Quote on my App. on iphone and Android

What you may think as a curse, can be the ultimate dream for others... Be grateful.

Quote of the day on my App on iphone and android

Everything is negotiable except freedom and Dignity... 

Keep dreaming!

If you have a dream, don't let anyone destroy it... and if you don't have, invent one!

Separate people from their costumes!

It has been said: Separate People from the problem. And I add: Separate people from their costumes and clothes, and look at them as humans with dignity.

Rising Women Rising World Launch at the UK Parliament 17Nov, 2014

When you raise a woman, she'll raise her voice
She will call the world, and she will be heard
She will use her power to help every girl and mother
She will teach them to fly 
She will encourage them to touch the sky .
She will add to their dictionary 
The how , the when , the where , and the why

To question ,to answer , to start a fire
To love, to dream, to build a team
To empower the ambitions
To change the conditions
To give birth to a generation of visionaries
To beautify the world, to accomplish her missions.

Dr. leila Nicolas at Oxford University

Dr. Leila Nicolas is going to deliver 2 talks at Oxford University: 1- A seminar :'Current challenges in the Middle East - Views from an activist, woman, analyst' -  (12.11.2014 17.00 h)check the invitation on this link:http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/details/35064-cis-conversations-current-challenges-in-the-middle-east-views-from-an-activist-woman-analyst.html

2- A lecture:Transitional Justice: the "doable" Syrian options ( 14.11. 2014 12.00h)check the invitation on this link:http://otjr.crim.ox.ac.uk/index.php/events/seminar/447-transitional-justice-the-doable-syrian-options.html  

Dr. Leila Nicolas app. on iphone and android

Guilt or Shame!

There is a huge difference between guilt and shame.. Never let anyone drive you to the "Blame, Shame" situation... if you are guilty, admit it but never accept to shrink in a destructive shame.

Motivation vs. preaching!

There is a huge difference but a thin line between "motivation", "influencing" and "Preaching"... People need someone to motivate them, influence them to make the change needed in their lives.... But, NEVER a PREACHER who assumes that he/ she owns the whole truth, and he / she is "in the know" and you are ignorant and needed to be advised.

Change your Perspective!

Change your Perspective, deal with what you offer as an "Investment" not a "Sacrifice".

Neighboring Insurgency: How are the Syrian Crisis and International Responses Driving Lebanon to a Fragility Trap?

Paper Presented at the panel "Local Ownership, Global Collective Action, and Addressing Fragile States" in the 2014 Annual Meeting – Global Governance: Engaging New Norms and Emerging Challenge,  June 19- 21, 2014

Introduction

Lebanon and Syria, two neighboring countries in the Middle East, have always been interrelated in all aspects socially, politically, economically and even culturally. The two countries share a 365-kilometer border, as well as extremely close historical, communal and familial ties.

In March 2011, a revolution erupted in Syria, starting a peaceful one then rapidly turned into a violent insurgency, which caused an unstable sphere, that transformed to a "magnet" to radicals and terrorists from all over the world.

2012 and subsequently, the Syrian war leaked out of its borders, causing major risks to Lebanon, which seldom has been immune to the events happening near its borders. Syrian spillover to Lebanon took many forms: military, economic, influx of refugees etc.  From the Syrian crisis’ early days, there was no doubt that Lebanon, traditionally under its neighbor's strong influence, would not remain un-influenced for long as Syria’s regime has a history of direct and indirect interference in Lebanese internal affairs.

Today, signs of Syria’s spillover effects are evident in Lebanon: Border lines between the two countries have been caught in the conflict, with weapon smuggling, as well as militant attacks against Lebanese villages. Political and sectarian tensions plus the huge influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon not only had humanitarian but also political, economic and security consequences.

Was Lebanon a fragile state before the Syrian crisis? What are the causes of fragility situations in Lebanon? What are the effects of Syrian crisis, international and donors' policies on Lebanon? How can the international community and donors in cooperation with local ownership help Lebanon overcome these consequences and escape fragility?.

In this paper, I assume that the effects of the spillover of the Syrian crisis and the international responses are deeply and negatively affecting the Lebanese State's existence, leading to a strong belief that Lebanon is heading rapidly to a "fragility trap".

This paper is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief sketch of the definitions of  a "Fragile state", including an overview of the Lebanese situations of fragility before the Syrian crisis. Section two presents a summary of the major political, structural, and economic effects of the Syrian spillover on Lebanon. The third section discusses the effects of donors' measures to cope with the refugees' crisis on Lebanon. The final section suggests some solutions and recommendations to help Lebanon escape a fragility trap.

Neighboring Insurgency: How are the Syrian Crisis and International Responses Driving Lebanon to a Fragility Trap?

Paper Presented at the panel "Local Ownership, Global Collective Action, and Addressing Fragile States" in the  ACUNS ( Academic council of UN) 2014 Annual Meeting – Global Governance: Engaging New Norms and Emerging Challenge, Istanbul,  June 19- 21, 2014

 

Contents

List of Acronyms 3

Introduction. 4

Section One: Is Lebanon a Fragile State? 5

1- Theoretical approaches of Fragility. 5

2- Lebanon before the Syrian crisis: not really a "Fragile State" but  had "Situations of Fragility" 8

Section Two:  Spillover  Consequences  driving  Lebanon  to  a "Fragility Trap" 11

1- Structural and Economic Factors 11

a- Geography. 11

b- Violent Conflicts, Terrorism and Organized Crime. 11

c- Demographic Stress 12

d- Low Income and Economic Decline. 14

e- Poverty. 14

f-Unemployment 14

g- Stress on Infrastructure. 15

2- Political and Institutional Crisis 15

a- Crises of State Legitimacy and Authority. 15

b- Tensions among the Lebanese, and the refugees 15

Section Three- Donors' Policies 17

- Direct Cash Programs 17

Section Four: Suggested Solutions and Recommendations 20

Bibliography. 24

 

 

 

List of Acronyms

Centre for Research on Inequality and Social Exclusion (CRISE)

Country Policy and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA)

The Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC)

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)

European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Human development index (HDI)

Indicators for Foreign Policy Scales (CIFP)

International Rescue Committee (IRC)

Lebanese Lira (LL)

Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

Millennium Development Goals (MDG)

Syrian Pounds (SYP)

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID)

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)

United States Dollars (USD)

World Food Program (WFP)

 

 

Introduction

Lebanon and Syria, two neighboring countries in the Middle East, have always been interrelated in all aspects socially, politically, economically and even culturally. The two countries share a 365-kilometer border, as well as extremely close historical, communal and familial ties.

In March 2011, a revolution erupted in Syria, starting a peaceful one then rapidly turned into a violent insurgency, which caused an unstable sphere, that transformed to a "magnet" to radicals and terrorists from all over the world.

2012 and subsequently, the Syrian war leaked out of its borders, causing major risks to Lebanon, which seldom has been immune to the events happening near its borders. Syrian spillover to Lebanon took many forms: military, economic, influx of refugees etc.  From the Syrian crisis’ early days, there was no doubt that Lebanon, traditionally under its neighbor's strong influence, would not remain un-influenced for long as Syria’s regime has a history of direct and indirect interference in Lebanese internal affairs.

Today, signs of Syria’s spillover effects are evident in Lebanon: Border lines between the two countries have been caught in the conflict, with weapon smuggling, as well as militant attacks against Lebanese villages. Political and sectarian tensions plus the huge influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon not only had humanitarian but also political, economic and security consequences.

Was Lebanon a fragile state before the Syrian crisis? What are the causes of fragility situations in Lebanon? What are the effects of Syrian crisis, international and donors' policies on Lebanon? How can the international community and donors in cooperation with local ownership help Lebanon overcome these consequences and escape fragility?.

In this paper, I assume that the effects of the spillover of the Syrian crisis and the international responses are deeply and negatively affecting the Lebanese State's existence, leading to a strong belief that Lebanon is heading rapidly to a "fragility trap".

This paper is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief sketch of the definitions of  a "Fragile state", including an overview of the Lebanese situations of fragility before the Syrian crisis. Section two presents a summary of the major political, structural, and economic effects of the Syrian spillover on Lebanon. The third section discusses the effects of donors' measures to cope with the refugees' crisis on Lebanon. The final section suggests some solutions and recommendations to help Lebanon escape a fragility trap.

 

 

 

Section One: Is Lebanon a Fragile State?

Before we answer the question: Is Lebanon a fragile state?, or whether it was so before the Syrian crisis, we have to make a brief literature review for definitions of "fragility" first.

1- Theoretical approaches of Fragility

          A literature review for "fragility" or "fragile states" reveals that these terms are highly disputed; there is no accepted and set definition of what constitutes a fragile state on the international academic levels, even though it is a term allocated to states that pose a threat to international order and security.

          Some refer "fragility"  to economic and developmental standards, some refer it to all political, social, economic and security aspects, and others argue that it is such a normative concept that puts definite assumptions of how states should perform, noting that these standards are mainly western ones.

          Whilst there is no internationally-agreed definition of the term "fragile state", the most influential definitions are those of the development- oriented approaches, mainly that of the World Bank, OECD, DFID and others. However there are other international trends for defining fragility; mainly conflict - oriented and stability - oriented approaches; which are correlated with the first stream illustrations of causes of fragility.

          Most development agencies define "fragility" principally as a fundamental failure of the state to perform functions necessary to meet citizens’ basic needs and expectations.[1] While the second and third streams describe fragile states as incapable of assuring basic security, maintaining rules of law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities for their citizens.[2]

a- Development- oriented approaches:

          To mention some definitions adapted by development agencies and donors, we choose the following:

- The World Bank defines fragile states as a set of countries exhibiting the most extensive fragile characteristics as low-income countries ranking among the lowest on the Country Policy and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA)[3].

It notes, however, that a definitive list of “Fragile States” is impossible to draw up since the defining characteristics “Fragile States”- are a continuum. Some countries have more fragile characteristics than others, and for many countries, fragile status is a phase[4].

- OECD defines “A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. "Fragile States" are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. "Resilient States" exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory, They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum”[5] .

          The OECD report expresses a shift from a “thin” to a “thick” conceptualization of state fragility, it considers a “thick” conceptualization to encompass “the multiple dimensions of state-society relations”[6] and a “substantive understanding centered on the quality of state-society relations and with greater attention to potential stress factors, including economic vulnerability, demographic dynamics, climate change and technological innovation”, and it can be summarized as follows: the “thin” approach is concerned with efficiency, stability and conformity, while the “thick” approach refers to liberal values of liberty and democracy[7].

          A solid critic to the OECD definition comes from Kaplan in an article published by Global Dashboard, where it argues that this definition offered by OECD "depends too much on Western ideological conceptions of how states ought to work, and ignores inconvenient (to Western mindsets) factors such as identity and history—despite ample evidence from across the world that these latter factors are crucial"[8].

- The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), agrees that all states are fragile in some aspects and they move in and out of fragility. DFID report argues that "People disagree about what constitutes fragility and no state likes to be labeled as fragile by the international community". Joining the OECD definition, DFID refers to fragile states as where the “government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor”[9].

Critics for Development Approach definition:

There has been much criticism of the emphasis some development agencies have placed on state "will" to perform certain functions, on the grounds that "will" is a normative concept. A strong one of them is found in the DIIS report [10] which projects three weaknesses in this definition as follows:

First, this definition directs attention strongly towards the state, thereby ignoring the fact that fragility may exist outside the state and that the state, despite its willingness and capacity, may be unable to manage the fragile situation.

Second, the report argues that  there are no clear criteria for determining the extent of political will that is needed to move into or escape fragility. Determining whether a given state lacks political will or not is a judgment depends strongly on the eye of the beholder.

Third, the report confirms also that the definition disregards the point that international phenomena may affect fragile situations. Fragility is seen as a national question, However, global conditions may influence and spur fragility as well as shape possible solutions. Moreover, the definition’s national focus hides the point that external engagement is not neutral or apolitical. In such a situation, external engagement may, despite good intentions, provoke reactions that further strengthen fragility. Thus, it is erroneous to regard the emergence of fragility as a purely national phenomenon.

 

b- Conflict - oriented approach

 The Centre for Research on Inequality and Social Exclusion (CRISE), defines fragile states as "failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlements and legitimacy", "Fragile State" means  "a country that is failing or at high risk of failing in three dimensions:

 (i) authority failures: the state lacks the authority to protect its citizens from violence of various kinds;

(ii) service failures: the state fails to ensure that all citizens have access to basic services; (iii) legitimacy failures: the state lacks legitimacy, enjoys only limited support among the people, and is typically not democratic". [11]

- For the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the term fragile state is reserved for states that are vulnerable and states in crisis. States that are vulnerable are characterized as being “unable or unwilling to adequately assure the     provi­sion of security and basic services (…) and where the legitimacy of the government is in question”, while states in crisis are “where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory”[12].

c- Stability - Oriented Approach

DIIS report argues that from an action-oriented perspective, the challenge is, on the one hand, that a broad definition that may include all potentially fragile situations is likely to cover a very large proportion of the low-income countries, thus making the definition less meaningful, and on the other hand, that a narrow definition facilitating the elaboration of operational directives is likely to neglect both important fragile situations and important causes of fragility, and it suggests the following definition for "Fragility":

"Institutional instability undermining the predictability, transparency and accountability of public decision-making processes and the provision of security and social services to the population"[13].

 

The Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC)[14] differentiates between many relatively similar types of fragile states, where it defines a fragile state as" one that is significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems and particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts.

The opposite of a "Fragile State" - according to CSRC report- is a "Stable State" – one where dominant or statutory institutional arrangements appear able to withstand internal and external shocks and contestation remains within the boundaries of reigning institutional arrangements.

However, A relatively similar type is the "Crisis State" which is in danger of state collapse , it is "a state under acute stress, where reigning institutions face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and shocks". This is not an absolute condition, but a condition at a given point of time, so a state can reach a “Crisis Condition” and recover from it, or can remain in crisis over relatively long periods of time, or a crisis state can unravel and collapse.

The opposite of a "crisis state" is a "Resilient State", where institutions are generally able to cope with conflict, to manage sub-state crises, to respond to contestation, wherever the state sits between fragility and stability.

The third type is the "Failed State" which is defined as in the condition of "State Collapse" – e.g., a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A "failed state" is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence.

2- Lebanon before the Syrian crisis: not really a "Fragile State" but  had "Situations of Fragility"

- Indicators for Foreign Policy Scales[15]- (CIFP) report, refers to the state as the primary unit that needs to exhibit three fundamental properties of 1) Authority, 2) Legitimacy, 3) Capacity (or to use the World Bank's language - security, Justice and Jobs).[16]

In 2011, according to the report issued by CIFP, Lebanon was ranked at level 63 out of 197 states has been studied. where the majority of the top 20 most fragile states are located in Sub - Saharan Africa and the MENA regions.

- Even on The OECD list of the fragile countries 2013, based on 2012 data, Lebanon was not mentioned in the list of 47 top Fragile States.

Here are Some facts about Lebanon before the Syrian crisis:

-  Lebanon is located along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and is surrounded in the north and east by Syria and by Israel in the south, an issue that makes it vulnerable to conflicts and tensions since 1948; the formation of the Israeli state.

- Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has undergone a history of armed conflicts [1958 revolution, a civil war (1975- 1990)]. The civil war radically damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure, the average income per person decreased by two-thirds, and the ability of the government to provide social, health, and education services nearly disappeared.[17]

- Following the civil war, Lebanon rebuilt much of its war-torn physical and financial infrastructure. However, the increased budget deficits and increasing debt was financed by the consecutive governments since the early 1990s through heavy borrowing, mostly from domestic banks, which led to a very high growing debt.[18]

- Two decades after the civil war, Lebanon has been able to achieve considerable progress in raising living standards, however  levels of poverty and unemployment remained high, as the Lebanese economy heavily depends on tourism, commerce and services particularly its commercial banking system.

- According to the 2004 National Survey of Household Conditions, the governorates of Beirut and Mount Lebanon host approximately 50.4% of the population. The average household contains about 4.3 individuals but this varies according to regions.[19]

- There are 18 officially recognized religious groups. The sensitivity and politicization of demographic statistics hinders a uniform and official demographic analysis of the country. The only population census made was under the French mandate in 1932 that found Christian Maronites to constitute the largest demographic group, followed by Sunni Muslims and then Shiite Muslims.[20] These findings formed the basis of the confessional political system, which reserved the presidency for Maronites, the Prime minister for Sunnis, and The speaker of the parliament for Shiite.

 - Lebanon is a middle income country whose economy relies on two main sources: foreign aid and services.[21] However, Lebanon is the world’s "most indebted middle income country", its debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio standing at 173%.[22]

-UNDP estimated Lebanon’s extreme poverty rate at 8.4 percent in 2008, however 92% of aggregate inequality can be explained by “within-governorate” inequality and only 8% to “inter-governorate” inequality.[23]

Actually, Poverty is concentrated in certain regions in Lebanon, mainly in Beqaa and the north especially Tripoli and Akkar.

- The National Survey of Household Living Conditions (2007) estimated the official unemployment rate at 9.2%. In 2012, the World Bank published the results of a survey indicating that the unemployment rate was approximately 11% in 2010, with women and youth particularly negatively affected by unemployment (estimated at 18% for women and 34% for young people).[24]

- UNDP reports reveal that Lebanon has achieved notable success in making progress towards several Millennium Development Goals (MDG) since 2000. Supported by strong economic growth in years before the Syrian crisis, Lebanon shows progress in each of the HDI indicators[25].

Therefore, In recognition of the empirical statistics- shown above- It was hard, before the Syrian crisis, to define Lebanon as a "Fragile State", however it was increasingly favorable to describe the Lebanese State as having "situations of fragility" as it better captures the fact that fragility is not exclusively about poverty, or low income, but it may be determined by both the nature and boundaries of a state, and beyond the state - to the society within a state, and the regional sphere that affects the State.

 

Section Two:  Spillover  Consequences  driving  Lebanon  to  a "Fragility Trap"

 

It is common that a "Fragile State" is usually unable to deal with external shocks, where external shock comes in the form of war, significant economic crises, natural disasters etc. Most recently in the Middle East, an external shock hit Lebanon in the form of a spillover from the Syrian war, which affected Lebanon deeply and negatively and may lead it to become a fragile state:

Although fragility is accepted to be multi-causal and multi-dimensional, however we can place more importance on certain causal factors over others in the case of Lebanon as affected by the Syrian crisis. The most prevalent ones are which follow:

1- Structural and Economic Factors

a- Geography

Lebanon is a small country located at the crossroads of different continents which helped in shaping its unique religious, political and ethnic diversity. Lebanon is stuck between bad neighbors, endlessly seeking domination. Neighboring Syria played a major role in the historical, geographical and cultural ties between the two countries which made it impossible for Lebanon to escape the consequences of the Syrian civil war.

b- Violent Conflicts, Terrorism and Organized Crime

- The conflict in neighboring Syria was the primary driver of the sectarian unrest and terrorist attacks in Lebanon (2012 - January 2014), where sectarian fighting and political assassinations in Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon killed hundreds of Lebanese civilians.

Sunni Radicals called for supporters to back Syrian opposition thus sending arms and fighters from Lebanon to Syria and vice versa, while Hezbollah (Shiite) intervened in Syria to back Assad’s regime, thus escalating more sectarian tensions in Lebanon.

      i.        Armed clashes first erupted in Tripoli (Sunni dominated city) following a rally in support of Syrian protesters. Fighting broke out between the Alawites who support the Syrian regime and Sunnis supporting the Syrian opposition.

Actually, poverty, unemployment, lack of infrastructure and social security mixed together with a deep sectarian divide provided a fertile ground for deadly clashes between supporters of Syrian regime and supporters of the Syrian rebels.

Between June 2011 and April 2014, Tripoli witnessed around 20 "rounds" of deadly fighting, that resulted in both civilian and army fatalities and injuries.

     ii.        Between 2012- early 2014, Lebanon suffered from several terrorist attacks. One of them was against two Sunni mosques in Tripoli, where two cars exploded in front of two mosques on Friday directly after the prayers killed 45 innocent people and wounded more than 400. The others were in the form of suicidal terrorist bombings in Beirut and Bekaa in 2013 and early 2014 in the Shiite-dominated areas killing 75 civilians and injuring more than 500.

 

Sunni extremists claimed responsibility for most of the suicide bombings against the Shiite-dominated areas and the Iranian Embassy in Beirut[26]. It is important to note that the casualties of these terror crimes were Lebanese civilians from different religions. In one of these deadly crimes, two suicide bombers blew up their cars outside an orphanage as they tried to hit an Iranian cultural center, killing at least four people and wounding more than a hundred, all of which were orphaned children.[27]

 

 

    iii.         East Lebanon, southern Beirut and the Syrian-Lebanese border have been targets of a string of shelling rockets, bomb attacks, mostly suicide blasts, killing dozens of people.

 

Jihadist groups frequently claim responsibility for cross-border rocket attacks on eastern Lebanon, targeting Lebanese civilians which they claim are in revenge for Hezbollah's intervention in the Syria's war[28]. Besides, Syrian Army helicopters have bombed targets in Lebanese territory especially "Ersal" region (in Bekaa) which has become a transit point for weapon-smuggling and fighters involved in Syria's war.

 

   iv.        After the Syrian war and the influx of refugees, the pace of crimes increased dramatically inside Lebanon, official statistics revealed that number of crimes raised from 11 crimes/month in 2011, to 16/month in 2012, to 29 crimes/month by 2013. The same for robbery crimes which increased from 210 crimes in 2012, to 182 crimes/month in 2013, while robbing cars using machine guns, from 4/month in 2011, to 7/month in 2012, then to a striking 98/month in 2013.

 

    v.        Weapons were smuggled in both directions between Lebanon and Syria, the United Nations had said[29]. One of the failed smuggling attempts, in April 2012; when the Lebanese navy intercepted a ship, coming from Libya, loaded with three containers of weapons destined for Syrian opposition forces. [30]

c- Demographic Stress

As the World Bank Assessment Report stated, "Since the onset of the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has generously maintained an open border policy and has permitted refugees to temporarily but freely settle across the country"[31]. However, the escalation of the Syrian conflict, has caused a humanitarian catastrophe. 

The picture now in Lebanon - as described by UNHCR- is "a devastating milestone worsened by rapidly depleting resources and a host community stretched to breaking point. The Lebanese people have shown striking generosity, but are struggling to cope. Lebanon hosts the highest concentration of refugees in recent history. Tiny Lebanon has now become the country with "the highest per capita concentration of refugees worldwide"[32].

Historically, Lebanon has also been affected by a variety of refugee influxes, starting with the Palestinian movements of 1948 and 1967, during the Iraqi crisis and most recently with the Syrian crisis:

      i.        Palestinian refugees constitute around 10% of the population in Lebanon. According to UNRWA, 455,000 Palestinian refugees live in the country[33], most of them the descendants of those who fled their land after the creation of the state of Israel and the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

 

     ii.        53,070 Palestine refugees from Syria have been confirmed as living in Lebanon and have been recorded by UNRWA[34].

 

    iii.        The Iraqi refugees that come to Lebanon after the 2003 invasion estimates around 50,000 individuals.

 

   iv.        High number of migrant domestic workers that are estimated over 200,000.

 

    v.        Finally, the Syrian refugee movements that started to come to the country in 2011:

The influx of Syrian refugees accelerated rapidly; in June 2012, there were just 25,411 Syrian refugees in Lebanon; by June 2013 there were 480,512, and in May 2014 the  number of Syrian refugees estimated by the UNHCR is 1,081,676 spread over 1611 municipalities[35].

Lebanese officials refer to a total of 1.3 million Syrian refugees are have entered Lebanon by May-2014, (37 percent of Lebanon’s pre-crisis population)[36], 87% of them are concentrated in 225 municipality; contain 67% of Lebanese poor people, and 12% have entered Lebanon illegally [37]. Many other refugees have never applied to register in the UNHCR, some live in ruins or unpopulated areas, etc.

d- Low Income and Economic Decline

OECD (2010) argue that low levels of economic production, characterized by particularly low levels of agricultural productivity and little investment in manufacturing, are root causes of fragility.

The data of World bank assessment[38], stated that the conflict in Syria is severely and negatively impacting the Lebanese economy, as follows[39]:

- Lebanese growth is estimated to be down by 2.9 percentage points, generating billions of dollars in lost economic activity over 2012-2013 impact assessment period (7.5 billion US dollars till summer 2013).

-  Lebanon’s public finances were structurally weak prior to the Syrian shock and are now becoming severely strained, with the deficit estimated to widen by USD 2.6 billion over the 2012-14 period.

- Following half a decade of robust growth, Lebanon experienced a remarkable decrease in its debt-to-GDP ratio, from about 180 percent in 2006, to 134 percent at the eve of the Syrian conflict in 2011.

- On the revenue side, spillovers from the conflict are estimated to cut USD1.5 billion in revenue collection over 2012-14, due to a combination of direct impact on key sectors (e.g., tourism) and indirect impacts through weaker economic activity.

- On the expenditure side, total budgetary spending by the Government alone is estimated to grow by up to USD1.1 billion over 2012-2014 because of the Syrian conflict and the associated sharp increase in demand for and consumption of public services by refugees from Syria.

e- Poverty

- As a result of the Syrian conflict, it is expected that by end-2014, some 170,000 additional Lebanese citizens will be pushed into poverty while the existing poor will fall deeper into it.  Prior to the Syrian conflict, nearly 1 million Lebanese were estimated to be poor (living on less than USD 4 per day). 

- To stabilize the situation, USD176 million will be required till end-2014, of which over USD 50 million is needed to scale up the National Poverty Targeting Program for poor and vulnerable Lebanese.

f-Unemployment

-The overall unemployment rate and the share of informal work in total employment could both increase each by up to 10 percentage points, up to 340,000 Lebanese, mainly youth and low-skilled workers, could become unemployed by end 2014 as a result of the Syrian conflict.

- Stabilizing the situation by implementing a comprehensive package of active labor market programs to improve livelihoods and earnings opportunities over the short-term would require resources in the order of USD166-242 million.

g- Stress on Infrastructure

- Over the period 2012-14, the fiscal cost of the Syrian conflict on infrastructure is estimated at USD 589 million, while USD1.1 billion would be required for stabilization, including USD 258 million for current spending.

2- Political and Institutional Crisis

a- Crises of State Legitimacy and Authority

- Postponing parliamentary elections: Claiming concerns over increasing political tensions and sectarian clashes, Lebanese representatives agreed to postpone June 2013 parliamentary elections until November 2014. Widely political compromise rejected by the Lebanese President Michel Suleiman and the "Free patriotic Movement" party, lead to 17-month extension, which was the first time the Lebanese parliament has lengthened its mandate since the civil war 1975-1990. Angry with this decision, and accusing PMs of corruption, civil society activists and protesters in Beirut –pelted parliamentarians' cars with tomatoes.

- The blockage of constitutional council: the Lebanese Constitutional Council, which is an independent body - supposedly- with judicial status to  monitor the constitutionality of laws, failed to meet to discuss the legality to the parliament’s term extension. Actually, politicians intervened to prevent the body from making a ruling on the issue, thus discrediting the independency of the council and the  legitimacy of its rulings.

- Presidential void: The Lebanese parliament failed to elect a president within the timeframe set by the constitution (the deadline was on 25th of May 2014) leading to presidential void.

b- Tensions among the Lebanese, and the refugees

Centuries before the Syrian crisis, the Lebanese society has been polarized in religious and sectarian groups, leading to sectarian tensions since the rule of Ottoman Empire, and specifically since the deadly clashes between Christians and Druze in 1841 and later on.

- The neighboring conflict, increased the uncertainty and fears of the diverse Lebanese groups, and lead to the emergence of extreme radical religious ideologies, and the coming out of suicide bombers for the very first time in the Lebanese history.

- The spillover and the influx of refugees raised Horizontal inequalities between different regions and areas in Lebanon. Syrian refugees are in direct competition for resources and jobs with struggling Lebanese families, especially because the primary geographical destinations and the regions of high concentration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are such underdeveloped, poor and marginalized areas. Mapping data of UNICEF, UNHCR, Republic of Lebanon Presidency of the Council of Ministers in October 2013 has revealed that 96 per cent of the registered refugee population and 66 per cent of vulnerable Lebanese live side-by-side in 225 locations[40].

The most important concern of the Lebanese government nowadays is the increased tensions between the host communities and the refugees. As the influx of refugees has increased dramatically, the host communities started to feel frustration and pressure. The frustration among host communities about the decreasing wages and unlawful job competition by Syrian refugees has increased. A Survey on the livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Lebanon cited that "206 localities are believed to be most at risk, situated mostly in the Bekaa and Akkar regions.... [and] social cohesion seems to be at risk because of the local radicalized political context which gives any individual problem a sectarian or an ethnic (Syrians/Lebanese) dimension".[41].

Here are some facts that increased tensions and inequalities:

- Number of the Syrian births in Lebanon in 2013 reached 31,000 births compared to 72,000 Lebanese births. Note that the Lebanese authorities and international donors covered the expenses of a large part of the Syrian deliveries for humanitarian reasons, while Lebanese mothers are deprived of this support.

-  400,000 Syrian refugee children in Lebanon require schooling, now outnumbering Lebanon's own 300,000 children in public schools.

- A field survey conducted by the Lebanese Economy and Trade Ministry found that, in the past two years, Syrians established around 1,196 unlicensed businesses in the country operating informally in various trade and tourism fields[42].

- According to the Economy and Trade Ministry's survey, 54 percent of the informal Syrian businesses are located in the Bekaa.[43]

- A number of community members told IRC staff that tension between Syrian refugees and Lebanese is increasing over competition for jobs. Community leaders are struggling to maintain calm in the midst of increasing economic hardship. The competition for jobs is coupled with increasing competition over scarce goods. Community leaders spoke to IRC about scarcity of basic food supplies, saying “certain items are going missing from the market because of increasing demand – sometimes staples [like] bread and vegetables.”[44]

- Similar to North Lebanon, a 60% wage reduction has been reported in the Bekaa as a result of competition by Syrian laborers and reduced border trade activities. In Baalbek, for instance, daily wages for unskilled labor dropped from LL 20,000 (15.5$) to LL15000 (10$) or LL10000 (6.5 $).[45]

- Syrians have been working as laborers in Lebanon for decades, competing for low-wage jobs mainly in the domains of construction and agriculture. The Bekaa valley and North Lebanon (mainly Akkar) comprise the largest agricultural areas of Lebanon, where the agriculture sector employs up to 10% of the Lebanese labor force and is the fourth largest employer in the country[46].

An assessment conducted in Akkar by IRC and Save the Children in October 2012 revealed that 20% of refugee families are finding employment in agriculture, thus bringing additional pressure and competition to the Lebanese agricultural labors.[47]

Section Three- Donors' Policies

To preserve their country's stability, the deeply divided Lebanese political actors reached a consensus in June 2012, called "dissociation policy", which meant non-interference in the Syrian conflict. However, this political paradigm of abstention was not the "ideal" policy as it framed the Lebanese government’s responses to the Syrian refugee crisis, instability issues, smuggling weapons, and spread of terrorism.

As a result, many challenges had been observed in many aspects, especially with the governmental policies dealing with refugees. Jordan, Iraq and Turkey settled Syrians in traditional camps, yet no organized refugee camps have been established for Syrians seeking refuge in Lebanon, as the Lebanese had previous "bad" experiences with the Palestinian camps which turned to a safe haven for terrorists and criminals. Therefore, Syrian refugees resided in more than 1,611 communities across the country, and had the ability to move freely, work, and mobilize supporters for both opposition and the regime without supervision.

The previous government headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, in office until March 2013, was falsely accused of sympathizing with Assad’s regime in Syria. So, Western donor countries as well as Gulf States sympathizing with opposition forces in Syria have been reluctant to disburse substantial funds to the Lebanese government, officially citing concerns over governmental mismanagement and corruption[48]. As a result, the international aid was managed around the Lebanese government in direct cooperation with non-state actors on the ground or the refugees themselves.

- Direct Cash Programs

 New researches[49] suggest that cash grants to the poor are as good as or better than many traditional forms of aid when it comes to reducing poverty. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, The authors defended the new approaches of transferring direct cash instead of aid to the poor. They argued that " It’s well past time, then, for donors to stop thinking of unconditional cash payments as an oddball policy and start seeing them for what they are: one of the most sensible tools of poverty alleviation"[50].

UNHCR, World Bank experts[51] and many economists[52] defend the policy of direct cash to the poor or refugees. UNHCR refers to the advantages of the ATM approach saying that "it is the most efficient and dignified method of dispersing cash to a large group of beneficiaries, it requires less logistics and overhead cost, it provides UNHCR more security and control of the process, and the service can be accessed even in areas without a UNHCR presence"[53].

In Lebanon, Cash has become the preferred modality used by international donors for rent, food, and other needs following a large-scale unconditional cash winter assistance for   refugees and vulnerable registered families, delivered via ATM card by the UNHCR, (ECHO), as well as ongoing food assistance via e-vouchers by (WFP).

- The ATM cash program conducted in Lebanon to specified groups of refugees, each family received a minimum of $150 plus an additional $27 per family member, plus 66,176 registered refugee households with cash ATM cards for Winterization and Hygiene and Baby Kits assistance. The ATM cards were loaded in April  with cash for use by 42,270 refugee households for the final month of winterization, and 36,982 households for hygiene and

baby kit assistance. Therefore, Plus food vouchers, UNHCR paid cash as follows[54]:

Cash for winterization (through ATM cards)	211,350 refugees
Cash for shelter	12,251 refugees
Emergency cash for protection	843 refugees
Cash for hygiene and baby kits	184,910  refugees

 

- The experience in Lebanon prove that "giving cash directly" had some benefits, however it affected negatively the host communities, put pressure on Lebanon, and raised many concerns:

      i.        This way of aid had discriminated between the refugees and caused tensions among them[55], and the hosting communities.

The Swiss Center for Peacebuilding (SwissPeace) stated that "Services provided for free to refugees from Syria but leaving out Lebanese host communities clearly risk exacerbating perceived or real inequalities". The report referred to "cash payments for rent/shelter to refugees from Syria, particularly in cases where cash is transferred to refugees with no particular attention being paid to the costs incurring to host families"[56]. The Report adds that" Cash for rent programs by international agencies are reported to have set precedence and high expectations among Lebanese host communities that cannot be met by the government’s programs. Of equal sensitivity are job creation programs targeting Syrian refugees with the aim of reducing long-term dependency on aid"[57].

     ii.        Although Lebanon has an open economy, the influx of refugees and cash given to them have caused 100% raise to the prices of food prices and supplies.

    iii.        Trusted official sources have told the author of this paper, that a good percentage (around 20%) of registered refugees, pass the Lebanese-Syrian borders at the end of the month to collect their vouchers[58] or Cash money from ATM then go back to Syria where they live[59]. This may drastically drain UNHCR funds needed for more vulnerable refugees.

   iv.         Reports have said that refugees are selling their vouchers, and mainly exchanging food and fuel vouchers at a 10 to 15 percent discount for cash[60].

    v.        As we all know, the crisis has hit the Syrian economy severely. Prices of basic goods have skyrocketed, and the black market has put new pressures on regular citizens.

By delivering direct cash, the international community has been encouraging refugees to come to Lebanon for financial and economic reasons, here are some clarifications:

 * Recent statistics done by "statistics Lebanon", found that more than 40% of the 1.1 million refugees registered by UNHCR came from non- conflict areas in Syria[61], which means that they are seeking economic refuge not security one, and the donors' measures of giving aid directly to the refugees is one of the reasons that encourages them.

* Direct cash is encouraging refugees to come to Lebanon, benefiting from the gap between what is offered in Lebanon and wages in Syria:

In the first few months of the crisis in Syria, The minimum wage was SYP 9,975 ($212), while the country’s median wage was around 12,000 Syrian pounds which is $255 (2011) at the official exchange rates at that time.[62] Today, the median salary has been raised to 16,000 pounds ($96 at current exchange rates), and Some estimates put it between13,000 pound ($78) and SYP 13,500 ($81).

Food prices rose during the crisis to exceed the potential of the Syrian citizen to secure his daily needs, while the rate of price rise reached, on average, to 300%, where fruits and vegetables has increased 600%[63].

In a study of what a Syrian family pays now to secure basic food items, depending on the amount of consumption of these materials per month, ”Central Bureau of Statistics ,” shows that the individual needs the amount of 4700 SYP/ month, to secure the necessary materials, and therefore a small family made up of four people needs around 19000 SYP(115$) per month, which is equivalent to the salary of a government employee from the first category - ” university graduate.”[64]

A small family (5 members) registered with UNHCR[65], gets 150$ + 27$ /family member has a privilege to get around 285$ / month which is 2.4 times more than "university degree" employee in Syria. Therefore, this is one of  the real motivators for Syrians to seek economic refuge in Lebanon.

Section Four: Suggested Solutions and Recommendations

Security has returned to Lebanon after the formation of a new government in February 2014 after nearly a year without one. However, the economic and social crises are still dominating the Lebanese sphere. Day after day, the Lebanese are affected dramatically by the Syrian Crisis.

As a state heading quickly to a "fragility trap", the international community has to take responsibility before it collapses.

As we all know, it is the responsibility of States to protect their citizens. When governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, the international community then steps to take this responsibility and ensure that those basic rights are respected. But, what if this responsibility has been a cause to depriving another state's citizens from their rights? what if taking this responsibility is leading another state to the edge of civil war, or to collapse?

Here, the international community and donor states have to think out of the box, to be creative taking into consideration that "one size fits all" policy is no more applicable in the twenty- first century, where many new challenges have appeared.

Based on the facts and challenges, the international community has to choose of different realistic solutions and scenarios:

Solution One: Let the Lebanese State Collapse

This scenario shall be the outcome of the current policies. It will topple the Lebanese institutions, raise major security concerns which may lead to a civil war in Lebanon and spread of terrorism in the whole region.

Solution Two: Pragmatic Approach

It implies an increased understanding within the international community dealing with the influx of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. They should not only imply doing different things, but also doing things differently; e.g. doing things outside traditional expertise in dealing with refugees crisis.

This solution requires short term procedures, and long term policies as follows:

A- Urgent Actions and Short Term Procedures:

Many of the registered Syrians refugees don't comply to the definition of refugees, however many others are vulnerable and in need for increased assistance. The international community must take into consideration that there are various types of Syrian refugees in Lebanon[66], and they have to cooperate with Lebanese authorities to classify refugees, decide the best procedures to deal with both humanitarian and stability concerns, and then implement them:

1-Classify Refugees:

Syrian refugees in Lebanon can be classified into four categories:

a.    First category: who are really in need for humanitarian assistance, as they flee from war, which is still taking place at their regions. This category should be on the top of assistance priority.

 

b.    Second category: who came to Lebanon from prior conflict areas; which are safe and secure by now but they may have no homes or place to live. This category should be encouraged to return, while aid and assistance should be delivered by UN- Syria to help them cope with their financial hardship.

 

c.    Third category: Economic immigration: those who are not real refugees. They came from non- conflict regions, to benefit from aid or to get jobs. Many of those have registered as refugees in Lebanon and still living in Syria. This category should be encouraged to return to their homelands, the aid assistance should be stopped in Lebanon. UN in Syria may supply them with aid and materials if they are in need, to help them cope with their economic hardship.

 

d.    Fourth category: those who were previously working in Lebanon, and they registered themselves as refugees to benefit from aid. Those should never benefit from any assistance, as they are exploiting the aid program.

2- Help the new Lebanese government to develop a new strategy that preserve both the Lebanese state and the Syrian refugees, by:

                   a- Classify the security immigrations and the economic ones.

                   b- Build camps on the Lebanese - Syrian borders for category ONE.

                   c- Coordinate a cooperation between Syria, Lebanon and the UN to return refugees to their homelands, for category two and three.

Second: Long term Policies

 The Best solution for dealing with the Syrian war consequences on Lebanon should be a multi dimensional integrated One:

As we have seen, Lebanon has been driven quickly to fragility trap. Therefore, international measures helping to improve security, strengthen government institutions and promote socioeconomic development must take place hand by hand with local partners, based on local priorities.

In doing so, The UN and international community measures must be pragmatic, fast, flexible and with long-term commitment to target three dimensions:

A. Enhancing the security of both refugees and Lebanese citizens; providing humanitarian relief based on humanitarian needs only.

B. Contributing to a legitimate government with sufficient capacity;

C. Creating a peace dividend.

A. Public safety and security

One important goal of a new policy in Lebanon should aim to increase public safety and security for both Lebanese and Syrian refugees. This means preventing violence and tensions between host communities and the refugees.

-Armed Violence Reduction: Lebanese are afraid to face the same scenario as Palestinian refugee camps, where militants and terrorists act freely. Thus, the international community should support the Lebanese Army to remove arms, and improve security in local communities, thus reducing the number of weapons in circulation which lessens the risk of armed conflicts.

B- Strengthening the capacity of government

The donor community should strengthen the capacity of state institutions, and help the Lebanese state to cope with the raising problems by supporting the governmental decisions. Not in any case, should the international community policies undermine effective role of the government.

 

 

C- Creating a peace dividend

All future governmental policies should be targeted to create a peace dividend for the Lebanese population, especially those affected by Syrian crisis (Tripoli, Ersal etc..) through improving their living conditions. Employment is a major factor, since getting former militants and young men into work can help to curb or prevent violence. It is  important to link development cooperation as closely as possible to humanitarian assistance.

- Funding development programs in the most affected areas in Lebanon: Prevention is better than cure, and this means devoting more attention to avoiding future conflicts. So, the international community and local ownership should design projects to remove the factors that fuel conflicts and to build public support for stability, especially targeting the development of social services such as infrastructure, health care, education etc.. It must also generate employment and economic opportunities through diverse activities like funding small and medium enterprise sectors.

- Empowerment of women:

As the World Bank has noted, gender is smart economics. In Lebanon, gender inequalities are still dominant. International community should ensure that socioeconomic programs focus on equal roles for women as men, this should include tackling the issue of women rights and health and especially protecting female Syrian refugees from human trafficking, forced marriages, sexual assaults and prostitution.

 

Bibliography

Reports:

·         Commission of the European Communities, “Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007” Progress Report, Lebanon, 2008.

·         FDID, Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, Department for International Development, UK, January 2005.

·         Good Practices for Urban Refugees, Database For Professionals Working With Urban Refugees, available at:http://www.urbangoodpractices.org/pages/view/good-practice-examples [accessed May 26, 2014].

·         IDAL – Investment Development Authority of Lebanon. www.idal.com.lb

·         International Rescue Committee, Reaching the Breaking Point: An IRC briefing note on Syrian refugees in Lebanon, June 2013.

·         International Rescue Committee/Save the Children, Livelihood Assessment- Syrian Refugees in Lebanon- Bekaa Valley and North Governorates, Lebanon, October 2012.

·         Ministry of Finance, Report: Lebanon- Country Profile 2013, Republic of Lebanon, 5 April 2013.

·          MOA/FAO 2010 Census Data: Agricultural Census - Report, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agricultural Organization, 2010.

·         OECD, Fragile states 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world, Paris, 2012.

·         OECD, The Missing Piece: Improving International Support to the Peace Process, Paris, 2012.

·         Oxfam/BRIC/ LCSR, Survey on the livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, November 2013.

·         The World Bank, Afghanistan: A fragile State?, June 11, 2007.

·         The World Bank, If You Give the Poor Cash, Does it Help?,  from Evidence to policy, June 2013.

·         The World Bank, Lebanon: economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict, September 2013.

·         UNDP- about Lebanon: http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/countryinfo/ [accessed May 27, 2014]

·         UNDP, Millennium Development Goals- Lebanon Report 2008.

·         UNHCR- Syria Regional Refugee Response- Lebanon, Facts, June 12,2014.

·         UNHCR, Cash Assistance Update- Lebanon, April 2014.

·         UNICEF/UNHCR, Equity in humanitarian action: Reaching the most vulnerable localities in Lebanon,  Republic of Lebanon - Presidency of the Council of Ministers, October 2013.

·         USAID, Fragile States Strategy, January 2005.

 

 

Blattman Christopher and Niehaus Paul, Show Them the Money: Why Giving Cash Helps Alleviate Poverty, in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014.

 

Blattman, Christopher and Fiala, Nathan and Martinez, Sebastian, Generating Skilled Self-Employment in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from Uganda, November 14, 2013.

 

Blattman Chris: Dear governments: Want to help the poor and transform your economy? Give people cash. at:http://chrisblattman.com/2013/05/23/dear-governments-want-to-help-the-poor-and-transform-your-economy-give-people-cash/ [accessed May 26, 2014].

 

Clap Andre and Yassin Nasser, Outcome evaluation: conflict prevention and peacebuilding, UNDP, Jan- Feb 2008.

 

Clapper James R., Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014.

 

Crisis States Workshop – London, March 2006: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/drc/FailedState.pdf [accessed May20,2014].

 

Dibeh Ghassan, “Foreign Aid and Economic Development in Postwar Lebanon”. UNU-WIDER Working Paper, June 2007.

 

Engberg-Pedersen Lars, Andersen Louise and Stepputat Finn, Fragile Situations: Current Debates And Central Dilemmas, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, Copenhagen, 2008:9.

 

Faour Muhammad A. ,“Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 6, November 2007.

 

Haber Rabih, How can Lebanon cope with the influx of Syrian refugees", speech delivered in a seminar held at Issam Fares center, May 15, 2014.

 

Hisso Motaz, The Poor Gets Poorer in Syria, Al-akhbar, August 10, 2013.

 

Kaplan Seth, What the OECD Does Not Understand About Fragile States, Global Dashboard, UK, Feb. 2013, available at:http://www.globaldashboard.org/2013/02/03/what-the-oecd-does-not-understand-about-fragile-states/[ accessed May 6, 2014].

 

Mcloughlin Claire, Topic Guide on Fragile States, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham, UK, 2012.

 

Ohrstrom Lysandra, WFP cracking down on misuse in U.N. food voucher program, The Daily Star, June 22, 2013. 

 

Ralston Laura, Giving Cash Unconditionally in Fragile States, World bank blog, 27 Feb. 2014.

 

Shamas Soha, Unlicensed Syrian businesses Target of Ministry Plan, Al Akhbar, November 7, 2013.

 

Stamm  Sibylle, Conflict Dimensions of International Assistance to Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: A Discussion Paper, KOFF/SwissPeace, April 2013.

 

Stewart, F. and Brown, G., 'Fragile States: CRISE Overview 3', Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Oxford, 2010.

 

World Bank country brief - Lebanon.

 

World Bank, Fragile States At A Glance.

 

 

 

 

 

 

---

[1] Claire Mcloughlin, Topic Guide on Fragile States, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham, UK, 2012, p.9.

[2] ibid, p. 10.

[3] World Bank, Fragile States At A Glance.

[4] World Bank, Afghanistan: A fragile State?, June 11, 2007, at:

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21366928~menuPK:2246552~pagePK:2865106~piPK:2865128~theSitePK:223547,00.html [accessed 4 May, 2014]

[5] OECD, The Missing Piece: Improving International Support to the Peace Process, OECD, Paris, 2012. And OECD, Fragile states 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world, OECD, Paris, 2012, p. 15. Available at:

http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FragileStates2013.pdf [ accessed May 6, 2014].

[6] ibid, p. 15

[7] ibid, note no. 3, p. 21.

[8] Seth Kaplan, What the OECD Does Not Understand About Fragile States, Global Dashboard, UK,Feb. 2013, available at:

http://www.globaldashboard.org/2013/02/03/what-the-oecd-does-not-understand-about-fragile-states/[ accessed May 6, 2014].

[9] FDID, Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, Department for International Development, UK, January 2005.

[10] Lars Engberg-Pedersen, Louise Andersen and Finn Stepputat, Fragile Situations: Current Debates And Central Dilemmas, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, Copenhagen, 2008:9, p. 6.

[11] Stewart, F. and Brown, G., 'Fragile States: CRISE Overview 3', Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Oxford, 2010.

http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=3843[accessed May 16,2014].

[12] USAID, Fragile States Strategy, January 2005.

[13] Lars Engberg-Pedersen, Louise Andersen and Finn Stepputat, Fragile Situations:Current Debates And Central Dilemmas, op.cit., p. 6.

[14] Crisis States Workshop – London, March 2006:

http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/drc/FailedState.pdf [accessed May20,2014].

[15] As part of a broader effort to enable more effective international engagement in failed and fragile states, a team from Carleton's Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project (CIFP) has been working with the Canadian government, publishing a yearly index based on a thorough evaluation of failed and fragile states.

[16] - Authority refers to the extent to which a state possesses the ability to enact binding legislation over its population, to exercise coercive force over its sovereign territory, to provide core public goods, and to provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities.

- Legitimacy describes the extent to which a particular government commands public loyalty to the governing regime, to generate domestic support for the goverment's legislation and policy.

- Capacity refers to the potential for a state to mobilize and employ resources towards productive ends. States lacking capacity may prove unable to respond effectively to sudden shocks such as natural disasters, epidemics, food shortages, or refugee flows.

 

[17] World Bank country brief - Lebanon.

[18] UNDP- Lebanon, country brief ( about Lebanon).

[19] According to “Living Conditions of Households”, Ministry of Social Affairs, UNDP, ILO, Central Administration for Statistics, Lebanon, 2007.

[20] Muhammad A. Faour in “Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 6, November 2007 p. 909

[21] Ghassan Dibeh, “Foreign Aid and Economic Development in Postwar Lebanon”. UNU-WIDER Working Paper, June 2007, p. 1.

[22] Commission of the European Communities, “Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007” Progress Report Lebanon, 2008.

[23] Andre Clap and Nasser Yassin, Outcome evaluation: conflict prevention and peacebuilding, UNDP, Jan- Feb 2008, p. 17.

[24]  Official statistics by Ministry of Finance, Report: Lebanon- Country Profile 2013, Republic of Lebanon, 5 April 2013, p. 40.

[25] Between 1980 and 2012, Lebanon’s life expectancy at birth increased by 6.2 years and expected years of schooling increased by 2.9 years. Mean years of schooling was estimated from educational attainment data available from UNESCO Institute for Statistics for 2007.Lebanon’s GNI per capita increased by about 77 percent between 1990 and 2012.

 Lebanon’s HDI value for 2012 is 0.745—in the high human development category—positioning the country at 72 out of 187 countries and territories. Between 2005 and 2012, Lebanon’s HDI value increased from 0.714 to 0.745, an increase of 4 percent or average annual increase of about 0.6 percent.

These are available at:

UNDP- about Lebanon: http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/countryinfo/ [accessed May 27, 2014]

and, Millennium Development Goals- Lebanon Report 2008, at:

http://www.lb.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/MDG/Publications/MDG_en.pdf [accessed May 27, 2014]

 

[26] James R. Clapper , Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014.

[27] the orphanage is one of the Sunni institutions.

[28] In an interview with the battalion’s commander, Raad Hammadi, who claimed responsibility for the rockets fired on the Lebanese region of Hermel. Hammadi, spoke about a “war that has no red lines,”, available at:

http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/al-akhbar-qalamoun-our-war-has-no-red-lines [accessed May 15, 2014]

[29] Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN special envoy to the Middle East, told reporters after briefing the 15-member UN Security Council about events in Lebanon:

Arms flowing' between Lebanon and Syria, Al- Jazeera English,  09 May 2012 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/201259075266543.html [accessed May 27, 2014]

[30] Lebanon stops ship with Syria-bound weapons, Al- Jazeera English, 28 April 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/04/201242813737244536.html [accessed May 27, 2014]

[31] Report: Lebanon: economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict, World Bank, September 2013, available at:

http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/LBN-ESIA%20of%20Syrian%20Conflict-%20EX%20SUMMARY%20ENGLISH.pdf [accessed May 15, 2014]

[32] UNHCR chief Antonio Guterres  statement, quoted in: The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon passes the 1 million mark, UNHCR website, News Stories, 3 April 2014 http://www.unhcr.org/533c1d5b9.html[accessed May 15, 2014].

[33] UNRWA - where we work, available at:

http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon

[34] UNRWA- Facts and figures: 63% OF PALESTINE REFUGEES FROM SYRIA HAVE BEEN DISPLACED, available at:

http://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis [ accessed June 15, 2014]

[35] for example: Ersal province, has 40,000 Lebanese inhabitants, hosts 120, 000 Syrian refugee.

Data available at UNHCR website:

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122 [ accessed May 12, 2014]

[36] UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon, Ross Mountain, draws parallels with other countries to give a sense of the overwhelming burden this refugee population is placing upon the country. He says the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon is equivalent to 18 million Mexicans coming into the South of the United States over 18 months or 16 million refugees crossing into France.

[37] Rachid Derbes, Minister of social affairs, Media interview on June 14,2014.

[38] On September 2013, at the request of the Government of Lebanon, the World Bank, in collaboration with the

UN, the EU, and the IMF, has undertaken a rapid Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)

of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon for the 2012-2014 period.

[39] All the statistics in the parts ( d, e, f, g), are cited from the world bank assessment, unless otherwise mentioned.

[40] Equity in humanitarian action: Reaching the most vulnerable localities in Lebanon,  UNICEF, UNHCR, Republic of Lebanon Presidency of the Council of Ministers, October 2013.

[41] Oxfam/BRIC/ LCSR, Survey on the livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, November 2013, pp.40- 41.

[42] Soha Shamas, Unlicensed Syrian businesses Target of Ministry Plan, Al Akhbar, November 7, 2013.

[43]"The competition is harsh and illegal," explains head of the Zahle Chamber of Commerce Elie Chalhoub. "Syrian shop owners are smuggling raw materials and goods at a very cheap price from Syria, in addition to employing cheap Syrian labor. Most of them do not pay taxes or electricity and municipal bills."

 Lebanon: Unlicensed Syrian Businesses Target of Ministry Plan:

http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17542 [accessed May 6,2014].

[44] International Rescue Committee, Reaching the Breaking Point: An IRC briefing note on Syrian refugees in Lebanon, June 2013.

[45] International Rescue Committee/Save the Children, Livelihood Assessment- Syrian Refugees in Lebanon- Bekaa Valley and North Governorates, Lebanon, October 2012.

[46] IDAL – Investment Development Authority of Lebanon. www.idal.com.lb

Full-time family farm operators account for 81% of the total number of farm operators in Baalbek-Hermel, 75% of farm operators in the rest of the Bekaa and 40% of farm operators in Akkar, according to MOA/FAO 2010 Census Data: Agricultural Census - Report, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agricultural Organization, 2010.

[47] International Rescue Committee/Save the Children, Livelihood Assessment- Syrian Refugees in Lebanon- Bekaa Valley and North Governorates, October 2012.

[48] Sibylle Stamm, Conflict Dimensions of International Assistance to Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: A Discussion Paper, KOFF/SwissPeace, April 2013, p.5.

[49] Many papers and articles are quoted in: Laura Ralston, Giving Cash Unconditionally in Fragile States, World bank blog, 27 Feb. 2014, available at:

http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/pushing-envelope [accessed May 26, 2014]

[50] Christopher Blattman and Paul Niehaus, Show Them the Money: Why Giving Cash Helps Alleviate Poverty, in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014.

[51] for example:

Report: If You Give the Poor Cash, Does it Help?,  from Evidence to policy, World Bank, June 2013, available at:

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHDOFFICE/Resources/5485648-1332253705502/Evidence2Policy-Uganda.pdf[accessed May 6, 2014].

[52] Some of them:

Blattman, Christopher and Fiala, Nathan and Martinez, Sebastian, Generating Skilled Self-Employment in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from Uganda, November 14, 2013, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2268552. [accessed May 26, 2014].

Chris Blattman: Dear governments: Want to help the poor and transform your economy? Give people cash. at:

http://chrisblattman.com/2013/05/23/dear-governments-want-to-help-the-poor-and-transform-your-economy-give-people-cash/ [accessed May 26, 2014].

and: GiveDirectly Organization: http://www.givedirectly.org/

[53] Good Practices for Urban Refugees, Database For Professionals Working With Urban Refugees, available at:

http://www.urbangoodpractices.org/pages/view/good-practice-examples [accessed May 26, 2014].

[54] UNHCR, Cash assistance update- Lebanon, April 2014.

[55] The UN refugee agency cash assistance program utilizing ATM cards expanded to serve 30,000 families of Syrian refugees after the completion of a pilot program for 200 families in northern Lebanon. The program is aimed at benefitting the most vulnerable refugees registered with UNHCR and the money allowance will help them pay for daily living costs, including food, rent, transport, fuel and clothing, and thus become more self-sufficient. 66,176 registered refugee households with cash ATM cards for Winterization and Hygiene and Baby Kits assistance:

http://www.unrefugees.org/site/c.lfIQKSOwFqG/b.8558151/k.7D31/UNHCR_to_help_30000_Syrian_refugees_through_ATM_cash_program.htm [accessed June 6, 2014]

And:

UNHCR, Cash Assistance Update, Lebanon, April 2014.

[56] Sibylle Stamm, Conflict Dimensions of International Assistance to Refugees from Syria in Lebanon: A Discussion Paper, op. cit, p. 7.

[57] ibid, p.

[58] The official value of the coupons is $27 during the summer, and $31 during winter as caloric needs are much higher.

[59] For example: official numbers -collected by the author of this paper-  listed the number of Syrians crossing the borders in July 2013 were about 15000 / day as follows: Masnaa: 7500 arrivals to Lebanon vs. 7050 departures - Aboudiyeh: 1670 arrivals vs. 1500 departures - Arida 778 arrivals vs. 1441 departures. These percentages are higher during holy vacations, where the refugees go to spend the holidays with their relatives and come back.

[60] Lysandra Ohrstrom, WFP cracking down on misuse in U.N. food voucher program, The Daily Star, June 22, 2013. 

[61] Rabih Haber, How can Lebanon cope with the influx of Syrian refugees", speech delivered in a seminar held at Issam Fares center, May 15, 2014.

[62] Motaz Hisso, The Poor Gets Poorer in Syria, Al-akhbar, August 10, 2013.:

http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/16688 [accessed June 6, 2014].

[63] Syrian employee pays his full salary to secure food monthly, Aliqtisadi – March 11, 2014

[64] Syrian Economic forum, March 13, 2014

http://www.syrianef.org/En/?p=3214 [accessed June 6, 2014].

[65] The OXFAM survey on the livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Lebanon found that The median family size is (5.1) and its composition are not too different than the typical Syrian one:

Oxfam/BRIC/ LCSR, Survey on the livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, November 2013, p.3.

[66] It has been noted that any Syrian citizen( holds Syrian ID) who applies to UNHCR has been registered as a refugee.