Netanyahu’s 2026 Doctrine

 

In a striking statement, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel is working to establish a “Hexagon of Alliances” around the Middle East. This coalition includes India, Greece, and Cyprus, alongside unnamed Arab, African, and Asian nations, aimed at countering what he termed the “emerging radical Sunni axis.” He emphasized that he would further develop this trajectory during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tel Aviv in February 2026.

These declarations undoubtedly reflect a strategic shift in Israeli political discourse; Netanyahu has transitioned from an exclusive focus on the threat posed by the Iranian-led “Shia Axis” to warning against rising regional “Sunni” powers. This suggests an Israeli desire to neutralize any force capable of balancing Israeli hegemony over the region.

Intellectual Roots: Reviving the “Periphery Doctrine”

The idea of building alliances beyond the immediate Arab environment is not new to Israeli strategic thought. Its roots trace back to the “Periphery Doctrine” formulated by Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, in the 1950s. This doctrine was based on breaking the Arab encirclement by establishing alliances with non-Arab states on the region’s fringes to counter Arab weight and dismantle geopolitical isolation.

Today, Netanyahu appears to be reviving this philosophy but in a more ambitious form. Rather than merely seeking allies on the periphery, he seeks to re-engineer the center of gravity itself, positioning Israel as the central link between multiple regions extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to South Asia.

The Components of the “Emerging Sunni Axis”

According to the Israeli perspective, the upcoming confrontation—following the weakening of the Shia axis—will be with states forming the core of what Netanyahu calls the “Emerging Radical Sunni Axis,” specifically referring to the following regional powers:

1. Turkey: Ankara is viewed as a rising regional Sunni power whose influence has significantly increased following the collapse of the previous Syrian regime. Former officials have warned that “Turkey is the new Iran,” suggesting that a new regional threat is taking shape from Ankara, aimed at imposing an alternative hegemony across the region.

2. Egypt: In a notable shift, Netanyahu warned during a closed Knesset session in February 2026 that “the Egyptian army is gaining strength, and we must monitor it closely.” This reflects a transition from a “cold peace” to “strategic apprehension,” particularly in light of the Turkish-Egyptian military rapprochement, which Tel Aviv has described as the “Sunni axis raising its head.”

3. Saudi Arabia: Despite normalization tracks, Netanyahu attacked what he perceived as a “change” in the Kingdom’s regional positions in January 2026, specifically its insistence on a two-state solution and its rapprochement with Turkey. He asserted that those seeking peace with Israel should not join entities that strip Israel of its legitimacy.

The Geo-Economic Dimension: The IMEC Corridor

This Israeli project of confrontation is not solely security-based; it is also grounded in geo-economic calculations. Israel seeks to position itself as a strategic transit hub between Asia and Europe, capitalizing on shifts in global supply chains.

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) serves as the structural backbone of this orientation, connecting India to Europe via the Gulf and Israel. This grants Tel Aviv a pivotal role in global trade and energy movement. It also intersects with Eastern Mediterranean arrangements, in which Israel is enhancing cooperation with Greece and Cyprus to transform the region into a hub for energy and logistics.

Conclusion

The “Hexagon of Alliances” is not merely a political or security pact, but a strategic repositioning project aimed at transforming Israel into a logistical gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. However, the success of this project remains contingent on Israel’s ability to convince Washington of the necessity to confront the rising “Sunni Axis” in the vacuum left by the confrontation with the Shia Axis.

On the Brink: Between the American Merchant's Mindset and the Iranian Bazaarist

Coinciding with U.S.-Iranian negotiations, Hebrew and American media are abuzz with threats of military action against Iran. This follows President Donald Trump’s imposition of a strict, multi-day deadline to sign an agreement—or face the consequences.

These threats and military mobilizations, synchronized with diplomatic talks, present a unique confrontation: the “real estate mogul” mindset of President Donald Trump clashing with the “Bazaar culture” deeply rooted in Iranian foreign policy. In this context, the American military buildup serves as a “negotiating” tool used by Trump to extract painful concessions that he believes Iran would only grant under the shadow of an existential threat.

The current negotiations reflect a struggle of wills between two schools of diplomacy: the culture of the “Bazaar” versus the culture of the “Real Estate Dealer.” While both share a “utilitarian pragmatism,” they diverge fundamentally in their definitions of “value,” units of time, and tactical maneuvers. They can be compared as follows:

I. The Philosophy of Time and Negotiation Management

While the Real Estate Dealer views time as a “cost”—where stagnation represents capital erosion and lost potential profits—the Bazaar Negotiator employs a strategy of “long-term endurance.” In the Bazaar, patience is an instrument of attrition; time shifts from an economic burden to a strategic pressure point used to force the opponent into concessions, breaking the deadlock.

For instance, President Trump has set a definitive deadline of 10 to 15 days to reach a final agreement, threatening a “precise and shocking” military operation if the date passes. Trump views the high alert status of American fleets in the Gulf (such as the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald Ford) as a massive operational and political cost that cannot be sustained without “closing” a profitable deal. To him, every passing day without a signature is a “loss” that allows Iran to repair its fractured economy or absorb domestic pressure. Thus, he pushes for a swift resolution to convert “military investment” into “political profit” before pivoting to other international battles.

Instead of yielding, Tehran deliberately raises its “market value” through calculated escalatory steps, such as naval maneuvers, transforming military threats into a means of increasing the price of “de-escalation.” In the Bazaar, offering “calm” is a precious commodity granted only in exchange for sovereign economic concessions, such as the comprehensive lifting of sanctions.

However, the “long-term endurance” strategy currently carries significant risks. Excessive stalling—specifically with Trump—could turn time into a factor of internal exhaustion due to the “maximum sanctions” policy. Furthermore, prolonging negotiations might drive Trump to pursue the military option, especially under Israeli pressure, echoing the events of the first round of negotiations, which culminated in the June 2025 war.

II. “Hostile Takeover” vs. “Piece-by-Piece Sale”

Trump seeks a “hostile takeover” to impose a total surrender on Iran, leveraging economic pressure and domestic protests to force a comprehensive agreement that resolves all outstanding issues at once. This mindset prioritizes a final, decisive outcome.

On the other side, Iran rejects the “grand bargain” and adheres to “fragmented bartering.” For the Iranian negotiator, selling all “cards” at once means losing future maneuverability. Consequently, the Bazaar merchant offers tactical concessions (e.g., a temporary suspension of certain centrifuges) in exchange for corresponding tactical gains, while keeping strategic “power assets” off the final negotiating table.

III. Divergent Tactics and Perceptions of Outcome

The Real Estate Dealer mindset relies on “improving existing assets” to drive up their price. Conversely, Bazaar culture employs “brinkmanship,” using crises to create “negotiating value” out of nothing, then bartering a retreat from these escalatory steps for tangible political or economic gains.

While the Dealer requires “conditional transparency” to lead to a binding final contract, the Bazaar negotiator uses “constructive ambiguity.” This ambiguity provides the space to maneuver between ideological constants and pragmatic necessities. This contrast also extends to the role of mediators. At the same time, the Dealer views them as mere “brokers” whose technical job is to bring the highest bid, the Bazaar culture transforms them into “multiple channels” to foster diplomatic competition, preventing any single party from monopolizing the mediation process.

The fundamental difference also lies in each party's ultimate objective. While the Real Estate Dealer seeks a profitable and final “exit strategy,” the Bazaarist fights for a “strategy of continuity.” A merchant might sell a property and exit the market if conditions deteriorate, but the Bazaar negotiator never leaves his “shop”; he rearranges the goods on the shelves, changes the storefront display, and invests in stagnation as a survival mechanism—transforming material weakness into rigid negotiating power.

Conclusion

The essence of the current conflict is a clash between the “logic of the result” (Trump) and the “logic of the process” (Iran). The merchant wants to return with a final “title deed” to declare a swift political victory. At the same time, the Bazaarist uses negotiations to preserve the state, neutralize the military option, and reach an “arrangement” that grants time to repair the domestic front and improve the economic situation.

Ultimately, to achieve an appropriate outcome and avoid war, the negotiating scene remains dependent on the ability of both parties to find a “balance point”: where the merchant accepts a long-term “lease” for stability instead of a full “title deed,” and the Bazaarist is convinced that the price of keeping the “shop” occasionally requires sacrificing some “precious wares

The U.S. Withdrawal from Syria: From "Costly Deployment" to "Contractual Security"

 

The United States military has announced its withdrawal from its most critical military bases in Syria, namely the Al-Tanf and Al-Shaddadi garrisons. These two sites represent the cornerstone of the American military footprint in the country. The Al-Tanf base, situated at the Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian border tri-point, serves as a vital hub for monitoring and controlling the Syrian-Iraqi border and the vast Syrian Desert.

Meanwhile, the Al-Shaddadi base, which links the Al-Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor governorates, has functioned since 2016 as a primary center for Global Coalition operations against ISIS. It has also been a crucial node for coordinating military and intelligence support among other American bases across northern and eastern Syria.

With the withdrawal from these bases and the declared intent for a total military exit, Syria enters an entirely new phase, marking the end of a decade of U.S. military presence. This withdrawal can be analyzed through the following strategic frameworks:

I. The Shift Toward "Offshore Balancing"

Many American strategists have long urged U.S. administrations to adopt the principle of "Offshore Balancing." This doctrine involves delegating regional security to local allies who manage security tasks. At the same time, the U.S. intervenes only if an ally fails or if a strategic vacuum emerges that a major rival power seeks to exploit.

In practice, the current administration is applying this principle in Syria by increasing reliance on local partners. This aligns with the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Strategy, both of which emphasize that allies must take full responsibility for their own security and burden-sharing. Consequently, following Syria's official joining of the Global Coalition against ISIS last November, the Pentagon's classification of the central Syrian state has shifted from "adversary" to a "functional partner" capable of undertaking counter-terrorism efforts independently, thereby reducing the American burden. The Trump administration views a permanent military presence in Syria as a drain on resources without a proportionate strategic return.

II. The Absence of Utility

Since its establishment, the Al-Tanf base has served as a pivot point to sever the "land bridge" stretching from Tehran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, and to monitor the movements of "Axis of Resistance" groups across the Syrian Desert. Currently, following the collapse of the previous Syrian regime and the disruption of this land corridor, the continued maintenance of the base has become an unnecessary security liability.

According to U.S. assessments, maintaining forces at isolated bases no longer serves as a deterrent; instead, they have become "soft targets" that give adversaries free leverage. Under this perspective, the existence of Al-Tanf near Iraq—amid regional tensions and Iranian threats to target U.S. regional bases—represents a costly strategic and security burden.

As a result, the physical presence of vulnerable military bases is being replaced by "Over-the-Horizon" (OTH) oversight. This entails the use of surveillance protocols and rapid aerial intervention capabilities launched from "anchor" bases in Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan.

III. Focusing on "Great Power Competition"

This withdrawal is consistent with the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Strategy, which prioritize the Indo-Pacific region. These strategies recalibrate the hierarchy of threats to U.S. national security, focusing primarily on domestic security and regional stability within the Western Hemisphere.

From the current American strategic perspective, regional crises in the Middle East should be managed through a "regional balance of power" involving Turkey, Israel, and Arab states, while maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). This transition allows the Pentagon to redirect resources toward more vital international theaters.

Conclusion

The American withdrawal from Syrian bases—preceded by the handover of bases in Iraq to national armies—is part of a "conditioned and organized transition." It reorganizes the U.S. military posture from a "costly deployment" on the ground to a "strategic presence" that is less expensive and yields higher regional returns.

Given that Syria is entering the sphere of direct American influence for the first time in its modern history, the United States now possesses the capacity to influence, monitor, and intervene when necessary without requiring permanent military bases inside the country.

Ultimately, the U.S. is concluding the phase of direct military investment in the Syrian geography, moving toward strategic employment based on the concept of "Contractual Security"—a shift that mitigates burdens and serves as a core pillar of the Trump doctrine in his second term.

Revolutionary Pragmatism: The Iranian Negotiating Behavior

 

The anticipated Istanbul negotiations between Iran and the United States are set to commence this week, with several regional powers attending as observers. Both primary parties, along with many regional states, seek to find common ground to spare the Middle East from a U.S. war on Iran or a regional conflict—a scenario recently threatened by the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

To understand the prospects of this negotiating round, one must analyze the deep structural nature of Iranian decision-making. This process transcends simplistic ideological labels that depict Iranian logic as merely “revolutionary hardline” or the so-called policy of “slaughter with a piece of cotton” (a metaphor for winning by incremental attrition).

I. The Dialectic of the Hedgehog and the Fox

In his famous essay, The Hedgehog and the Fox, philosopher Isaiah Berlin—referencing Tolstoy’s view of history—noted: “The hedgehog relates everything to a single central vision... a single, universal, organizing principle... while the fox knows many things, pursues many ends, and focuses on the diversity of things.”

In formulating a state’s Grand Strategy, this suggests that some actors focus on a central ideological goal (the Hedgehog). In contrast, others display tactical flexibility and a readiness to follow various pragmatic paths (the Fox).

Regarding Iranian strategic culture, the conservatives and the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) can be seen as embodying the “Hedgehog” persona. Conversely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and certain reformist or centrist presidents (such as Rouhani or Pezeshkian) represent the more pragmatic “Fox” elements. These actors encourage diplomatic engagement with the international community to ease sanctions, prioritizing economic survival and diplomatic normalization over ideological rigidity.

The dynamic oscillation between these two approaches explains the Iranian strategic decision-making process. Iranian Grand Strategy often achieves its highest efficacy when it balances these two or “embraces contradictions,” particularly when roles are divided between these two modes. Analyzing Iranian strategy requires identifying which pattern is dominant at a specific time or within a particular policy sphere.

II. Bazaar Diplomacy

An objective reading of Iranian diplomatic history proves that the state’s political persona is not driven by “hostility for the sake of hostility.” Zero-sum equations are not the primary driver; instead, Tehran adopts a “Rational Choice” model that calculates costs and benefits in pursuit of relative gains.

Here, what Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi describes as “Bazaar Culture” emerges as a structural pillar of negotiating behavior. This political culture rejects absolute rupture and believes that any conflict can be transformed into a potential “deal.” From this perspective, the Iranian decision-maker seeks strategic gains from all international interactions; hostility and negotiation are not opposites, but rather two tools in a “Grand Bargain” aimed at reducing costs and avoiding exhaustion.

Consequently, calculated escalation, strategic alliances, or even a policy of “disassociation” are employed as negotiating tactics to raise the “market value” of the Iranian political position before reaching a final equilibrium point. In Istanbul, the “Diplomatic Fox” will likely lead the Bazaar culture at the table, practicing the art of bargaining to maximize gains. At the same time, the “Sovereign Hedgehog” remains steadfast in the background as a safety valve, ensuring the negotiator does not cross strategic “red lines.”

III. Revolutionary Pragmatism

The Iranian system operates internationally on the basis of “Revolutionary Pragmatism”—the ability to align long-term ideological goals with immediate material constraints. Driven by the “Rationality of Survival,” the regime does not adopt suicidal policies; rather, it possesses enough flexibility to offer functional concessions, provided they remain under the “ceiling of constants.”

The limits of Iranian maneuvering in Istanbul can be understood as follows:

• Systematic Concession: Accepting negotiations on enrichment levels or technical monitoring may be classified internally as “tactical flexibility” to protect the state structure from economic or military collapse.

• Rejection of Surrender: Tehran views any concession that transcends national sovereignty or leads to the dismantling of elements of power (such as the missile program) as a path to surrender. In Iranian strategic thought, surrender is a suicidal act leading to the loss of domestic legitimacy and external deterrence.

• Red Lines: The loss of conventional military power or “normalization with Israel” remains outside the Iranian cost-benefit calculation, as it represents the suicide of the political identity upon which the regime is founded and a direct threat to the national security system.

Conclusion

Iranian behavior in Istanbul will be governed by a precise equation: preserving the regime’s security and avoiding a comprehensive military confrontation, without sliding into concessions that compromise strategic constants. Tehran recognizes that surrender is the shortest path toward collapse and the loss of domestic and regional legitimacy.

However, the efficacy of the Iranian “Bazaar Culture” remains contingent on the presence of an American “buyer” with the strategic desire to strike a deal. The success of the Istanbul talks depends on the Trump administration’s conviction to replace the “total undermining” option with the principle of “relative gain.” This will determine whether the United States enters the bazaar with the mindset of a merchant seeking a sustainable agreement or that of a besieger who accepts nothing less than total dismantling.

Iran: The Limits of Reliance on Russian-Chinese Support

 

The anticipated negotiations between the United States and Iran are taking place amidst a clear intersection between the diplomatic track—seeking a resolution—and the continued escalation of confrontational signals, with military options remaining firmly on the table.

Many observers suggest that the decision to return to the negotiating table resulted from a combination of overlapping factors. These include U.S. and Israeli intelligence reports indicating an inability to topple the regime—especially after the cessation of domestic protests—and a lack of regional appetite for war (except Israel). Additionally, the announcement of joint naval maneuvers between Iran, Russia, and China in the northern Indian Ocean, before their postponement to mid-February 2026, carried significance far beyond procedural logistics. The postponement itself reflected a “dual message”: providing a window for diplomacy while maintaining the threat of a “military alignment” should negotiations fail.

In parallel, unconfirmed reports circulated about the arrival of Chinese and Russian military transport aircraft in Iran, carrying equipment, though no official confirmation or denial was issued. The mere widespread circulation of such information bolstered the impression that Iran is not entirely isolated in the face of military pressure. It further suggested that Tehran may have refurbished its military capabilities and could deliver strategic surprises in the event of a conflict—surprises that could exceed those of the June 2025 war.

Consequently, the question of Russian and Chinese positions regarding any war aimed at regime change in Iran is often framed within two contradictory approaches:

• The First Approach: Exaggerates the importance of Russian-Chinese support, considering any U.S.-Israeli war for regime change a strategic “red line” that Moscow and Beijing would not permit to be crossed.

• The Second Approach: Downplays these positions, arguing that Moscow and Beijing will continue to adopt a policy of neutrality while the United States strikes their allies and diminishes their influence in vital regions.

However, a more accurate objective reading requires a realistic approach to the behavior of both powers. This view sees Iran as a pivotal state, yet not a decisive one in shaping its global influence. Thus, potential Russian-Chinese support is likely to be substantial and precisely calculated, rather than an open-ended existential commitment.

I. Iran in Russian Calculations

For Russia, Iran derives its importance primarily from its geographical location rather than being a “strategic ally” in the classical sense; historical relations between the two have long been marred by suspicion, mistrust, and quiet competition.

Iran serves as a primary conduit for circumventing Western restrictions on Russian trade and energy, particularly via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links Russia to the Indian Ocean. However, from Moscow’s perspective, this importance remains functional and strategic rather than existential. Russia possesses other alternatives, albeit less efficient or more costly, whether through the Arctic, Central Asia, or the Pacific.

Therefore, the Russians seek to prevent chaos and assist Iran in achieving stability and repelling external aggression. This stems from their vital interest in maintaining the INSTC and preventing the United States from employing a policy of “incremental attrition” of allies, which might eventually clear a path to the Russian heartland itself.

II. Iran in Chinese Strategy

In the Chinese approach, Iran appears as part of a broader network of corridors and relations that Beijing utilizes to extend its economic influence.

China views Iran as a significant energy supplier and a useful geographic node within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At the same time, however, it avoids transforming this relationship into a defensive alliance that could lead to a direct confrontation with the United States. China typically adopts a risk-distribution policy, ensuring its strategic projects are not tied to the fate of a single state suffering from chronic sanctions and pressure. It measures its policies and alliances based on the principle of “utility.”

Hence, China’s rejection of a war for regime change in Iran does not stem from ideological commitment as much as it does from the fear of destabilizing a region vital to global trade, disrupting energy supply chains, and the concern over establishing a precedent for unilateral military intervention that might threaten its interests in the future.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the interests of Russia and China align with Iran in rejecting a war scenario and advocating negotiations to resolve the crisis. However, this intersection does not imply a readiness to engage in a direct confrontation with the United States in defense of Iran, nor does it mean the provision of ironclad security and defense commitments.

The Iranian decision-maker undoubtedly recognizes this equation, treating Russian and Chinese support not as a “rescue umbrella,” but as a diplomatic and logistical pressure factor that helps secure a degree of balance against the Western-American-Israeli alignment.