consists of 39 contingents, however this
rainbow of forces, which have different military cultures and different agendas,
make it less effective.
5- UNIFIL II
shouldn't only rely on the positive perceptions of some religious sects or some
political parties in Lebanon; they should work on to gain the support of the
whole spectrum of different religions in the South.
6- National contingents
must minimize the rotations of the soldiers: It has been noticed that the
rotation of the troops is preventing soldiers from promoting better relations
with the locals.
The new comers
always need time to understand the cultural diversities and adapt with the new
trainings and workshops should be adopted to introduce new officers and
soldiers to the coming challenges, facilitate their understanding of the
mission and the environment, as well as increasing their cultural awareness.
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majority civilians, and about a third of these children. Moreover, around one
million people in Lebanon had been displaced by the war, 15,000 homes were
destroyed, and the infrastructure throughout the country was severely damaged. 43
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Israeli civilians were displaced, and thousands of homes were damaged in
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Former commander of the UNIFIL mission, French General
Alain Pellegrini, in an interview with Italian newspaper La Republica on
December 20, 2006, said that “the threat issued by al-Qaeda is to be taken
seriously. We have stepped up security measures so as to protect the Blue
Helmets against any attacks.” (See BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December
On this issue,
Mr. Tenenti said " we don't talk to political parties, we have
relations with all official bodies; national and local authorities even they
are supporters to Hezbollah. there is no direct relation with Hezbollah".
Timur Göksel, UNIFIL
– Peacekeepers in the Line of Fire, op.cit, p.4.
Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails,
Palgrave Macmillan, USA, 2001, p.19.
- A/55/305 - S/2000/809, op. cit, (paras. 48-64)