Following the assassination of Hezbollah leader Mr. Haitham al-Tabtabai by Israel, the current landscape in Lebanon has grown increasingly complex. Lebanon faces an Israeli strategy aimed at provoking a comprehensive confrontation amid a lack of a balance of power and the Israeli right’s desire, led by Netanyahu, to sustain regional escalation at least until the upcoming Israeli elections in the autumn of 2026.
Currently, Israel possesses what is termed “Escalation Dominance.” This implies that it is the stronger party, capable of demonstrating a superior ability to increase the intensity or scope of the conflict to a level the adversary cannot match or chooses to avoid. Israel holds the upper hand in military force, allowing it to raise the escalation level and inflict significant losses on Lebanon even without transitioning to a full-scale war. Consequently, its current preferred course is to exercise an escalatory strategy that exerts immense pressure on the Lebanese people, reminiscent of the events of September 23, 2024—a day of unprecedented intensity even for those who have witnessed Israeli military operations in Lebanon since 1978.
The Revival of the Jabotinsky Doctrine
Israel is currently returning to the Jabotinsky “Iron Wall” doctrine. Metaphorically, this suggests that Israel must be surrounded by a wall of solid iron—meaning it must possess overwhelming military might such that anyone attempting to resist it “hits their head against the iron wall” and fails. This power serves a psychological and media function, aiming to instill the conviction that “Israel is invincible,” thereby suggesting that regional actors must acquiesce to its demands due to an inability to alter the reality or achieve a military victory.
On this basis, Israel’s current movements follow a clear threefold strategy:
Provoking Lebanon into a Wide-Scale Confrontation: To re-impose a new “balance of power” that renders Lebanon similar to the West Bank or Southern Syria—where Israel can intervene at will, seize geography, and establish buffer zones.
Undermining Arab-Regional Tracks: Sabotaging efforts seeking negotiation and a ceasefire, as the priority for the Israeli leadership remains the continuation of conflict and tension at least until the Israeli elections next year.
Attempting to Expose Hezbollah as Vulnerable:
Conducting “qualitative” or “calculated” operations is intended to suggest that Israel can penetrate deep into the security infrastructure.
Attempting to change the “rules of the game” entirely, not just by containing weaponry, but by imposing limits on its role and messaging its perceived futility.
Portraying the movement as incapable of sowing doubt within its constituency. However, experience suggests that this base is well aware of the nature of the confrontation and the scale of past sacrifices. Furthermore, any public frustration in Lebanon over the lack of response is fundamentally a national grievance over the violation of sovereignty, rather than specific discontent with the movement’s tactical decisions.
Two Complex Scenarios
This reality places Lebanon before a difficult equation consisting of two scenarios:
Scenario I: Responding to Daily Attacks: This would provide what is known as a “Casus Belli” (justification for war), enabling a massive escalation that reshuffles the cards and grants “legitimacy” to widespread bombardment in Lebanon.
Scenario II: Non-Response: This allows Israel to pursue a “gradual escalation,” particularly through daily field operations and a policy of incremental attrition under the threshold of full-scale war.
Conclusion
Lebanon is currently dealing with a clear attempt to be drawn into an all-out war—a conflict it cannot easily navigate given the absence of a balance of power, the erosion of deterrence, and the American “green light” enjoyed by Israel in its unrestricted movements across Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Since such a war would lead to the widespread destruction sought by Israeli hawks, self-restraint emerges as a strategic choice par excellence.
In this instance, one may recall Sun Tzu’s maxim: “He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot, will be victorious.” Lebanon must avoid sliding into a confrontation at an inopportune time, especially amid talk of Arab initiatives that might compel the United States to pressure Israel to halt its attacks and proceed with negotiations to implement the ceasefire agreement signed in November 2024.
